399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, and the Mission to the United Nations1
Washington, February 12, 1972,
2307Z.
Tosec 23/25316. Please pass Secretary Rogers at Key Biscayne. For Ambassadors Tasca, Handley, Popper and Phillips.
- 1.
- We have reviewed the situation once again and will continue to do so on a day-to-day basis.
- 2.
- We share fully GOG/GOT concern at Czech arms importations and support them in the move already made by them to the UN to get arms under effective UN control.
- 3.
- Thus far, we have pointed out to our Greek friends the dangers in the present course and the need to exhaust peaceful remedies. We welcome GOG assurance peaceful remedies will be exhausted. A peaceful settlement of the situation to mutual satisfaction of Greece and Turkey would constitute positive achievement in terms of strengthening the cohesiveness of the southern flank of NATO as well as the American position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Whether Greeks can achieve that objective, it is difficult to judge, particularly since there seems to be a difference of assessment as to whether Makarios can whip up public support on his own behalf or whether GOG assessment that [Page 982] it will have broad support is correct one. Significance of action by Clerides urging Makarios in effect to agree to Greek demands to form government of national unity is difficult to assess. At minimum, Makariosʼ delay in surfacing this matter publicly indicates that he is sufficiently concerned to try to find some peaceful way out.
- 4.
- In these circumstances, we wish all of you, pending further developments, to maintain a posture of cautious, watchful waiting and a low silhouette. These should be no assumption that US intends to play a leading good offices role since this time, unlike the previous two crises, this is not a matter in which a war seems likely between our two NATO allies—Greece and Turkey. This means being readily available to talk to your governments and in the case of Phillips to be available to talk to Waldheim, but at this juncture avoiding any US initiatives. If there are attempts to involve US directly, we will wish to weigh on their merits individual requests, such as passing along messages or similar role.
- 5.
- If Veniamen or Makarios takes the initiative with US to suggest that a deal would be possible on the basis of the Czech arms being taken over by the UN in exchange for Grivasʼ leaving, Popper should in first instance urge GOC to convey this proposal directly to GOG. He should not offer to pass on message, and, if asked to do so, should not give encouragement but seek instructions.
- 6.
- With respect to the UN, we note report that GOT and GOG have gone to UN asking it to take steps to put Czech arms under UNFICYP custody.2 Without taking the initiative and only if Waldheim asks US views, USUN should make clear that if UN can get this done, it would be a constructive contribution in current situation. If GOG and GOT have doubts on this score and raise the issue, Tasca and Handley should make clear our position, but should take no initiative to raise subject.
- 7.
- We will, of course, watch closely indications of possible Soviet involvement and generally share Moscowʼs assessment of possible Soviet position as described in Moscow 1282.3
- 8.
- If addressees have any comments on this message, thoughts or suggestions, please send them along in Nodis category.
Irwin
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Sisco, cleared by Kissinger, Davies, Boyatt, Saunders, C.H. Thomas (S/S–O), and Armitage (IO/UNP). Repeated immediate to the White House, London, and Moscow.↩
- For documentation, see Secretary Generalʼs Special Report, March 16, 1972, UN doc. S/10564 and Add. 1, 2.↩
- National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 717, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. 19 Feb. 1972.↩