Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

418. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State ¹

Nicosia, December 1, 1972, 1530Z.

2181. Subject: General Grivas. Ref: Rome 7306, rptd as State 217750.²

1. Following comment from Cyprus vantage point on King Constantineʼs remarks re Gen. Grivas may be helpful in assessing info contained reftel.

2. We believe Grivas is as well prepared as he is ever likely to be. While his political front is shrill, poorly organized and unimpressive, his clandestine military force of some hundreds of armed conspirators is now trained, equipped and deployed for action on short notice. At least that is what high Govt officials tell us in their more nervous moments, and other evidence corroborates it.

3. We estimate Grivas forces could carry out isolated acts of violence such as attempts on lives of Govt leaders, seizure of police stations, telecommunications, utilities, and airport; but critical factor for success of any coup would be posture of mainland Greek-officered National Guard and of large Cyprus police force. This remains something of an enigma, but we tend to believe reports that as long as intercommunal talks are proceeding with prospects of success, Greek Govt and National Guard will keep Grivas under control.

4. Contrary to what King said, Makarios and Grivas have had only one meeting, on March 26, as far as we know. It produced no agreement.

5. King apparently saw FonOff DepDirGen Pelaghias while in London. If Pelaghias said Cyprus Govt could not move against Grivas because of his “foreign” (evidently Greek) support, he was taking a line in sharp contrast with Makarios. Latter tells us he could move effectively against Grivas if he wished, but states he is holding his hand in order not to provoke Grivas into military response which could upset tranquility, divide Greek Cypriot community, destroy prospect of intercommunal agreement, and perhaps ultimately result in partition of island.

6. Very difficult to estimate when Grivas might make his move. On the one hand, he cannot sit still indefinitely. On other, he does not presently seem to have clear Greek Govt support which would be essential for his purposes. His publicity organs have come out against holding presidential election scheduled for next February, on ground this would confirm Makarios—whom they regard as traitor to Hellenism—in office for five more years. Yet they are unable to present a candidate who would make an impressive showing against Makarios. In this context, we can see Kingʼs point that Grivas might feel compelled to strike against Makarios before elections take place. Should he do so, we think it would be a desperate operation, with Greek Govt reaction through National Guard and Cyprus police the crucial factor.

7. From our info we are unable to judge extent to which Constantine or Monarchist elements are involved in Grivasʼ movement.

8. Dept may wish pass this cable to Athens and Rome.³

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Nodis.
2. Dated November 30, it reported that King Constantine had stated that he had information that Grivas was “fully financed, fully armed, and ready” to move against Makarios. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 6975 from Athens, December 6, the Embassy stated that a Greek Government decision on support for Grivas would depend on circumstances at the time he made a move against Makarios. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)