39. Memorandum for the Record Prepared by the Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence (Knoche)1
SUBJECT
- DCI Meeting with the President’s Commission
1. The Director met with the Commission for three and one quarter hours this afternoon to answer questions based upon his depositions given to the Staff the preceding week.2 All members of the Commission were in attendance except for Governor Reagan. The Vice President was in and out. President Shannon left after two hours. The only Staff members in attendance were David Belin and Monte Gray.
2. Gray asked a number of questions about internal Agency controls. The Director was asked how confident he was about knowing about any dubious activities within the Agency. He explained his use of the chain-of-command, communications within the Agency, and such groups as MAG to keep himself posted.
3. There were a number of questions about the Director’s use of the MBO management system. There seemed to be some concern that such systems may not fit the Agency. The Director emphasized the importance of assessing progress in reaching objectives, rather than in consideration, one by one, of individual projects. The Vice President asked how MBO would help in trying to determine what should be done in such trouble spots as [less than 1 line not declassified] Portugal.
4. Gray referred to the tendency of some previous DCI’s to run directly certain operations of special appeal to them. The Director said he [Page 88] would not undertake such “vest pocket operations”. He sees himself as a manager rather than an operator.
5. There were some questions on the role of the DDCI. The Director and various Commissioners, including the Vice President, had laudatory things to say about General Walters and his background. It was pointed out that the IC Staff Chief is a three-star military job and that this lessens the need for a DDCI from the military services. This led to questions as to whether the DCI should be an outsider and the DDCI an insider. The Director responded by saying that this could be made to work, but that he thought that any such arrangements should not be legislated. General Lemnitzer thought that it was important that the DDCI be from the military in order to “maintain balance” within the Community. He was reminded that the IC Staff job as it is now manned permits of this.
6. There were a number of questions about the role of the Inspector General. Commissioner Griswold was particularly concerned that a staff of somewhere between three and five be thought able to cope with important reviews. The Director said that his experience with past IG reviews did not show them to be all that productive and he thought a very small IG Staff could deal with appropriate internal reviews. He outlined his own view that the staff should be kept slim so that the line can concentrate on the real work. The Vice President questioned this saying that he thought the role of the staff was to plan and think, and the role of the line was to act. The Director said he thought that picking the best possible people to act in the line would also permit them to think and plan as well.
7. Griswold asked for the DCI’s concurrence, which he got, with the general proposition that the Inspector General should be enhanced and its responsibilities broadened.
8. Gray noted the Director’s efforts to develop a freer flow of communication with the Agency in efforts to break down unnecessary compartmentation. He asked if this does not cause some within the Agency to grow concerned about security. The Director said this was possible but it is something we believe we can handle.
9. Returning to MBO and internal auditing, Griswold asked if there were perhaps not too much concentration on efficiency and results without a comparable look at legalities and proprieties. The Director said legalities and proprieties are considered when a project is approved and that the auditing is designed to determine whether our resources have been productive.
10. Commissioner Kirkland asked about the role of the General Counsel in the approval process. The Director said the tradition has been that the General Counsel’s comments are sought when matters are referred to him. All new operational proposals are not sent to the [Page 89] General Counsel, though if contracts or operational sensitivities are involved they would be. Kirkland asked if the General Counsel, in this day and age, would be consulted on the approval of activities like that of the Ober Project (MHCHAOS).3 The Director said yes.
11. Gray noted that often an approved Agency operation seems to change perceptibly in its thrust over time. He asked how operations can be kept monitored and controlled. The Director said his chain-of-command, internal communications and reliance on employees are his best bet. Griswold asked if this would not be an ideal charge for the IG? The Director said yes, but repeated that past IG inspections have not proved all that useful in surveying questionable activities.
12. Gray asked if there were a mechanical way to get the General Counsel cut in on all projects. The Director noted that he personally frequently asks the General Counsel for his view and that this is serving as an example to his subordinates.
13. Gray asked about the DCI Directives of 1973 and 1974,4 and in particular, how they are devised. The Director said he personally had dictated them and had invited comments from those to whom they were sent. He noted that not all of the directives were in our regulations; not all need be. Those that should be will be so included.
14. Commissioner Shannon noted recent press stories concerning details of intelligence activities and asked the Director for his views on the origin. The Director noted the interest of the press in pursuing these subjects and the availability of ex-employees and others who can provide bits and pieces which the press stitches together to form the stories.
15. The Vice President asked the Director to describe the nature of his meetings with Seymour Hersh prior to the New York Times story of 22 December 1974.5
16. Questions then turned to outside controls, beginning with the Congress. The Director said a Joint Committee would be our best bet. As things stand now he must report to six committees and protection of security is difficult, if not impossible. He was asked for any examples of flagrant violations. He cited the case of the Chile disclosure last year.
17. In response to questions, the Director urged augmentation of the PFIAB role to include outside reviews of intelligence activities. He [Page 90] pointed out that one particular value of outside inspection is that it forces instructions to devise matching inside inspection arrangements.
18. Belin suggested that an independent commission might be established to review the Community every few years. The Director said this would be an approach similar to his PFIAB suggestion.
19. The Director also urged that there be some kind of annual public report by PFIAB to help build public understanding.
20. The Director was asked if the NSCIC has played a useful role. The Director noted that it had met almost not at all.
21. General Lemnitzer asked how CIA and DIA differences are handled at USIB, and the Director discussed procedures and philosophy.
22. Commissioner Shannon asked if it would be good to establish a six- or eight-year term for the DCI. The Director said this might be a good idea if it were assumed that one serves at the pleasure of the President. The Director certainly agreed that no one should be allowed to lock into the job for an excessively long period of time.
23. Commissioner Shannon asked if it would be a problem if an unclassified Commission report were to mention the organization and internal operations of the Agency. [2 lines not declassified]
24. The Director was asked if he had ever been asked to tailor intelligence estimates. The Director replied in the negative. He said that Dr. Kissinger never asked him to discuss positions prior to meetings and that neither Kissinger nor Schlesinger is reluctant to criticize. The DCI finds that, in the main, disagreements and various points of view within the National Security Council are useful to the President and his consideration of alternatives. The Director cited the absolute need for there to be an independent intelligence agency in this context.
25. Questions turned to assassination allegations. [3 lines not declassified] The Director said that revolutions inevitably cause blood to flow but there is a difference in backing a side in a revolution and an out-and-out assassination plan. Gray asked if the DCI would inform the 40 Committee of qualifications and implications in any proposed plan concerning support to a revolution. The Director answered yes.
26. Belin asked if there were any evidence known to Director Colby that the CIA was involved in any way in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. The Director said absolutely not.
27. Belin asked if there were any evidence known to Director Colby that Oswald6 was a CIA agent of any kind. The Director’s response was [Page 91] in the negative. Belin asked if he had ever been provided any money or other support from the Agency. The Director said no.
28. Belin noted that Allen Dulles had once been quoted as saying that he would lie to protect intelligence information. He asked Mr. Colby if he would do so also. The Director said no that there could be occasions when he would not want to discuss all information but that he would not lie to Congress or to duly constituted authority.
29. Belin asked whether the Director would carry out an order from the President to do something but not to inform State, Defense or PFIAB. The Director said yes, since this would be a matter of a President’s authority as head of the Executive Department. Belin asked what he would do if the President asked him to carry out an activity, but not tell Congress. The Director said he would have trouble here because he was pledged not to keep secrets from Congress and had so stated in his confirmation hearings. Griswold asked in such hypothetical cases would the Director resign and make the matter a public issue by going to Congress. The Director said he might have to resign but he would not make such an issue a public spectacle.
30. Belin asked whether compartmentation can prevent the DCI from knowing everything that is going on. The Director said that he couldn’t know everything that is going on, but that he should know about the programs and the general thrust of the activities and he repeated his reliance on chain-of-command, Management Committee, MAG, communications, etc.
31. The Director cited the importance of the Commission’s formulating its recommendations in such a way that we are allowed to operate within the United States. He noted the availability here of key foreigners. He mentioned current efforts to state the guidance for such activities, referring to NSCID #9.7 It has been staffed and prepared for USIB’s consideration prior to going to the NSC.
32. The Director was invited to discuss his views of counter-intelligence and the details of Angleton’s departure. The Director went into considerable detail on this and tabled with the Commission, as Exhibit A, a paper prepared on the subject (attached).8
33. One particular aspect of this arose when Commissioner Dillon said that the Commission had been advised that [names not declassified] had been told they couldn’t stay in their jobs. The Director said that was not his intention, that they were to be told simply that neither would succeed to Angleton’s job at the top of the CI Staff.
[Page 92]34. Dillon referred to a recent magazine article which made the charge that Colby had instructed that the skeleton reports be drafted by the IG in such a way as to point blame at Angleton. The Director said there was no substance to this and invited the Commission to query [names not declassified] the authors of the report.
35. Belin asked if the Agency were losing morale and initiative as a result of the reviews. The Director said this is a danger but he thought we could pull out of this problem if the reviews can culminate with an understanding of the importance of intelligence rather than concentrating on hobgoblins.
36. Commissioner Dillon asked about the statutes concerning intelligence sources and methods. He asked the Director if he considered this a gray area. The Director said no, that he thought he had responsibilities to protect such information but authority resided with enforcement components. He invited the Commission to help us in efforts to get the law tightened.
37. Belin asked the standard question as to whether additional “bomb shells” still existed within the CIA files and records not yet uncovered by the Commission. The Director said he was not aware of any and was as interested as the Commission is in assuring credibility on this.
38. Commissioner Kirkland asked if the Agency has ever studied oversight arrangements covering foreign intelligence agencies. The Director said we had not but there is in general very little oversight abroad.
39. The Director urged that the Commission’s recommendations not prevent appropriate forms of surveillance. He particularly needs authorities to carry out surveillance with regard to Agency employees and a general prohibition can be harmful.
40. Commissioner Dillon noted that the White House staff frequently makes requests of the Agency. Some of them are for substantive intelligence which presents no problems, but some are for operational support which may be improper. He thought it might be a good idea to designate one officer close to the top of the Agency who would be informed of all requests for operational support to the White House. The Director thought this a very good idea.
41. Griswold returned to the problem of leakiness of some ex-employees and to the fact that Howard Hunt was able to get information directly from Agency officials. He asked whether all such relations with ex-employees should not be cut off. The Director felt there was no way to cut off friendly relationships but that it was a situation in need of watching. In Hunt’s case, most of what he sought was known to the Deputy Director and it would be hard to criticize the working level.
[Page 93]42. Commissioner Kirkland asked for the Director’s comments on the Tom Braden thesis about remaking the Agency.9 The Director said that a transfer of the analysis and production function to State would sacrifice the independence and objectiveness that is the Agency’s hallmark. He said that the transfer of covert actions to Defense would leave the problem of how to avoid official attribution to activities that must not be official. The Director was particularly critical of the Braden idea that the spymasters and paymasters be put off in a tool shed to accomplish their job. The Director said this is just the opposite of what we need.
43. The DCI was asked if he had any final thoughts or recommendations. He recommended that a decision be made on how to handle the classified records of the Commission when the Commission completes its work. He said that they could go to CIA Archives under appropriate control or simply to the National Archives. In any event, he was concerned about the sensitivities of the papers. The Director also noted that he did not wish to intervene in any way in the substance of the Commission’s final report but since it would be unclassified he would have a concern about revelation of sources and methods. He suggested that the report be made available to the President and be sent from there to the Director for advice on the security score prior to its publication.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01009A, Box 17, Rockefeller Commission, 070275–210775. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- Colby gave two deposition interviews to the Commission Staff, April 21 and April 23, covering CIA domestic operations, FBI–CIA relations, external oversight, the roles of the DCI and DDCI, and the application of the MBO program to the Intelligence Community. Minutes of the two interviews were drafted by Knoche and are ibid., Job 79M01476A, Box 17, Colby Appearance Before the Rockefeller Commission, 28 Apr 75, Book II, 190973–250475.↩
- MHCHAOS was the code name for the CIA’s domestic spying operation begun in 1967.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 36.↩
- See Document 17.↩
- Lee Harvey Oswald.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 22.↩
- Not found attached. See footnote 2, Document 18.↩
- On April 27, the Washington Post reprinted a Saturday Review article by journalist Tom Braden in which he suggested several reforms for the CIA, including turning over psychological warfare to the Voice of America, limiting covert operations to aiding “friendlies” with money, and appointing as CIA chief a civilian “who has demonstrated staunchness of character and independence of mind” for fixed, non-renewable term of six years. (Tom Braden, “CIA: Power and Arrogance,” Washington Post, April 27, 1975, p. 34)↩