Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

154. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires ad Interim in Germany (Fessenden) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)¹

Bonn/Bad Godesberg, December 24, 1970.

Dear Marty:

The whole affair of the Ehmke visit, Binder article, and my talk with Sahm have kicked up such a fuss that I find it impossible to try to sum it all up. The whole thing is a classic case of Bonn intrigue, and I apologize for getting involved in it. The whole mess defies summing up, so I want to give you in this letter as full a report as I can give. I am enclosing a special report [less than 1 line not declassified] which is not being sent to anybody but you.² [4 lines not declassified] I am also enclosing a memcon of my talk with Sahm on December 16, as requested by Jim.³

I only hope in this whole affair that the State Department does not get into trouble with the White House on charges that the State Department put me up to expressing my concerns to Sahm. Ehmke told me that Kissinger entertained such suspicions. The fact is that Hal Sonnenfeldt knew about my plan to have a long talk with Sahm and raised no objections. He had called me on Monday, December 14, to ask me to send in my frank views. (I sent these in, and I understand you have seen them.)⁴ The whole purpose of Hal’s call was to do what he could with his boss to get him to take a more sympathetic view on the Ost Politik.

To demonstrate that Bonn is more intrigue-ridden than ever, I now want particularly to report two conversations I had yesterday, December 23, one right after the other, with Moersch and then with Ehmke, both of whom called me in.

Moersch really startled me. He is a mild-mannered man, although getting tougher in his new job. He said he wanted to make absolutely clear that in his view and that of Scheel, Frank and Von Staden “and everyone else in the Foreign Office,” I had done exactly what I should have done in this whole affair. He said that the all-important thing was that we continue to be completely open in our relations and that they valued the fact that I had spoken openly. He put the whole blame on what he called those “political amateurs” around the Chancellor, namely Ehmke and Bahr. He said that Ehmke has gotten very nervous because of the SPD loss in recent elections. He is the bright boy who has shot up fast, becoming a professor in his early 30’s and a Minister in his early 40’s. He doesn’t know how to react to setbacks, and has lost his nerve. He is lashing wildly out in all directions. Bahr he characterized as a man with a single-minded obsession on the Ost Politik, judging every issue by how the Soviets will react, and totally unconcerned by the internal political realities in Germany. He then said that “these people” in the Chancellor’s office actually believe that I was responsible for leaking the story to Binder. Moersch says he personally knew this to be a downright lie to cover up for the real culprits in the Chancellor’s office. He knows Binder well, had dinner with him December 21, and it was clear to him that Ahlers plus others in the Chancellor’s office were behind the Binder story. Ahlers ought to be fired, Moersch said. Moersch finally said that a problem that he and Scheel have is that they can’t get to Brandt without “those men” who surround him, but they will find an early opportunity to get to him alone in order to bring home to Brandt that all of this mess was not a plot by me or the State Department, but that the trouble lies with Ehmke and Bahr. Moersch ended by saying that he hoped very much that I would forgive this messy situation and would continue to deal with them in the same open spirit as I have in the past. I thanked Moersch profusely for his comments and expression of confidence.

I then went directly to Ehmke. He was just finishing dictating his report on his Washington trip. Sahm was there but sat as a silent and uncomfortable-looking partner during the entire conversation. Ehmke began by saying that he had good talks in Washington. He said that to his surprise he had found complete harmony of views with Henry Kissinger. First, Henry had not been nearly as much concerned as he had been led to expect by the problems we are having with the Soviets around the world. He had not been negative in his judgment of the SALT talks. He certainly gave no impression of a negative overflow effect on the Berlin negotiations of our general problems with the Soviets. On the substance of the Berlin talks, there seemed to be no differences at all, except possibly that the U.S. side—here he mentioned you particularly—feel that the Germans may be asking for too much. Furthermore, at least on the principle of expediting the Berlin negotiations, there was no disagreement with Kissinger. The principle of expediting was agreed, he said, with the details to be worked out later. The standing conference idea was received with an open mind and even sympathetically by Henry Kissinger. [1½ lines not declassified] All in all, Ehmke said, Kissinger in his view seemed to be in harmony with him. He said Kissinger was very surprised to find that the concerns I had expressed about misunderstandings simply did not exist. Ehmke said that Kissinger said to him: “If there are any differences in the future, you have a telephone on your desk, just give me a ring.”

On the Binder article, I said to Ehmke that I had heard an astounding report that I or the Embassy had been responsible for leaking the story to Binder. I said that we had talked with Binder and that, like any professional newsman, he has not divulged his source specifically, but he has said enough to make it very clear to us that this story came out of the Chancellor’s office. Ehmke looked me straight in the face and said “I know whom you mean” (Ahlers). Ehmke said that he was present yesterday when that man in the presence of the Chancellor swore flatly that he had nothing to do with the story. Ehmke said this in such a way that one could deduce that he did or did not believe Ahlers.

I also told Ehmke that I assumed he knew that I had not been in any way the instigator of his trip to Washington; Sahm had raised it with me. I then told Ehmke that I had not been particularly surprised by Sahm’s reference to a possible Ehmke or Bahr trip because “word had found its way to us” several days before that the Chancellor’s office was considering such a trip because of its concerns about misunderstanding in Washington on the Ost Politik. [2 lines not declassified] Ehmke said flatly that he knew nothing of any such consideration in the Chancellor’s office beforehand, either about a trip to the U.S. or about concerns on the Ost Politik.

I tried to end up on a disarming (or tongue-in-cheek) note. I said his mission was obviously a very successful one because he had found such a fine harmony of views. In spite of the general mess of the last ten days, perhaps the overall situation today was an improvement as far as confidence between Bonn and Washington. Ehmke responded in kind, said some complimentary things about me, said there were several things in this whole affair which were unclear to him, and expressed the hope that I would not think that they held me responsible. He also said he hoped I would continue expressing openly my views at all times.

On this pleasant note we parted. Sahm tried to walk me down to the front door, I am sure to tell me how much he regretted all this and probably to add more besides. Ehmke seemed to sense that Sahm wanted to have a private word with me and rather insistently called Sahm back into his office to prevent him from accompanying me. So Sahm, looking inwardly torn, only was able to wish me Merry Christmas.

The picture I get from all this business is of a nervous Ehmke and Bahr thoroughly mistrusted by the majority of the SPD, by the Berlin Senat, by the FDP, and by the Foreign Office, to say nothing of the Opposition. Wehner is their only real support. Brandt, tired and ordered firmly by his doctor to spend three full weeks in Kenya, is just not able to cope.

My final conclusion is that political Bonn desperately needs a Christmas vacation.

All the best,

As ever,

Russell Fessenden ⁵

Attachment

Bad Godesberg, Germany, December 16, 1970.

Memorandum of Conversation⁶

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Ulrich Sahm, Ministerialdirektor, Office of the Chancellor, Bonn
• Minister Russell Fessenden, American Embassy Bonn

SUBJECT

• U.S.-German Relations on Berlin Negotiations and Ost Politik

I invited Sahm to my house for lunch on December 16. I have known Sahm for a long time, first meeting him in the early 1960’s when he was No. 2 in the German NATO Delegation. We normally discuss things very frankly.

In the course of discussing other currently operational subjects, I told Sahm that I had heard various indications that there was concern in the Chancellor’s office about attitudes in Washington towards the Berlin negotiations and the Ost Politik. (I based this, of course, on the unquestionably accurate information we got [less than 1 line not declassified] about Bahr’s concerns [less than 1 line not declassified] on December 11. Bahr had intended this to get to us. I did not, however, throughout the conversation say anything that could lead to identifying Bahr [less than 1 line not declassified].) I said that I was concerned about anything which could lead to mistrust between Governments. I added that if there were any concerns in the Chancellor’s office, they were ill-founded. People seem to have been misled by such things as the Acheson story which, I pointed out, the White House as well as the State Department had been prepared to deny. Unfortunately nobody asked the question at the White House daily press conference, although they had done so at the State Department. I also said that we in the Embassy have been doing everything possible to bring home to Washington the importance of maintaining good relations with the Brandt Government, and I believe this was understood in Washington. We had, for example, been stressing in our reporting that the longevity of the Brandt Government is probably much greater than earlier thought⁷ and that given the paramount importance of maintaining good relations with the elected government of Germany, this was important. We had also been highlighting the constructive role the Brandt Government has played in the NATO-burden-sharing exercise and in negotiating military arrangements for our troops.⁸

I then said that on the substance of negotiations, there was complete understanding between Washington and Bonn. There is even some feeling in Washington that the Germans are taking a too-hard line on substance, in the sense of asking too much. There is, however, a difference of emphasis on tactics, and it is here that any difficulty may lie. I pointed out that the Chancellor in talking with the Ambassador has expressed a view identical with ours: no time pressure, patience and toughness. Nevertheless, we keep hearing from the Government noises about the need for speeding up the negotiations. All of this is not helped by Soviet propaganda, which keeps feeding out the line that the U.S. is acting as the big roadblock. I then told Sahm that I wanted to be very frank and tell him about some of the other things we hear from FRG Government circles. I stressed very strongly that all of these comments were volunteered to us. For example, Genscher has gone out of his way to volunteer to us “Don’t let anybody in the Brandt Government put you under pressure to speed up the negotiations or make undue concessions.”⁹ Schuetz made very similar comments on the pace of the negotiations to the President.¹⁰ Some key members of the SPD (Wienand, although I did not name him) have also told us not to be pressured into too much speed or into too soft a position. I told Sahm that we of course conduct our basic relations with the Chancellor’s office and the Foreign Office, not with Schuetz or Genscher or the SPD Bundestag Fraktion. Nevertheless such comments as these volunteered to us from key figures have to be reported to Washington and cannot help but influence opinion.

I then raised with Sahm Bahr’s last-minute intervention with the Ambassador on December 9,¹¹ just before the December 10 Berlin Ambassadorial meeting. I said that I frankly felt Bahr had overdone his presentation. I knew that Washington wanted something firm said to the Soviets by the Ambassador at the meeting. I said we had deliberately done minimal reporting on Bahr’s intervention, fearing that the full impact of what Bahr said would not be well received in Washington.

I ended by saying that I hoped everything possible could be done to retain an atmosphere of confidence and trust.

Sahm immediately said that something had to be done and asked whether Kissinger could come to Bonn. When I said I thought this was most unlikely, he then said that somebody like Ehmke or Bahr ought to go to Washington promptly. I did not react one way or another to this suggestion. Nor did I indicate that we had already heard that such an idea was being considered.¹²

1. Source: Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Amb/DCM Correspondence, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only Addressee. Drafted by Fessenden.
2. Not found.
3. Sutterlin.
4. No such communication has been found.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
6. Secret. Drafted by Fessenden on December 24. For Sonnenfeldt’s analysis of both this memorandum and a conflicting account drafted by Sahm, see Document 161.
7. As reported in telegram 14392 from Bonn, December 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GER W)
8. As reported in a letter from Fessenden to Sutterlin, November 30. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 74 D 430, DEF FRG)
9. A memorandum of conversation between Genscher and Dean, December 5, is ibid., EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JDean—Memos of Conversation, 1970.
10. Schütz met Nixon at the White House from 3:43 to 4:23 p.m. on November 17. (Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Although no U.S. record has been found, Pauls drafted an account of the discussion, a copy of which is ibid., RG 59, EUR/CE Files: Lot 91 D 341, POL 39.5, 1970. Four Power Talks, Dec., Commentary on Talks; see also Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 3, p. 2294, footnote 3.
11. See Document 141.
12. In a December 28 letter to Hillenbrand, Fessenden supplemented his account: “I should have added to my Memcon with Sahm the fact that he queried me closely at the end about the reasons for any misunderstanding or mistrust of the Ostpolitik in Washington. After stressing again that there were no basic differences on substance, I added that Washington was a big place and that there were those who did have their doubts. In response to his prodding, I cited the view held by some that a false atmosphere of détente would be created, making it more difficult to maintain NATO strength. I also cited the view held by others that the Ostpolitik would lead to such internal differences as to be damaging to the fabric of the German body politic.” (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Amb/DCM Correspondence, 1970)