417. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State 1

1717. Subject: Arms Delivery to Grivas.

1.
Summary: Acting Pres Clerides informs us that security situation on island has sharply deteriorated. Grivas has received large clandestine arms import and crystallized his plans to strike against Makarios.
2.
Acting Pres Clerides took DCM aside at social event Sep. 15. Said he had kept regular Council of Ministers meeting Sep 14 in session for several hours overtime, partly to brief Ministers on sharp deterioration in security situation on island. Through its penetrations of Grivasʼ organization, GOC has learned that large clandestine shipment of arms has arrived and been partially distributed to Grivas groups. Negotiations for this shipment, valued at 180,000 Cypriot pounds (US $468,000) took place with an unidentified party in Lebanon. Shipment was delivered by three caiques to a point on the southeastern coast near Xylophagou River. Arms, belived to be largely but not entirely of Soviet manufacture, are thought to include 500 automatic weapons; heavy machine guns and bazooka-type weapons are believed to have been part of shipment.
3.
Clerides stated at least partial distribution of weapons to Grivas supporters is indicated by visit paid to Makarios by small group of Grivas supporters who boasted of their new acquisition. GOC has report that further transaction, to include mines and explosives may be in the mill.
4.
According to Clerides GOC intelligence service (CIS) first learned of shipment shortly after arrival through penetrations in Grivas entourage, and immediately informed Makarios and Clerides himself. Knowing that Greek services (KYP) are equally able to monitor Grivas activities, it was decided to keep this affair closely guarded secret and wait to see if KYP would inform GOC of its own accord. In fact, this occurred quite promptly but, in Cleridesʼ view, it is not conclusive one way or the other. Clerides recalled that Greece informed Archbishop of Grivas absence from Athens very promptly after his disappearance from home last fall. At the time Clerides noted, Greek services, to his positive personal knowledge, had known for approximately two months of Grivasʼ plans to return to Cyprus.
5.
Question in his mind, Clerides told DCM, was whether arms importation had been supported covertly by Greece as a signal that Makarios had better agree to a solution developed in intercommunal talks, or else. If GOG in some way involved and this was its intention, Clerides thought a serious error in calculation was being made. Clerides proceeded to explain why.
6.
GOC, Clerides said, now has evidence that Grivas has crystallized his plans for action against Makarios. These are that he will strike to unseat Govt by force if Makarios should, between now and scheduled presidential election in Feb 1973, accept a solution ruling out enosis “as any viable solution must.” If a solution has not been reached by Feb and Makarios holds the election and declares his candidacy, Grivas will strike then.
7.
This plan, Clerides commented, runs directly counter to GOGʼs interest in a solution premised on an independent Cyprus and evolved between now and the end of the year in expanded intercommunal talks. If negotiators agree on a package proposal (Clerides discussion on this point is included in septel)2 and Makarios decides to resist, he and Grivas will become natural allies.
8.
Clerides stated that, ideally, Greece should cease to think of Grivas as potential leverage on Makarios, if it does, and use its influence to get him out of Cyprus before a solution is worked out in the talks. Clerides said he had made this point to GOG representatives.
9.
Rermarking on other aspects of Grivasʼ organization and financing, Clerides said GOC believes Grivas thinks he can count on loyalty of 500 to 600 men. Actual number who would stand up and fight, however, is in GOCʼs opinion considerably less than that. Grivasʼ forces are by no means homogeneous. They include some committed enosist fanatics, a hard core of personal followers, a large number of Makarios penetrations, and a body of followers of the late Interior Minister Georkadjis. Many of last named retain allegiance to Unified Party (Cleridesʼ own) and would not commit themselves in an effort to upset Govt by force without party approval. (This, Clerides implied but did not explicitly state, would not be forthcoming.)
10.
On financing, Clerides stated that Grivas has received 50,000 Cypriot pounds (US $130,000) from the Bishop of Kyrenia, 10,000 pounds (US $26,000) from Bishop of Kitium, and a very large personal contribution from a mainland Greek shipping magnate.
11.
As an example of the thoroughness of Makariosʼ penetration of Grivasʼ organization (belied, we would note, by failure to obtain [Page 1034] advance information on arms shipment) Clerides cited recent instruction given by Grivas to a subordinate to prepare report on means of bugging telephones of Pres and other senior Govt officials in such a way as to both eavesdrop on conversations and permit disruption of telephone services at such time as Grivas chose to attack. This request was in hands of Makarios and Clerides in less than 24 hours. Govt has been able to establish identity of individual concerned and has him under surveillance.
12.
Comment: We are inclined to credit Cleridesʼ report of clandestine arms shipment to Grivas although he has tendency to exaggerate somewhat. We will be seeking confirmation through other channels.
Popper
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority;Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, EUCOM, and USUN.
  2. Not further identified.