Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

172. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 4, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Egon Bahr, January 31, 1971

As a result of my discussions on Berlin with Dobrynin on January 28, I arranged a meeting with Egon Bahr on Sunday, January 31. The following are the highlights of the meeting which lasted for an hour and a half.

Bahr explained that the major issues from the Federal Republic’s point of view were:

(1) the legal access procedure,

(2) the problem of guarantees, and

(3) the legal status of federal organs in West Berlin.

On the third point the FRG was prepared to agree that:

• —no constitutional organ (the President or Parliament) could meet in Berlin,
• —the German Ministries would be made subdepartments of the Representative of the FRG in Berlin, and
• —the Three Powers could notify Bonn that Berlin was not considered part of the FRG.²

I told him about my conversations with Dobrynin and showed him the Soviet note on guarantees (covered in the separate memorandum to you on my January 28 meeting with Dobrynin).³ He said that the Chancellor had authorized him to say that the FRG would welcome with enthusiasm any bilateral Soviet-American conversations and he felt the note was quite far-reaching. It was then decided that Bahr would let me know the German position on each of the three issues—access, guarantees and status, and that I would discuss them with Dobrynin. As we made progress on these points I would give them either to Ambassador Rush to introduce into the Four-Power discussions or, alternatively, to Bahr to raise as German ideas. I explained that we would not make any move that had not been approved by the FRG.

I concluded the conversation by emphasizing that it was essential to avoid the slightest leak and that the only persons aware on our side would be you, Ambassador Rush and myself. Bahr replied that he would tell only the Chancellor. We then agreed upon a procedure for establishing a secure communication link and reviewed the steps to be taken.

A full record of the conversation is attached at Tab A.

Tab A

January 31, 1971.

Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)⁴

SUBJECT

• Conversation of Dr. Kissinger with Egon Bahr Aboard the Jet Star Going From
• Cape Kennedy to New York, January 31, 1971

The meeting proved somewhat difficult to arrange because of Foreign Office jealousies in Bonn and State Department problems here. It was therefore decided that the Vice President would invite Egon Bahr to the moon shot under the pretext that he had promised it to him on the last occasion he was down there, and that I would then pick him up and give him a ride to New York.

We spoke for an hour and a half. The conversation began with my asking Bahr in a general way how he visualized the evolution of the talks. He said they had to be speeded up. I said I had never understood that phrase. What exactly did they have in mind? Bahr recommended that we put our total program on the table for the Soviets— let the Soviets reject it, and then begin a process of bargaining. I asked Bahr what he thought the major issues were. He said the legal access procedure, the problem of guarantees, and the legal position of the federal organs in West Berlin. I asked him what he was willing to do on the latter. Bahr said, with respect to the latter, the Federal Republic was prepared to agree that no constitutional organ (that is to say, the President or the Parliament) could meet in Berlin. It was also prepared to make the German Ministries subdepartments of the Representative of the Federal Republic in Berlin. And finally, they were prepared for the Three Powers to notify Bonn that Berlin was not considered part of the Federal Republic. Now, on the other hand, it would be very difficult to prevent committees of the Bundestag from meeting there. He said he also realized that there were some issues which were more important for Germans than for Americans. For example, the question of West German passes for citizens of Berlin was a matter of great urgency for the Germans. It was not a matter of particular concern to Americans.

I then told him briefly about my conversation with Dobrynin and asked him what he thought about it. He said that he had been authorized by the Chancellor to say that the Federal Republic would welcome with enthusiasm any bilateral Soviet-American conversations. The Federal Republic had full confidence in us. I said it would not be a matter of confidence because we would make no move that had not been approved by them.

We then discussed the procedure by which we could effect it. We agreed that it should be in the following manner. Bahr would let me know the German position on three issues: (1) access procedures; (2) guarantees; and (3) Federal presence. I said that I could not possibly raise the issue of West German passports at an early meeting since this would not seem to be a plausible American proposal. As we were making progress, and if we were making progress on these three points, I would give them to Rush to introduce in the Four-Power context, while alternatively, Bahr could introduce them as German ideas. In either event, then the Germans and we would work together within the Four Powers to bring about the agreed solution. I told Bahr that total discretion was essential and that if there were the slightest leak, I would break off my contact with him as well as my contact with Dobrynin on the subject. Bahr said that he was so enthusiastic for this procedure that there would be no question about any leaks. The only person in Bonn that would be told would be the Chancellor. I told him the only persons told on our side would be the President, Rush and myself.

I then showed Bahr the Soviet proposal on guarantees. He said there were two weak points in it; namely, the phrase that “violations would be brought to the attention of the four guaranteeing powers,” and also that “they would act only in the sphere of their competence.” But he said, except for those two phrases, the text was actually more far-reaching than the Western countries were prepared to demand in the proposal slated to be put forward at the February 9 session of the Ambassadors.

I then suggested to Bahr that the Germans toughen their position on the guarantees because there was no point in having the Soviets come up with a harder formulation than we were offering to them if this channel was to have any viability. Bahr agreed to do so.⁵

We then agreed on the following procedure: (1) we would establish a secure communication link, either via the hot line between Bonn and Washington or via the existing CAS channel or via a channel yet to be determined; (2) that Bahr would let me know through this channel what the German position was on access procedures and guarantees and Federal presence; (3) that I would let him know both before and after a meeting with Dobrynin; (4) that Bahr would do the same about any conversations he had with Falin; (5) that I would let him know exactly what would be told to various people; and (6) that Ambassador Rush would be kept informed and would funnel any agreement into the Four-Power context. Bahr expressed his enthusiasm about this procedure and departed on this note.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. According to another copy, Kissinger and David Young drafted the memorandum on February 2. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 37, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Chronological File (“D” File), Feb. 1971–Jan. 1977) Butterfield stamped the memorandum indicating that the President had seen it. For their memoir accounts of the meeting, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 805–810; and Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pp. 354–356.
2. Nixon marked this point and wrote in the margin: “Doesn’t this go too far?”
3. See Document 169.
4. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information.
5. In a February 4 special channel message to Kissinger, Bahr forwarded a list of Federal institutions with offices in West Berlin and a proposed set of principles for a Berlin agreement, including formulations and clarifications on access, Federal presence, and foreign representation. Bahr also reported that he had his first substantive talk with Kohl on principles for an agreement between West and East Germany. On the basis of a “somewhat heated and polemical discussion,” Bahr concluded, however, that East Germany would still “use every further pretext for new obstructions” on traffic to Berlin. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3])