153. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Letter from Chancellor Brandt; Need for Review of our Policy on Berlin
The Chancellor has written you, Prime Minister Heath and President Pompidou letters reporting generally on his talks in Warsaw, when he signed the German-Polish treaty, and proposing that the Berlin talks be intensified (Tab B).2
He notes that the treaty will remove the Oder-Neisse border question as a burden on relations between West Germany and Poland and as an impediment to a wider European détente. He expects on the basis of his conversations to establish a “constructive” relation with [Page 458] Poland (this was before the riots). He informed the Polish leaders that the treaty with Warsaw was related to the Soviet treaty, as would become evident in the Bundestag debate. (By this he means that they will not be ratified separately, and the Soviet treaty will have to come first.)
The operational part of the message concerns the Berlin talks. The Chancellor finds that the last sessions produced some points of departure and in order to retain the initiative, he proposes that the negotiations be given a “conference-like” character. (His advisors have told us they envisage a more or less permanent negotiation at a fairly high level.)
The Chancellor notes that he has written to Kosygin, mainly to reassure him that Bonn continues to want a good relationship with the USSR and to repudiate press reporting that Bonn is taking a tougher stand, as reflected in the NATO meeting and the Berlin talks.
The Chancellor’s proposal to speed up the Berlin talks reflects the increasing anxiety in Bonn that the Berlin negotiations may fail, and, as a consequence that the Soviet and Polish treaties cannot be ratified thereby causing the collapse of the Chancellor’s foreign policy. Some of his advisors, and perhaps the Chancellor as well, have been shaken by some tough talk from the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviets are claiming to the Germans that we are the main sticking point in the Berlin talks. Bonn is also suspicious that we do in fact oppose Ostpolitik, a suspicion that is fed by newspaper speculation here and in Germany.
The French also seem to be wavering on the tactics of the Berlin talks, though not the substance. On the basis of my talks with Ambassador Alphand,3 I think the French Foreign Ministry will probably want to support an acceleration in the negotiations, though this may not reflect President Pompidou’s desires. The British, however, seem more relaxed though they too might see some virtue in more intensive negotiations.
The problem, of course, is not the pace of the negotiations but the substance. The main issue for the Western Allies is access to West Berlin. We have taken the position that any new agreement must include a specific Soviet acceptance or acknowledgment of responsibility for maintaining unhindered access and some of the details of how it will be implemented. The Soviets cannot do this without repudiating to some degree the “sovereignty” of East Germany. Without this Soviet role, however, we have opposed turning the detailed negotiations over [Page 459] to the East and West Germans to work out the precise procedures for regulation of traffic. To date, the Soviets have fallen well short of the West’s requirements since they have not been prepared to accept positions that, in his view, would derogate from GDR “sovereignty.”
The second issue relates to the political presence of West Germany in West Berlin. The Soviets have made various proposals for drastic reductions of Federal offices, and prohibition of various political meetings, including the Bundestag. They seem prepared to negotiate on this, but have made it clear that their agreement on access is conditional to a solution of the question of the German political role and presence.
Bonn apparently believes that there can be some skillful manipulation of language and exchange of notes between the Western Allies and the FRG, on the one hand, and the Soviets and GDR on the other, that will circumvent the current stalemate on access. Hence the Chancellor’s proposal for conference like talks.
Before replying substantively to this proposal, we will want to discuss it with the British and French. Before committing ourselves, however, it would be advisable to undertake reexamination of our position in preparation for the next Four Power Ambassadorial session on January 19, 1971. German issues were last addressed at the NSC on October 14. (Tab C)4
If you agree, I will issue an NSSM asking for a review of the status of the talks and alternative courses for us to follow. I will also ask that we do a longer term paper to examine the consequences of a failure in the talks and also a study of the problems we might face should the talks succeed and the German Eastern treaties be ratified. The issues involved have almost certainly been complicated by the rioting in Poland which is being kept under review for contingency planning purposes in the WSAG.
Recommendation
1. That you authorize me to direct two new studies on the operational alternatives in the Berlin negotiations, and on longer term implications of Bonn’s Eastern policy. (Tab A)5
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–179, NSSM 111. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A stamp on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to Kissinger under cover of a December 18 memorandum. “Before dealing with Brandt’s ostensibly procedural proposal,” Sonnenfeldt explained, “there is urgent need for a new study within the NSC system of the status of the Berlin talks and of courses open to us in the New Year. If we are going to marathon negotiations, we will need to review both substance and tactics, particularly since we may well come under new pressures from Bonn to accept a broad agreement on principles and then turn the negotiations over to Bahr and Kohl. In view of the growing internal problems within the Government on Ostpolitik and mounting German resentment it is also urgent for the NSC system to reexamine problems that will be coming along quite soon if there is a Berlin agreement, and also examine the consequences if there is no agreement.” According to an attached routing slip, the memorandum was returned to Sonnenfeldt on December 28 for “further action.” (Ibid.)↩
- Tab B is Document 145.↩
- Hervé Alphand, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, met Kissinger and Nixon at the White House on the afternoon of December 11. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)↩
- Tab C is Document 127.↩
- Nixon initialed the approval option. Tab A is printed as Document 156.↩