Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

400. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 13, 1972, 1147Z.

313. For the Secretary From Popper. Ref: Athens 793.²

1. I am glad Henry Tasca invited Nicosia comment on Athens 793, substance of which he and I discussed when I passed through Athens yesterday Feb 12.

2. All of us agree on importance of strong NATO southern flank and of Greek-Turkish cooperation as regards Cyprus and other potentially disruptive issues. We would agree, too, that a Cyprus settlement acceptable to Greece and Turkey would bolster US position in Eastern Mediterranean against Soviets and generally.

3. I think Henry oversimplifies the picture when he suggests that because Makarios is intransigent and thus stands in the way of such a settlement, he should be brushed aside. If we look at the matter solely in this way, we are taking a very big gamble. We are writing off the possibility that Makarios may dig in and resist; that a civil war may be started among the Greeks of Cyprus; that it may very well spill over to involve Turks; and that the Soviet Union will move in.

4. Moscow Radio (FBIS Kyrenis of M122012) is already setting the stage for possible action. It is saying that the strings of the plot against the lawful government of Makarios originate in the US and NATO and pass through Athens. GOG activity is described as intervention in internal affairs of an independent member of the UN in order to replace Makarios with a Cyprus Govt obedient to US and NATO, with the island to become a US and NATO base. The USSR continues to oppose such moves on principle.

5. While distorted though all this is, it points up the basic question we need to face. It is perfectly legitimate to look at the Cyprus problem in balance of power terms, but we had better be sure we have thought through the risks of a Greek power play directed against Makarios. If Makarios digs in and the Greeks roll over him, is it our estimate that the USSR will simply rant publicly and grumble privately and let another NATO foothold be established in an area it now claims is within its security zone? Will this be helpful in the talks the President will be having in Moscow in May? Can we just write off the UN reaction, and its exploitation by the Communists, so soon after we went to bat in the UN for the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan?

6. What I am suggesting is that there are more facets to the problem than reftel indicates. There are enough difficulties involved in simply ratifying the Greek plan of action as it unfolds (except for Amb Panayotacos here, they apparently did not even hint at it to us) for US to be justified in at least trying to hold the Greek Govt down a bit. There is still a good chance to work this problem out by diplomacy, and I think we can play a part. This entails risks for US, too, but I hope that both sides of the equation will be fully weighed in the next few days.³

7. Dept please repeat as desired.

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Dated February 11, it made suggestions regarding a U.S. response to the crisis in relations between Makarios and the Greek Government. (Ibid., Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73)
3. In telegram 312 from Nicosia, February 12, 1005Z, Popper reported that Makarios appeared to be looking to the United States for assistance in the crisis and requested authorization to schedule a meeting with him. (Ibid.) In telegram 25339 to Nicosia, February 13, 2153Z, drafted by Sisco, the Department of State responded to both telegrams 312 and 313 from Nicosia: “1. You can be assured that the factors cited in your para 5 of Nicosiaʼs 313 are and will continue to be weighed as our day-by-day review continues. 2. If you receive a direct or indirect request from Makarios, you should attempt to delay the meeting as long as possible, hopefully at least until February 15. If meeting unavoidable, you should listen and report. We should avoid any indication of possible U.S. role.” (Ibid.)