401. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- WSAG Meeting on Cyprus—February 14
The latest sitrep is immediately attached.2
[Page 985]The Issues
There are two issues which provide the framework for the discussion:
- —The basic one is whether we are prepared to acquiesce in a Greek-Turk solution to the Cyprus problem whatever it may be or whether we have a sufficient interest in avoiding the worst consequences of that course to try now to promote a negotiated solution. A negotiated solution would be one in which the Cypriot Government might change, but Cyprus would remain an independent nation.
- —The secondary question is: If we are prepared to keep our hands off and to let events take their course, how long can we do this without being forced into a position of apparent collusion with Greece and Turkey with the Soviet Union taking the side of Cyprus, perhaps even with a show of naval forces?
As you can perceive, the debate is beginning to shape up this way:
- —One view is that the US has an interest in heading off a Greek-Turk solution which could end in the partitioning of Cyprus. Two sentences in a draft cable Saturday (not cleared)3 capture this concern: “The US is publicly committed to the political independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The US cannot afford to associate itself as a matter of principle with a move that extinguished the independence existence of Cyprus.”
- —Another view is that we would be prepared to acquiese in whatever solution Greece and Turkey work out, although we would take a public posture opposing any solution that threatened Cyprusʼ existence.
The arguments made for the first approach are that a Greek-Turk solution would give the USSR an opportunity to pose as protector of Cyprus and to face the US down unless the US were prepared to back Greece and Turkey firmly. US backing for them would put the US in collusion with what might become a blatant outside effort to change the nature of the Cypriot state.
The arguments made for the second approach are that there can be no real stability between Greece and Turkey until there is a Cyprus solution that meets the concerns of both. They are much closer to the situation, and we should stand aside for the time being and take whatever risks are involved from standing aside rather than risk aborting a move that might improve chances for stability.
Your talking points4 cover these issues and the ramifications they open up as well as the operational issue that arises from Ambassador Popperʼs concern that he will have to see Makarios soon.