169. Editorial Note
On January 28, 1971, Assistant to the President Kissinger met Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House from 12:05 to 1:15 p.m. for a discussion of several issues, including the Berlin negotiations. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) According to the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger requested the meeting “to give Dobrynin the answers to our discussions of the previous week [January 23].” The memorandum records the conversation on Berlin:
“I told Dobrynin that the President was prepared to proceed along the line that we had discussed; that is to say, that Dobrynin and I would discuss the outstanding issues, and after some agreement in principle, move our conclusions into the Four-Power discussions on Berlin. I also told Dobrynin that I planned to speak to Bahr on an early occasion, and that we were also bringing Ambassador Rush back to make certain that he would be in on these arrangements.
“I reiterated the need for total secrecy of this channel, and that if the channel became public or was leaked to people other than those authorized to know, we would simply break it off. Dobrynin said they had always respected the privacy of this channel; moreover, it was very much in their interest to preserve its secrecy, and I could therefore be sure. He said that Falin had told Bahr that there might be a separate channel, but had not told him its nature and, except for that, no other person had been told. Dobrynin said that he thought this information would be well received in Moscow, and that he was hoping that some significant progress could be made in the next few months.”
After discussion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and negotiations in the Middle East, the conversation on Berlin continued:
“Dobrynin returned to the Berlin issue and said that the Soviet Union had attentively studied my suggestion that there had to be some guarantees. He then handed me the attached piece of paper (Tab A) which represents the strongest statement so far that the Soviet Union has made for assuming some responsibility for the outcome of an eventual West German-East German agreement. Dobrynin told me that Rush’s inflexibility had presented a peculiar problem for Abrasimov.
“Abrasimov actually has instructions to go further than he did on access procedures; however, since Rush was absolutely unyielding, he could not present them. He did not want to be in a position of seeming to keep making concessions. He therefore wondered whether Rush could offer anything at the February 9th meeting to show some move on our part to which, in turn, Abrasimov could then respond.”
At the end of the meeting, Kissinger and Dobrynin agreed to meet again after Kissinger had “prepared the ground with Bahr and Rush.” [Page 502] Kissinger would then “let Dobrynin know what the procedure would be.” Dobrynin also said he would “check in Moscow.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2])
The text of the Soviet note on Berlin (Tab A) that Dobrynin gave Kissinger during the meeting reads as follows:
“It goes without saying that the arrangement reached between the four powers on questions related to the status of West Berlin, as well as the agreements between the GDR and respectively the FRG and the Senate of West Berlin on questions of civil transit to West Berlin and therefrom, and on access for persons from West Berlin to the territory of the GDR, including its capital, are to be strictly implemented. Implementation of the arrangement on each question presupposes implementation of the arrangement on other questions.
“In those cases if facts of violation of the arrangement in this or that part thereof would take place, each of the four powers would have the right to call the attention of the other participants in the arrangement to the principles of the present settlement with the view of holding within the framework of their competence proper consultations aimed at removing the violations that took place and at bringing the situation in compliance with the arrangement.” (Ibid.)
Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation, including the attached Soviet note, to the President on February 1. (Ibid.) Both are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII.