Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, December 9, 1970, 1400Z.

14211. Subj: Further Bahr Contact With the Soviets. Ref: Bonn 13409.²

1. State Secretary Bahr requested the US, UK and French Ambassadors to meet with him at 1800 hrs, December 8, ostensibly to hear his account of Brandt’s visit to Poland to sign the FRG-Polish treaty.³ After requesting the utmost secrecy, Bahr began the conversation by saying that at his initiative he had met with Soviet Foreign Ministry official Fallin in West Berlin on December 4 for a conversation of 11/hrs.⁴ Bahr said the conversation had been “cool and tough.”

2. Fallin told Bahr that the Soviets had authorized recent harassments on the Autobahn at the request of the GDR. The Soviets had also approved the protraction of the harassments beyond the period of the CDU Fraktion meeting in Berlin. Fallin said the Soviets and the GDR were at the time of his talk with Bahr considering whether new harassments should be instituted in connection with the Heinemann visit to Berlin.

3. Fallin said he was informed about the hard-line position which Bahr had taken during the November 17–18 senior level meeting in Bonn. Fallin said that all four Western governments were taking an unconstructive attitude on the Berlin negotiations, but the FRG was the most unconstructive of all four. The Soviets felt this to be the case particularly because of the FRG refusal to discuss access questions with the GDR until the Four Powers had reached agreement on this subject. Fallin said the solidarity of the FRG with the negative position of the Western governments had raised a question in the minds of the Soviet leaders as to whether the Federal German Government genuinely wished to continue its present policy of reconciliation with the East.

4. Fallin said the Soviets were themselves considering adopting a more rigid position on Berlin partly because of the general Western attitude, partly because of the recent NATO communiqué creating yet another linkage between the Berlin agreement, this time with a conference on European security, and because of Brandt’s similar action in linking ratification of the FRG-Polish treaty to a Berlin settlement. Fallin said the stiffening tendency on the part of the Soviets was supported by the GDR and by the attitudes expressed by all other Warsaw Pact members during their December 1–2 meeting in Berlin, where all participants had taken the same position. Bahr remarked parenthetically that Brandt had received the impression in his talk with Gomulka that Fallin’s description of the Warsaw Pact meeting was accurate.

5. In commenting on the Warsaw Pact meeting, Fallin said the meetings had been initiated at the desire of the Poles. The latter wished to have Warsaw Pact confirmation of the reversal of the earlier Warsaw Pact common position against diplomatic relations with Bonn before the FRG recognized the GDR in the light of Polish willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic prior to officially recognizing East Germany. Fallin said this position had been approved by Pact members with no opposing votes. The Pact had also approved the Czech proposal to begin negotiations with the FRG.

6. Fallin indicated that he was aware that no new date had been fixed for the continuation of the talks between Bahr and East German State Secretary Kohl. Bahr said Kohl himself had indicated that he was in no position to set a date before Dec 10 but was interested in a possible meeting between Dec 10 and Christmas. The FRG was also interested in such a meeting. Fallin said that the Soviets would not under any circumstances permit the FRG to negotiate on goods and persons moving out of Berlin towards the Federal Republic as this was not in the FRG’s area of competence.

7. Bahr said he had concluded from this conversation that the Soviets were now concerned at the possibility the Western Powers believed the Soviets were in a position where they would be forced to accept a Berlin settlement. The Soviets were reacting to this. In this sense, Bahr said, the Soviets appeared to have changed their minds about the desirability of FRG ratification of the FRG-Soviet treaty prior to the CPSU Congress in March. They now were on a completely different time table where they thought they would take all the time they needed. In any event, the GDR for its part continued opposed in any event to a Berlin settlement and was working to pull the Soviets in their direction. Brandt had gained the same impression of this possible future from Gomulka.

8. Bahr said he believed the Western Powers’ negotiations should move ahead briskly in the talks in any case and not lose time. Losing time only played into the hands of the GDR. Gomulka had indicated the same idea to Brandt. The Western Powers should move while the iron was still hot to some extent, before the development moved still further in the direction of the GDR’s negative position. Ambassador Rush said the Western Powers were ready to move as soon as they can. But of course the main thing is that we want a sound agreement and this should have unquestioned primacy. Bahr said this was right, but in this, as in other negotiations, there was a critical time for closing the deal which should not be missed. Fallin had told Bahr that he had watched the faces of the West Berlin population. The West Berliners had looked tired, as though they did not want to have to live further with their present tensions. Bahr said he considered Fallin’s observation to be correct and that time was in fact working for the GDR.⁵

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin.
2. See footnote 4, Document 138.
3. Bahr reported to the Ambassadors on December 9 that “the atmosphere at the outset of the visit had been extremely strained and difficult” but soon improved. According to Bahr: “Within twenty-four hours, it had proved possible to talk openly and normally with the Polish leaders as though on the basis of long acquaintance. The Germans had feared a difficult situation and, in fact, the entire visit had been loaded with emotion on both sides. The Poles had heard the German national anthem for the first time since the war. And for Chancellor Brandt, as an opponent of Hitler, it had been particularly hard to have to assume the moral responsibility for the German past vis-à-vis the Poles.” “[T]he visit,” he concluded, “had been a very moving one for the German participants. They had all been struck by the impression, in contrast to their impression of the Russians in Moscow, that the Poles ‘were Europeans.’” (Telegram 14204 from Bonn, December 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GER W)
4. For a December 5 memorandum of conversation by Bahr, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 2193–2194.
5. For a German account of this discussion between Bahr and the Western Ambassadors on Berlin, see ibid., pp. 2251–2254.