155. Intelligence Information Cable1

TDCS DB–315/06924–70

COUNTRY

  • West Germany

DOI

  • 19–22 December 1970

SUBJECT

  • Comments of Federal Chancellery Minister Horst Ehmke concerning his quick trip to the United States

ACQ

  • [1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

  • [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]
  • It is judged that Ehmke believes his comments will reach the U.S. Government.
1.
[1 line not declassified] Federal Chancellery Minister for Special Affairs Horst Ehmke, who on 22 December had returned from a quick trip to the United States to discuss FRG–U.S. relations with senior U.S. officials in Washington. Ehmke stated that he was pleased with the results of his trip, considering that he had established to the satisfaction of the Brandt regime that there did not exist any “crisis of confidence” between the FRG and the U.S., as had been stated in a New York Times article, datelined Bonn, which was published on 20 December. Ehmke said that there existed, and undoubtedly would continue to exist, some disagreement regarding tactics; for example, the FRG wished to move at a faster pace than the U.S., and the FRG was advocating “continuous talks” while the U.S. position in this respect was more reserved; however none of these differences constituted a basic lack of confidence between the two governments and they can continue to work in close cooperation to try to achieve a solution of the complex problems which [Page 467] face them with respect to Berlin and relations with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries.
2.
Ehmke stated that after seeing the 20 December New York Times article following his arrival in New York en route to Washington he had suspected that some of the information in the article had been leaked to the New York Times by American officials abroad, notably in the FRG. Ehmke said that he also suspected that the FRG press spokesman, Conrad Ahlers, had “confirmed” to the New York Times that certain of the information obtained by the Times was accurate. Ehmke added that Ahlers had been queried by Chancellor Willy Brandt and by Ehmke himself concerning the matter, and had denied any involvement. Ehmke indicated that he remained suspicious that Ahlers had had a hand in the affair, but that he was unable to prove it. (Source comment: It appeared that Ehmke’s comments concerning his expression of suspicion of American officials abroad as being the source of the New York Times story was more a provocative statement to the source than an expression of current belief. It is judged that Ehmke now believes that some party in or close to the Federal Chancellery was the actual source of basic information for the New York Times article and that his comments accusing American officials were aimed at camouflaging his true sentiments [less than 1 line not declassified].)
3.
Ehmke characterized his conversations with senior U.S. officials in Washington, including White House National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of Kissinger’s staff, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand as having been very frank and highly useful. Ehmke stated that he had been assured by the group of U.S. officials that the U.S., as had been stated by President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, and other U.S. officials, continued to support the “Ostpolitik” of the FRG. When Ehmke expressed to the U.S. group the concern of the FRG that the recent statement of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the effect that the FRG was “going too fast” in its “Ostpolitik” represented the view of the Nixon administration, the officials assured Ehmke that this was not the case; Acheson spoke only for himself, not for the U.S. Government.
4.
Ehmke said that in Washington he had been questioned about the conversations which have been held in West Berlin between FRG State Secretary Egon Bahr of the Federal Chancellery and V.M. Falin, Chief of the Central European Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which U.S. officials had indicated had given rise to some suspicion concerning the FRG’s attitude with respect to unilateral contacts with the Soviet Union. Ehmke added that he had apologized to the U.S. officials concerning the FRG’s handling of the matter, and had promised them that the U.S. would receive a full account of the talks [2 lines not declassified].
5.
Moving to a topic not concerned with his Washington trip, Ehmke remarked that he had learned that the French Government had rejected the proposal of Chancellor Brandt for the institution of “continuous Four-Power talks” and that he understood that the U.S. was tending to adopt the same negative attitude. Ehmke said that he hoped the U.S. would reconsider its position. However, the FRG plans to continue the talks with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) through the mechanism of meetings between FRG State Secretary Bahr and GDR State Secretary Michael Kohl. Ehmke added that he personally was not optimistic concerning the possibility of these talks generating significantly fruitful results; however he agreed that they should be continued. In speaking of the possible content of the talks Ehmke stated that it was his personal view that the question of Berlin access should not be broached in the FRGGDR talks until “much later”; however Bahr was the FRG official designated to conduct the talks, and Bahr wished to move at a faster pace. Ehmke said that he hoped that the Four Powers understood that the official policy of the FRG with respect to the conduct of talks with the GDR was that enunciated by Chancellor Brandt, as set forth in the comments made by the FRG Press Spokesman, Conrad Ahlers, on 21 December, not that enunciated by SPD Deputy Chairman Herbert Wehner in recent statements to media representatives. Ehmke added that it continues to be FRG policy that any arrangements that the FRGGDR negotiators might propose must be approved by the Four Powers.
6.
[1 line not declassified]
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VIII. Secret. No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only; Routine. Prepared in the CIA. Kissinger initialed the cable indicating that he had seen it. An unidentified NSC staff member wrote the following summary for Kissinger in the margin: “Ehmke reports on this trip to the US: —reassured there is no crisis in confidence; —you, Sonnenfeldt, Hillenbrand assured him Acheson spoke for himself (?); —source close to Chancellor may have been source of info for NY Times article; —French have rejected Brandt proposal for continuous 4 power talks; —Bahr wants to move faster than Ehmke.”