416. Record of Department of State Roundtable Discussion1
DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Popper
- Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies
- Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz
- Mr. Armitage, IO/UNP
- Mr. Churchill, NEA/GRK
- Mr. Boyatt, NEA/CYP
- Mr. Dillon, NEA/TUR
- Mr. Stoddard, INR/RNA/NE
- Mr. Kimball, IO/UNP
- Mr. Silva, NEA/GRK
- Mr. Austrian, Embassy Nicosia
- Mr. Rotklein, INR/RNA/NE
- Mr. Long, NEA/CYP
- Miss Vunovic, IO/UNP
Summary
The meeting was set up more to air views than to make policy decisions. The consensus of the meeting was the following:
- (1)
- A constitutional settlement is not in sight.
- (2)
- A modus vivendi or status quo settlement will probably be more realistic, but first the parties must go through the motions of trying for a constitutional settlement.
- (3)
- US influence is limited and should be reserved for the moment, awaiting a moment when the parties would be most receptive.
- (4)
- There may be a real argument in favor of reducing UNFICYP now.
- (5)
- We should be prepared to live with basically the present situation for a long time.
Discussion
Boyatt: The Greco-Turk dialogue contains dangers, especially since the massive withdrawal of mainland Greek forces in 1967, because Greece canʼt deliver on agreements with or promises to Turkey. The dialogue increases Turk expectations and makes the chances of Greece getting reckless more likely. The Bonn Greco-Turk agreement is not acceptable to Makarios. The USG would be better advised to [Page 1027] encourage a GOC/GOT dialogue, as they are the only real players in the game.
There is a tendency for people to think that all that is needed in the talks is for Makarios to compromise. He has already made some compromises, and while he may be the major obstacle to a settlement, he is by no means the only one. The Turks and Turk Cypriots must also compromise.
I donʼt think a constitutional solution is coming, as neither seem prepared to compromise enough. As a result, the USG should not engage its diplomatic capital on such a settlement unless the parties appear very near to agreement and need only a final push. We would be better advised to work for a modus vivendi settlement. I suggest a return to London–Zurich with demilitarization save police forces. This would be a real victory for Turkey in public opinion terms, wouldnʼt change the status quo against the Turks, and would give Makarios the plus of wiping out the politico/military borders of the enclaves.
(Note: At this point it was decided to discuss three major topics: (a) The role of Greece, (b) Makarios as obstacle, and (c) when and how to expend US diplomatic capital.)
THE ROLE OF GREECE
Churchill: Beyond the certainty of Papadopoulos desiring better relations with Turkey, everything is very murky.
Davies: Greece has lost its assets in Nicosia, but the threat of a Greco-Turk move to double enosis remains as a threat in Makariosʼ mind, thus giving Greece some influence with him. We should also bear in mind that Greece might well receive Western support if it imposes a Cyprus solution.
Popper: The lesson of the latest crisis is that Greece is not a monolith. As a result, Greece might make a move in Cyprus, but I doubt that it would be as a result of a real scenario. In order to really move, Greece and Turkey must first agree on what they want done, and they donʼt seem to have so agreed.
Austrian: The military strength of Greece on the Island should not be underestimated.
Boyatt: I agree the National Guard can take all key points, but then what?
Popper: Letʼs agree to disagree.
Herz: We should bear in mind that the White House in the event of a Greek move would probably “let nature take its course” without either helping or hindering. We would simply be forced to then take our lumps in the UN, etc.
[Page 1028]Popper: I doubt if we could maintain a “hands off” policy as a crisis proceeded, particularly in light of the Moscow meeting atmosphere.2 The White House might now be more sympathetic toward discouraging a dynamic solution.
Dillon: Since the latest crisis Turkey is fairly discouraged with the Greek ability to deliver. I would have problems with us saying this to Turkey, however. I also agree that Turkey should talk with the GOC, but I donʼt know how to achieve this.
Popper: How much initiative on Cyprus can we expect from the Melen Government?3
Dillon: None; they are not that interested in Cyprus.
Popper: But they are sending considerable funds to Cyprus, making belligerent statements, etc.
Stoddard: This is reactive.
Boyatt: (Referring to Herz comment above), the assumption behind such a White House attitude is that a dynamic move would go surgically, cleanly. It wonʼt; instead there will be a long messy period which would elicit some Soviet reaction.
Popper: The longer it takes, the worse it will get. Herz: Please understand I was not advocating a “hands off” policy.
Boyatt: We should in fact expend capital to avoid the kind of dynamic move that would put us in such a situation.
MAKARIOS AS OBSTACLE
Popper: How much do we need Makarios to achieve a settlement? How stable would the GOC be without him? Could the GOC negotiate and agree on a settlement without him?
It is clear to me that Makarios can deliver a settlement, but that the GOC would negotiate more flexibly without him.
Silva: There are two traps here: First, assuming Greece has a single policy and, second, assuming that if Greece moves against Makarios, it will do so militarily. This is nonsense, since Turkey will prevent a Greek military move. It is much more likely that Greece will launch a conspiracy against Makarios (i.e., assassinate him).
Popper: This is always possible.
Boyatt: I donʼt think Clerides could hold power; there are too many Cypriot leaders who are not willing to accept him.
Popper: Without Makarios I would expect Cypriot politics to become as individualistic as Greek politics. With him there is stability.
[Page 1029]U.S. ROLE
Popper: A possible return to London–Zurich would be difficult to achieve because it is a difficult system resting on the idea of a joint government. I see few signs of movement in that direction; rather the movement is toward a stable separation.
Boyatt: The latter means the continuance of two armed camps facing each other.
Popper: How about disarming at the same time?
Boyatt: This could be done, but what does Turkey get from that. London–Zurich, on the other hand, gives the Turks a diplomatic victory. Turkey wants too much; under a return to London–Zurich, they would retain the international guarantees and no longer have to pay the $25 million dole. What they would not retain is the separation of the communities.
Popper: The real problem, however, is the willingness of the Turk Cypriots to give up the separation which they see as their protection.
Dillon: Turkey would like the symbol of London–Zurich, but there are other problems. With the enclaves you do have a certain stability in the sense that with the existence of two armed camps, all must be careful in their dealing with each other. If something happens to the Turk Cypriots when there are no enclaves, there would be more danger of a Turk intervention because Turk public opinion would insist on defense of the then defenseless Turk Cypriots.
Boyatt: Keeping the enclaves raises the risk of an accidental explosion.
Austrian: The Turk Cypriots will not give up the enclaves.
Boyatt: But will Ankara?
Austrian: I believe the Turk Cypriots could sell their point of view in Ankara.
Popper: Denktash says that once trust and confidence is built, you can move forward.
A basic question concerns whether we ought to encourage either a beefed-up local autonomy scheme or a tacit agreement to maintain the status quo.
Davies: At this point perhaps we should discuss Xenia Vunovicʼs proposal (attached)4 which, while maintaining the enclaves and the London-Zurich guarantees, gives the chance to work out problems of co-existence in Nicosia.
[Page 1030]Popper: Cyprus is too small to separate out Nicosia. In addition, Nicosia is too central to the problem.
Vunovic: I chose one city because I felt the Turk Cypriots could not accept a loss of security in villages, many of which are remote. In addition, I felt that bringing the Turk middle class in Nicosia into the economy would be helpful.
Popper: Nicosia is the heart and center of the Turk Cypriot community.
Austrian: I agree. If the Turks were to accept this plan, the whole Cyprus problem would be settled. (Also, most Turk refugees are in Nicosia.)
Popper: What about Limassol?
Stoddard: It would seem odd to do it there.
Herz: An alternative would be to take smaller steps, to creep up to this in stages.
Rotklein: The Turks would object.
Popper: The problem is finding an acceptable trade off.
Herz: In Vienna after the War we had no trouble arranging joint police patrols, and decisions on who should have jurisdiction where. Could we achieve this in Cyprus by getting the GOC to extend economic benefits to the Turks. If this works, we could move onward.
Rotklein: Arenʼt we overlooking the forest for the trees? We have a bad atmosphere on Cyprus. If we could alleviate this atmosphere by, for example, getting a declaration from Greece that there will be no enosis…
Silva: Greece canʼt do it.
Davies: Could they make such a declaration in terms of Hellenism over-riding physical boundaries?
Rotklein: With the Turks declaring against partition.
Silva: It would have to be more positive in nature.
Dillon: Enosis is not the issue; Turk Cypriot fear of a shot in the back is.
Popper: This kind of declaration would have to be a part of a settlement.
Dillon: How far will Makarios go on local autonomy?
Popper: He is in no hurry.
U.S. POLICY
Popper: What and how much of a role should we play? Our suggestions, which we can easily keep making, have no great weight.
Davies: What capabilities do we have in fact?
Popper: Basically, we will be the last step, when all else has failed.
[Page 1031]Stoddard: We could draw up a scheme of our own. We shouldnʼt be the cushion nor should we work through Greece.
Vunovic: Neither negotiators have any new ideas in mind. What happens if a deadlock now occurs? Either we, the UK, or the UN should do something now.
Popper: It is no problem for us to feed in ideas, to illustrate our continued interest and good will. If there is a deadlock on local autonomy, we should push small steps involving a trade off of economic benefits for the Turk Cypriots and a partial opening up of the enclaves for the GOC; at the same time we should discourage any evidence of a dynamic solution. Finally, we should accept the fact that the situation will continue like this for a long time.
Silva: Isnʼt there now a stronger threat of the UN putting pressure on Greece and Turkey?
Armitage: Just continuing as we are is dangerous with UNFICYP contributors getting restless, etc. If the talks deadlock shortly, I am not sure the contributors wonʼt say enough is enough.
Popper: UNFICYP will probably decrease in size in the future. Since 1967, it has been proven that the communities can regulate their affairs and that 3,000 UN troops arenʼt necessary to keep the peace. Thereʼs no reason why we canʼt go to a 500–1,000 man observer force without an interpositionary role.
I donʼt think decreasing UNFICYP would now be a real source of pressure on the parties to compromise.
Davies: I think we should do a planning exercise on decreasing the force to an observer/dispute-resolving force.
We must continue to support the talks, I see no real change in our action scenario except in the sense of doing some contingency planning.
Vunovic: Will Turkey put up with a continuation of the talks?
Popper: Everyone is afraid of a vacuum. Besides, there is nothing they have to gain from stopping the talks.
Dillon: There would have to be a radical change in the GOT (e.g., a coup by younger officers).