144. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Berlin Talks—Preliminary Assessment
The Four Ambassadors met in Berlin for their 12th session on December 10. The full cable traffic has not yet arrived, and we will do a detailed status report on Monday.2 However, in case questions come up before then, I thought you would want at least a brief report on and evaluation of the session.
General principles. Abrasimov produced a formulation for the general principles part of an eventual Four Power agreement (the text is at Tab A).3 The formulation is couched in extremely vague language, [Page 424] and purports to provide for agreement on three points: nonuse of force by the Four Governments “in the area of their respective responsibilities and competence”; the existing status in “that area” cannot be changed unilaterally; and avoidance of interference in the internal affairs of others or action which could violate their sovereign rights, public safety and order. The Soviet formulation is much too vague and potentially full of traps. It may thus be a very mixed blessing that the Soviets have finally, after much prodding, offered a specific written text instead of vague oral generalities.
Access. Claiming it was a major concession, Abrasimov said that the Soviets were prepared to say within the “framework” of a possible Four Power agreement that:
“transit between the FRG and West Berlin would take place in accordance with generally accepted norms and principles of international law, without interference, and on a preferential basis.”
Abrasimov said that this proposal was based on the assumption that “illegal” (by Soviet definition) FRG political activities in West Berlin would cease.
Moreover, Abrasimov added that the GDR considered it possible, if the Four Powers reached agreement on all issues, to provide for the following procedures for transit to Berlin:
- —the number of freight and passenger trains could be increased, and determined by the actual need;
- —through-express trains to Berlin could be possible, as well as sealed cargo transport (not passengers) by rail, road and water; finally,
- —certain freight documents might be eliminated.
These procedural provisions, Abrasimov said, could be contained in a written statement by the GDR, which in turn would be covered by a Soviet document. In this way, the Soviets would “join” in the undertaking.
Ambassador Rush pointed out that these proposals, while interesting, still did not meet the West’s interests since there was no real Four Power agreement on access, no commitment to avoid harassment on the access routes, and no reference to the principle of identification without control. All three Western Ambassadors agreed that the Soviet proposals were worth study, but all cautioned that the Soviet “concession” was in fact not too great.
Federal presence. As always, Abrasimov hit hard on the question of federal presence and Bonn-Berlin ties. Bundestag fraktion sessions clearly had to be eliminated, along with Bundestag committees. On the point of federal offices in Berlin, for the first time Abrasimov suggested (during a coffee break) that cosmetic changes might be sufficient—the federal offices might be identified as cultural and economic representation [Page 425] to the Senat, or liaison offices. Abrasimov also again insisted on a prohibition of neonazi activities and stricter conformity to demilitarization requirements in West Berlin. Finally, he again urged that the Three Powers state precisely that West Berlin was not a part of the FRG and not a Land of the FRG.
This last point caused some confusion when Ambassador Rush said that any arrangements relating to Bonn-Berlin relations must be balanced—it must note what is prohibited, but also some positive statements ensuring the continuation of ties. Abrasimov said that Gromyko had agreed with Rogers, Schumann and Douglas-Home that the Ambassadors were to consider only the exclusion of certain activities.
The next Ambassadorial session will be held on January 19, but advisers’ meetings will be scheduled earlier. The Three Western Ambassadors resisted Abrasimov’s repeated attempts to insert a positive note (constructive, progress, etc.) into the communiqué of the session. Both the US and the British Ambassadors opened their remarks by protesting the recent autobahn harassments, but the French Ambassador remained silent on that point.
Comment
The Soviets may well claim that their concessions are major and that they had to exert major pressure on the GDR to be able to offer them. (The concessions being (a) Soviet willingness to take some vague responsibility for access by a formula for the first time associating the USSR with the civilian access arrangements; and (b) willingness to maintain in changed form the presence of FRG administrative organs in West Berlin.)
In fact, the Soviets have given only very little, though it may be true that even that caused a major uproar with Ulbricht. Meanwhile, there remains the question of the Soviet price for what they purport to be giving. This continues to involve (a) a substantial grant of control over access to the GDR; (b) a major curtailment of the FRG’s political ties with Berlin; (c) the raising of the Senat to near-sovereign status; and (d) as yet a covered card, almost certainly an increased Soviet presence in the Western sectors.
On the basis of all of this, I do not see where serious progress has been made.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II. Secret. Urgent; sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it. According to another copy, Downey drafted the memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 10, Chronological File, 1969–75, 21 Nov.–31 Dec. 1970)↩
- No “detailed status report on Monday [December 14]” has been found. The cable traffic is as follows: telegram 1925 from Berlin, December 10, and telegrams 1929 and 1930, December 11. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)↩
- Tab A is telegram 1924 from Berlin, December 10; attached but not printed. (Also ibid.)↩