40. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Graham) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown)1
SUBJECT
- Future Organization of the Intelligence Community
1. Attached is a copy of an article from an April 27th Washington Post by Tom Braden.2 It calls for the dissolution of CIA. This is a studied piece and there is some merit in his arguments. There have been several others like it far more polemic in tone in various magazines and newspapers. They all point to a growing possibility that, after all of the Congressional investigations of intelligence, CIA will cease to exist in the form it has over the past 20 years. I believe it essential that DOD/JCS formulate its own concept of Intelligence Community reorganization or we may be stuck with harmful and ignorant solutions concocted by Congressional staff members. Further, some notion of desired outcome is essential to those of us in military intelligence who will be required to testify before the Congressional committees.
2. I have outlined below my views on this matter. I have discussed them with Lew Allen who essentially agrees with me. He has carried these views to Mr. Schlesinger who is also in essential agreement. I have also discussed these views with Gene Tighe and intend to discuss them with John Elder but with no one else. Naturally, neither Allen nor I wish to be characterized as kicking a wounded dog.
3. The last two Directors of Central Intelligence, Schlesinger and Colby, have tried hard to implement the Presidential decision of 1971 on the Intelligence Community.3 As you know, this directive stressed the DCI’s role as head of the Community rather than his role as Director of CIA. Schlesinger set up, and Colby supported, an Intelligence Community Staff headed up by a three-star uniform officer and staffed from the entire Community rather than just by CIA. There have been significant improvements in Community management as a result. However, the effectiveness of this arrangement has always been more dependent than is normally the case in bureaucratic arrangements [Page 95] on the character and style of two men—the DCI and his military IC Deputy. Without strong DCI support, the IC Staff is no match for the CIA barons. Further, the events of recent months cast doubt on the continuing viability of the notion that the DCI can serve both as the senior officer in CIA and the head of the Intelligence Community. For instance, none of the Intelligence Community is now willing to have Mr. Colby speak for them in the Congressional hearings. Colby is fighting for the institutional life of his agency and this is bound to take precedence over protecting the equities of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other intelligence activities. IC Staff effectiveness in Community leadership is also degraded by ASD(I) attempts to perform the IC Staff mission as it pertains to DIA, NSA, NRO, [less than 1 line not declassified] and Service Intelligence activities.
4. My view of future Intelligence Community organization rests on the following assumptions:
a. There is an unacceptable conflict of interest between the DCI and his role as head of CIA and that as an authoritative leader of the Intelligence Community.
b. There remains a strong need for an extra departmental intelligence element serving the NSC with highly aggregated intelligence analysis—military, political, and economic.
c. The need for a U.S. clandestine service remains.
d. The Department of Defense has the capability to undertake intelligence programs of size and secrecy.
5. My basic proposal is along these lines:
a. The Director, Central Intelligence, remains the senior U.S. intelligence officer reporting to the President and the NSC but with his responsibilities limited essentially to the production of National Intelligence Estimates and advice on National Intelligence Programs. His analytical and estimative functions would be restricted to those essential to National policy decision. His production staff would be divested of analytical efforts which would be delegated to the other agencies, e.g., military intelligence to DIA; political intelligence to INR, State; economic intelligence to Treasury and INR. The DCI would retain adequate capabilities to integrate all products competently. The USIB and its committee structure would be retained, chaired by the DCI. The IC Staff function and the National Intelligence Officers would be retained, staffed by detail from the various elements of the Intelligence Community. The NSC Intelligence Committee currently chaired by Mr. Kissinger would no longer be required.
b. The DCI would retain a role in Community resource decisions concerning major National intelligence systems through his chairman [Page 96] ship of the IRAC4 and EXCOM. His effectiveness in these roles would be greatly enhanced as he would be divested of the conflicting role as spokesman for CIA program managers.
c. Major programmatic activities now resident in CIA, such as satellite procurement and operation, [less than 1 line not declassified] the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, etc., are transferred to DoD elements, as appropriate. The satellite business should go to the Air Force NRO; [less than 1 line not declassified] NPIC to DIA, FBIS and development of advanced SIGINT hardware to NSA.
d. The clandestine services should be formed into an independent collection apparatus subordinate to the NSC, with strict adherence to anonymity, low visibility, and restricted to activities which must be done clandestinely. The highly visible overseas establishments of the clandestine service would be reduced to low visibility clandestine operations and liaison with foreign clandestine services.
6. I believe that the above measures will constitute an effective, and palatable to Congress, reorganization of intelligence. They would have their independent reporting capability to offset what they consider to be self-serving intelligence by the DoD and other departments. They would have some checks and balances in the problems of resource allocation. With the DCI in an independent role, rather than as spokesman for CIA, the Intelligence Community will respond much more readily to his guidance. With clear responsibility for sophisticated intelligence collection systems, the DoD can much more readily support both Washington and Commanders in the field with responsive intelligence and break down barriers of compartmentalization which have frequently been the tool of CIA managers to retain bureaucratic control. Further the sharp delineation of the clandestine service function would remove its pervasive influence over the rest of the Intelligence Community’s activities. As the central activity of the CIA, it has always tended to provide a means of obstructing other intelligence efforts and a convenient method for withholding intelligence from the Community at large. The clandestine mystique at CIA works directly counter to Community coordination functions of the DCI.
7. Even without the current pressures on CIA, technology would have driven us to new Community arrangements in any case. With near-real-time photography and signals intelligence from overhead satellites, the application of the so-called “National means” to the basic military intelligence problem is becoming more and more evident. Old [Page 97] arrangements whereby satellites were tasked by a cumbersome committee system headed up by CIA are no longer viable. In crises, the new satellites [less than 1 line not declassified] will have to respond to commanders. Not all requests will be met. Priorities will have to be set among military commanders’ requests and this must be done by the JCS, not by a civilian agency. As of today, CIA is attempting to take full control of [less than 1 line not declassified] via its managership of NPIC. NPIC’s product today is at least 95% in the military field. With the advent [less than 1 line not declassified] this percentage will go up and the direct application of photography to military operations will sharply increase. For that reason, NPIC should be brought under the control of the JCS through subordination of DIA.
8. Should the reorganization outlined above come to pass, we will probably require some reorganization within the DoD. Certainly, ASD(I) cannot be placed in the position it would like to be in, that is managing three large programs—DIA, NRO and NSA. ASD(I)’s function should be changed to that of: Comptroller for Intelligence Resources without further capability to dabble in the management affairs of the three major intelligence components or in the problems of tactical/national intelligence interface.
Lieutenant General, USA
- Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA Command Files 1970s, Box 3, DIA Command 1976. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]; Eyes Only.↩
- See footnote 9, Document 39.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 242.↩
- The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee comprised representatives from the Departments of State and Defense and the Office of Management and Budget who advised the Director of Central Intelligence about the consolidated intelligence budget.↩