Among the matters he discussed with the Commission was his belief that
the counterintelligence activities of the CIA had been seriously undercut by certain organizational
changes instituted by Director Colby.
Unfortunately, that memorandum was not delivered until the day before the
Commission’s Report was due,2 and so
could not be included in its Report.
However, I think the information in the memorandum should be brought to
your attention, and I am attaching a copy to this memo for that
purpose.
Attachment
Report by the Former Chief of the
Counterintelligence Staff, Central Intelligence Agency
(Angleton) to the
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States3
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES
Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission:
In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and
myself submit herewith a critique of the counterintelligence
function in the Agency. We welcome the Commission’s interest in this
matter because it will be the first review of U.S.
counterintelligence at such a responsible level in Government. In
any event, it is urged that authoritative attention, beyond the life
of the Commission, be given to the scope and role of
counterintelligence in the Intelligence Community. This action is
imperative because the current leadership is almost totally
uninformed and inexperienced in the specialty of
counterintelligence, and its authority for changes is being
permitted to go unchallenged. The result is reflected in the failure
to maintain continuity in this function. We believe that unless
there are some enforceable guidelines set forth by a higher
authority, the conduct of effective counterintelligence by the
Government will be lost for years to come.
[Page 99]
[Omitted here is general discussion of the value of
counterintelligence and the bona fides of Soviet defectors.]
Given the inability of the Intelligence Community to come to grips
with the problems raised by counterintelligence, it is suggested
that the only solution to the very unsatisfactory situation today
would be the appointment of an ombundsman who would be authorized to
act directly on behalf of the National Security Council on serious
interagency problems which have a direct bearing on the plans and
capabilities of the Communist Bloc and involve the more sensitive
operations of counterintelligence. Alternatively, consideration
could be given to the responsibilities of the Chairman of PFIAB, which might be enlarged to
satisfy this need.
As Attachment A,4 I submit a letter and attachment which was
submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 31 January 1975. Given the
march of events and the uncertainties involved, in addition to the
responsibilities of his high office, it is understandable, perhaps,
that the Secretary has not wished to become entangled in
disputations on this subject matter as long as the Agency and its
various Directors are being subjected to investigation.
Nevertheless, in our view, the issues involving Soviet strategic
disinformation and our defense posture go to the heart of national
security insofar as they relate to estimates affecting the world
balance of power. Additionally, we believe it to be most misleading
for one to assume that estimates derived from technical collection
alone justify the negotiation of finite disarmament and other
treaties with the Soviet Bloc governments unless there is
corresponding high-level covert intelligence production which
supplements and confirms the findings of technical collection.
This view argues against the philosophy now being aired with Olympian
aplomb that technical coverage alone is a substitute for clandestine
sources or that it gives a reliable data base which justifies a
super power to bargain away its strength. (Attachment B sets forth
the views of Mr. Paul Nitze
and his first-hand impression of the SALT talks.5 Of particular interest is his description
of the atmospherics: [a] the peculiar role of the KGB among Soviet
negotiators, and [b]6 how an uninformed U.S. representative learned
from the Soviet delegation of changes in the U.S. negotiating
positions arrived at in Washington. The KGB attempted similar ploys
during the Johnson Administration with a former high official of
President Kennedy’s on the
Vietnam issue.)
[Page 100]
If there be validity to the information derived from Golitsyn,7 then it would follow that
détente and estimates derived therefrom are misleading with regard
to the events in Portugal, Vietnam and other areas where we are in
competition with the Soviets and the Bloc. A more accurate picture
could be obtained if the structure of the Intelligence Community, in
its processing of information, were less concerned with public or
overt data regarding the Soviet Bloc intentions, such as the
reporting of Ambassadors and other representatives, and instead give
full faith and credit to secret information from bona fide sources
who are or were within the Soviet Bloc system and whose warnings
regarding disinformation have been universally ignored. To repeat,
it is the opinion of these sources that the bulk of information
available to the West through Soviet Bloc contacts, regarding the
strategy and aims of the Eastern Bloc, is, on the whole, spurious
and represents little more than coordinated handouts which advance
the interests of Soviet Bloc strategic disinformation at many levels
of communications.
The remainder of this report represents the status, as of March 1975,
of U.S. counterintelligence, primarily within the CIA, but also, as the perspective
requires, at the national level. The discussion consists of four
parts:
- The authority under which CIA
conducts counterintelligence activities.
- The nature of those activities.
- A summary of critical developments in the history of U.S.
counterintelligence from 1945 to 1975.
- Recommendations which we respectfully urge the Commission to
submit to the President for his consideration.
I. The Authority
The current version of National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 5, U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities
Abroad, effective 17 February 1972, is the charter for the conduct
of foreign clandestine activities by CIA and by the other members of the U.S. intelligence
and counterintelligence community.8
NSCID/5 defines
counterintelligence as “. . . that intelligence activity, with its
resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of
inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect
the security of the nation and its personnel, information and
installations against espionage, sabotage and subversion.
Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing,
recording and disseminating information con
[Page 101]
cerning hostile clandestine activity and of
penetrating, manipulating or repressing individuals, groups or
organizations conducting such activity.”
As defined, counterintelligence consists of two parts, security and
counterespionage. Security is essentially the
static defenses erected against the clandestine activities of
adversaries of the U.S., whereas counterespionage is aggressive activity of engaging the
adversary clandestinely.
NSCID/5 stipulates that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake specified actions
in order to ensure centralized direction of all clandestine
activities within the scope of the Directive. It also charges CIA with primary responsibility for
U.S. clandestine activities abroad and permits other departments and
agencies to conduct such foreign clandestine activities as are
supplementary or are necessary to their security. Departmental
counterintelligence is brought together through two Director of
Central Intelligence Directives, one which requires coordination in
advance with CIA on clandestine
counterintelligence operations abroad, and the other which
stipulates that CIA shall serve as
a central repository of foreign counterintelligence data to the
Intelligence Community.
The flow of authority is from the National Security Council to the
Director of Central Intelligence to the Deputy Director for
Operations to the central counterintelligence unit of CIA or to an area division to provide
whatever assistance the Director may require to discharge his
obligations under NSCID/5 and its
assignment to him of responsibility for the protection of methods
and sources or under other laws, orders and directives. The
immediate mandate of the counterintelligence component, however, is
derived from those responsibilities assigned directly to CIA (and thus chiefly from paragraphs
1b, 3b, 3c, 3d and 9 of NSCID/5,
the chief provisos of which have been noted above).
In our view the DCI is not
exercising under NSCID/5
responsible centralized direction of counterintelligence clandestine
activity. As indicated to the Commission in verbal testimony, the
current Director has spent less than four to five hours with the
Counterintelligence Staff from the moment he became the Deputy
Director for Operations until the present. His knowledge of the
activity during the period when he was Chief of the Far East
Division was one of failure and is reflected in an Inspector
General’s report of the period. This and some of his communications
to the field are a matter of record in the FE Division. Instead of
exercising leadership in resolving the serious problems of
penetration and disinformation, which are of prime importance to the
security of the country, under his aegis there has been a
decentralization and mutilation within the Agency and, therefore,
within the Community of high-level counterintelligence activity. We
believe that sub
[Page 102]
stantial
changes are needed and that these changes should be effected with
and through an understanding of our counterintelligence mission,
capabilities and needs. In setting forth our collective views on
these matters, we do so, drawing on our professional experience as
to what needs to be set right and how it may be done. The primary
cause of the present vulnerability of our national security is the
inadequate attention and serious lack of understanding of the
counterintelligence function.
[Omitted here are Parts II and III, describing the nature of
counterintelligence activities and summarizing the history of the
CIA counterintelligence
service.]
IV. Recommendations
The following recommendations are presented for the consideration of
the Commission with the sole intent of revitalizing national
counterintelligence and enabling it to discharge its assigned
responsibilities in furtherance of national security. To this end we
propose the following changes:
1. That the Operational Directorate of CIA assign not less than one-tenth of its component to
counterintelligence.
2. That of this total about half be assigned to a central
counterintelligence unit in Headquarters and that the remaining half
be divided among the various Area Divisions and branches in
Headquarters and selected Agency stations abroad.
3. That CIA provide this cadre with
counterintelligence training in depth.
4. That selected counterintelligence personnel be rotated through
Headquarters and field assignments of growing responsibility in
accordance with career plans that afford them opportunities for
advancement which equal those of their Agency colleagues.
5. That counterintelligence designees abroad work under the nominal
command of Chiefs of Station but that they engage in
counterintelligence work full time and that they have privacy
channels of communications with the Headquarters counterintelligence
unit which will ensure that access to their sensitive information
remains on a compartmented, need-to-know basis.
6. That close operational liaison between the FBI and the counterintelligence unit
be fostered, and that direct, operational, domestic liaison with
other U.S. departments and agencies by the counterintelligence unit
be maintained to whatever extent the national interest requires.
7. That the U.S. establish a single central organ to formulate policy
for national strategic deception and to deal with adversary
deception, specifically including disinformation. Further, that this
body have the
[Page 103]
necessary
access to policy-creating levels of the U.S. Government and that it
have the necessary measure of jurisdiction over Governmental
components engaged in deception and counterdeception.
8. That CIA counterintelligence
liaison abroad be improved through a judicious augmentation of
exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration
leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing
with the common adversary, and the expansion of the cadre of
counterintelligence liaison officers abroad.
9. That CIA undertake a more
vigorous program to obtain further data about the intelligence and
counterintelligence services of China, Cuba and Eastern Europe, so
that our knowledge of them becomes fully comparable with our
knowledge of the Soviet services, and that these increased holdings
be placed in machine records as rapidly as their size warrants.
10. That the U.S., and especially the FBI and the CIA,
intensify counterintelligence work against Soviet and other
illegals.
11. That within the expanded counterintelligence unit in CIA headquarters a defector section be
created and that this section be responsible for supervising the
operational handling and continuing debriefing of designated
defectors, both abroad and in the U.S., the latter responsibility to
be assigned in agreement with the FBI and other affected departments and agencies.
12. That the chief of the counterintelligence unit have direct and
frequent access to the Director of Central Intelligence and other
Deputy Directors and members of the Intelligence Community engaged
in security and counterintelligence to ensure that
counterintelligence considerations are given due weight in the
formulation of policy and that counterintelligence capabilities are
fully utilized in defending CIA and
other U.S. departments and agencies against clandestine activity,
including penetration operations, carried out by our
adversaries.
