Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

170. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

• The Berlin Negotiations: The Past Several Weeks

There has been no positive movement in the Berlin negotiations since the first of the new year. But, there has been activity, especially on the Soviet side.

During this period, the Soviets have been active diplomatically: in the first half of January, Zorin saw Schumann in Paris, Gromyko met with Seydoux and with Ambassador Beam,² and in Washington, Dobrynin saw Hillenbrand just prior to his Moscow visit.³ Last week Schroeder met with both Kosygin and Gromyko. The thrust of the Soviet line in all these conversations was a combination of almost injured innocence (we really thought you wanted an agreement, but now we are disillusioned) and tough talk. As always, the Soviets bore down hardest on the question of Federal presence, and trumpeted their December 10 access proposals⁴ as major concessions.

In Berlin, the Soviets continued their diplomatic activity. Abrasimov took the initiative in arranging a private dinner with Ambassador Rush on January 18,⁵ and Abrasimov tried unsuccessfully to meet in secret with Mayor Schuetz. Abrasimov is now trying to arrange another dinner meeting with Rush just prior to the next Ambassadorial meeting (February 8) (cf. my memo on Rush Log No. 25489).⁶ But, Soviet activity in Berlin has not been confined to the diplomatic: in midmonth there was the harassment of Allied military vehicles over documentation (which the Soviets now explain away as a minor misunderstanding) and at this moment the blockage of civilian traffic continues (a result of the provocation presented by the FDP meetings in Berlin).

Four Power Talks

There have been two negotiating sessions this month, an advisers meeting on January 13, and an Ambassadorial meeting on January 19. (The reporting cables of these and the Rush–Abrasimov dinner of the 18th, are at Tabs A, B, and C.)⁷ Neither side offered new proposals. The following points came up during these meetings.

Access. On the matter of the general principles (the Soviet commitment) for access, there were slight signs of progress. The Western side still insisted on a Four Power guarantee, without qualification, containing the principle of unhindered access on a preferential basis based on the concept of identification without control. The Soviets have made it clear that they cannot accept a Four Power role in access matters, though they are prepared to make a unilateral statement (as they proposed in December) endorsing unhindered and preferential access for peaceful or civilian traffic. (Comment: we will probably soon come under pressure to abandon our insistence on a Four Power access commitment, and to come around to accepting a Soviet unilateral statement [which will note consultations with the GDR].⁸ But this would not seem to be any great loss for us, particularly if we remain firm in insisting now on the need for the Four to commit themselves in some fashion to the implementation of the entire agreement, including the inner-German agreements.)

The concrete problem which developed on the access issue relates to the “practical improvements,” and whether they in fact are improvements. The Soviet proposals of December offered some appeal because they contained provisions for express passenger trains and sealed cargo trains, etc. However, at the advisers meeting on January 13, the Soviets added their definition to their earlier proposals. The Soviets revealed, for example, that the seals would be placed on the trains after they had entered the GDR and had submitted to control. From the Western viewpoint the December access proposals became so diluted of content as to become little more than confirmation of existing procedures. From the Soviet viewpoint, as Abrasimov said on January 19, the proposals would provide some greater efficiency and speed by reducing the number of physical checks required for a large proportion of the civilian access. He made it clear that he never intended to suggest any sort of procedure that would allow for access free of GDR control.

In defending the Soviet position at the advisers meeting, the Soviet representative implied that the value for the West in the Soviet proposal was that it would, in effect, codify the existing procedures and in that way would prevent further deterioration in them. Abrasimov did not pick up this line at the Ambassadorial meeting which followed, but it does seem to represent the Soviet view of the negotiations as a whole. Whereas the Western side expected to proceed in the negotiations on the basis of the status quo, the Soviets have raised the ante, and are proceeding from the position that matters can be expected to get worse unless the West is willing to conclude an agreement now. The rather severe series of civilian autobahn blockages in the past two months have had as their “provocations” a level of Federal activity in Berlin which has continued for almost two decades without little more than minor oral protests from the East.

Federal Presence. The Western side offered no new proposals on this issue, although Ambassador Rush did indicate that the West would make clarifications through limitations on that presence. He also made the point that there also had to be explicit understandings to assure the continuation of approved (by the Three) activities without difficulties in the future—i.e., positive acceptance by the Soviets of Bonn-Berlin ties, as opposed to the drawing up of only a prohibited list. The Soviets were obviously displeased. Abrasimov said there could be no movement in the talks until the West explained exactly what it would do about ending Fraktionen and committee meetings, and eliminating the activities of FRG agencies, departments and institutions as well as neo-fascist and other hostile activities.

The Soviets have given the impression that they are prepared to make some concessions on access, Berlin’s representation abroad, and inner-Berlin movement—but that they absolutely will not budge, or reveal their concessions, until the West offers something more on Federal presence. The fact is, however, that the West has at least orally passed to the Soviets the full extent of our position on Federal presence—at least the maximum which the FRG has for the moment sanctioned.

It is possible that the Soviets can be brought to accept some cosmetic changes in the character of Federal agencies and institutions already existing in Berlin—though in the last session the Soviets continued insisting that these agencies had to be eliminated (even the Federal court in Berlin). Federal political meetings and Bundestag groups are the most difficult issue. The Soviets have repeatedly said that political presence is the core of the problem and must be eliminated; the FRG says that political involvement between Bonn and Berlin is essential to preserve the viability (read financing) of Berlin. There seems nevertheless to be some more water that can be squeezed from the German position—and the Soviets probably know this. Thus, until the FRG is prepared to come forward with a greater scaling down of Federal presence, there can be little hope of getting the Soviets to reveal more of their position. The point at which a reduction in Federal presence genuinely impairs West Berlin’s viability must be determined in the first instance by the Germans. For the Allies to make suggestions in this area invites only great danger.

Draft Comprehensive Agreement

During the past month the French, UK and FRG have evidenced great interest in consolidating the Western position. The French took the lead earlier in the month by offering a complete draft agreement. Then, the day before the Ambassadorial meeting, the British and French hit Ambassador Rush hard, charging that the US was lagging and out of line with the tactics of the negotiations (not the substance). It was essential, they said, for the West to present to the Soviets a draft comprehensive agreement. (So far in the talks, the West has tabled only position papers on portions of an eventual agreement.) Also, most of the Western position on Federal presence had not yet been offered to the Soviets in a written form, but only hinted orally. To submit a written document, the British and French argued, would represent some movement, and hopefully would reduce the FRG incentive to pursue access negotiations in the course of the Bahr–Kohl talks.

As a result of these pressures, the Bonn Group prepared the text of a comprehensive agreement for submission to capitals for approval. This text is at Tab D.⁹ In general terms the text is consistent with NSDM 91¹⁰ and does not damage the Western position. (Caution: the text does not yet have governmental agreement, and we wish to make a host of changes in it before it is near readiness for presentation to the Soviets.) You may wish to look it over, even in this preliminary stage, because it does contain the general format and positions. The limitations on Federal presence are contained in Annex III, and in particular in paragraphs 3–4 of that Annex. These limitations represent the maximum FRG concession so far.

Prior to the development of this text, Bahr floated his proposal in the Bonn Group for an “interim commitment” by the Four on access (recognizing that the Soviets would probably demand an interim commitment on Federal presence). The purpose would be to permit the inner-German talks to deal with access. A Four Power communiqué would trigger the inner-German negotiations; it would simply note that a stage had been reached which allowed the two Germanys to begin their negotiations. The substance of the commitment (which would remain confidential), according to Bahr, would be that the Four or the Soviets unilaterally state that access should be unhindered and on a preferential basis (comment: no one on the Western side can or has attempted to define the terms unhindered and preferential).

It is quite possible that the Germans plan to encourage the presentation of the draft comprehensive agreement to the Soviets on the expectation that the Soviets will reject it. At that point, Bahr can offer his interim commitment proposal as the only alternative to a complex collapse of the talks. (The initial Three Power reaction to the interim commitment proposal had been generally negative.) The British and French will probably go along with the scheme at that time. In that event, the center-weight of the negotiations will shift from the Four Powers to the Bahr–Kohl level. There is little likelihood that the Four could reject whatever arrangements were agreed by the German side. (Note: you are familiar with State’s instruction¹¹ on how to handle the tabling of a composite plan which we discussed telephonically on January 28.)

On the German bilateral side, the main events have been (a) two meetings between Bahr and Kohl, (b) Schroeder’s conversations in Moscow with Kosygin and Gromyko.

Bahr–Kohl

In their meeting of January 15, the main development was that Kohl dropped his earlier refusal to talk about general transportation and traffic between the GDR and FRG, thus bringing the East German position in line with Bonn’s concept. In their second conversation on January 26, Kohl “officially” confirmed this new position, but only if Berlin traffic were also discussed. (Kohl and GDR Foreign Minister Winzer had just been in Moscow again.) Bahr continued to resist this on the grounds that a four power mandate was needed. Kohl argued that this was unnecessary since the Bundestag would approve all three agreements together—a Berlin agreement, the Soviet-German treaty, and the GDR–FRG traffic agreement. Bahr argued that a German traffic agreement would not be submitted for formal FRG ratification and Kohl replied that this would not be acceptable.

Thus these talks are deadlocked for now, though the East Germans can move into a technical discussion of intra-German traffic as a holding action. It is clear, however, that through inducements and pressures the East Germans are trying to precipitate a separate negotiation that would totally undercut the four power negotiations.

Schroeder Moscow Talks

The points made on the Soviet side by Kosygin and Gromyko contained nothing new. They argued, as expected, against German Federal presence in Berlin, and offered total assurance that if this were resolved there would be no problems with access. The interesting aspect is that Schroeder seems to have been impressed with his conversations and with Soviet concern. He told our Embassy that perhaps the activities of the FRG should be less demonstrative. A lower profile seemed in order, he said. One had the impression that Schroeder senses a Berlin agreement is probable and that this will mean the ratification of the eastern treaties. In contrast to the more vigorous and violent attacks on Ostpolitik by Kiesinger at the CDU convention, Schroeder is maintaining a reserved position on Ostpolitik. As you know, Brandt and Bahr saw Schroeder before and after his trip and are pleased with its results.

Conclusions

Without having any persuasive evidence, it nevertheless seems that the Soviets are positioning themselves to make some further concessions, either on German presence or access, after which they will push hard for inner-German negotiations—if we will make a concession on Federal presence. Certainly, the mood in Bonn, if not yet desperate, is probably tightening as the Berlin election and the Soviet Party Congress draw near. But at the same time the Berlin harassments are obviously worrying Brandt. Bahr and others seem to be maneuvering with the Soviets. Certainly the only good explanation of German willingness to table a new complete draft is to force a deadlock which will be relieved by the brokering that Bahr and Falin do without our knowledge. (Falin may assume his post as Ambassador in Bonn very soon.)

1. Source: National Security Council, Senior Review Group Files, Box 96, SRG Meeting 2–10–71, Berlin Negotiations. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Haig attached a handwritten note to the memorandum: “HAK, Art [Downey] updated this for your use on weekend,” an apparent reference to Kissinger’s meeting with Bahr on Sunday, January 31; see Document 172.
2. In a January 8 meeting with Beam, Gromyko commented briefly on the Berlin negotiations; his comments are reported in telegram 149 from Moscow, January 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
3. Dobrynin met Hillenbrand on January 6. An account of their discussion on the next phase in the Berlin talks is in telegram 2404 to Bonn, January 7. (Ibid.)
4. See Document 144.
5. In addition to the telegraphic reports cited in footnotes below, Rush reported to Kissinger by telephone on the dinner and other developments on January 19. According to a transcript of the conversation, Rush said: “[Abrasimov] to see me for dinner last night. I saw him in Sept. He came over and stayed until 2:00 and we canvassed everything. You will get a full report on that. No progress made today but he stayed after the other ambassadors left but I think they are getting edgy. If we hold our position and not let it out of hand we will get an unfreezing.” Kissinger replied: “It’s my thought and the President’s. We admire the job you are doing.” After a half-hour break, as Kissinger was called to see the President, the two men continued their conversation by telephone. Rush stated his view that Abrasimov was “under orders to make agreement but no indication today. He stayed on after the meeting this afternoon and continued to want to talk about Berlin. Quite a bit of unease on interruptions of the Autobahn. I said these jeopardize the talks themselves. I have the feeling that there’s a bit of haste in their desire to get an agreement. As I mentioned earlier if we can hold firm and not give in to those that are weak, we will do fine.” Kissinger: “You are under no pressure from us.” Rush: “I know. The worst pressures are from Bahr. Ehmke is apt to panic under pressure on this issue. Bahr has panicked and does not reflect Brandt’s feeling. The Chancellor has been in accord with what we have done. That’s it.” Kissinger: “I just talked to the President and we both admire what you are doing. I told him of your conversation. Look in when you are back.” Rush: “I will and if you want me back or want to call, do. It’s good to have you there and I am pleased to have you there. You are a source of great strength.” Kissinger: “If you say it a year from now, we have broken the back of this thing.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
6. Reference is to a January 29 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger reporting Rush’s urgent “request” for a meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VIII)
7. Attached but not printed at Tabs A, B, and C are telegrams 71, 107, and 97 from Berlin, January 13, 20, and 19, respectively. (All also ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) Attached at Tabs E, F, and G are status reports on Berlin from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, January 11, 15, and 23, respectively. (All also ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 691, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. III)
8. Brackets in the original.
9. Tab D is telegram 842 from Bonn, January 23. (Also ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) Fritz Kraemer, Kissinger’s former mentor and a senior adviser in the Pentagon, commented that a revised text of the draft agreement, transmitted in telegram 1156 from Berlin on January 30 (ibid.), was “totally inadequate.” In a comment evidently intended for Kissinger, Kraemer wrote: “You have no time to study this complex, very important document. But, please let an ‘objective’ lawyer look at it.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Berlin, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Kraemer on February 4, the day before the draft agreement was tabled in Berlin, from 2:01 to 2:40 p.m. and again from 2:46 to 2:49 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No substantive record of the discussion has been found.
10. Document 136.
11. Telegram 15262 to Bonn, January 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)