Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

395. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 11, 1972, 1000Z.

288. Subject: Czech Arms.

1. Panayotacos is with the Archbishop now. Call began at 1000 hours local (0800 GMT).

2. From here it seems patent that Czech arms transaction is only a pretext for achievement of a long held GOG (Papadopoulos) desire to unseat Makarios. It looks very much as if Greece has set the wheels in motion and is unlikely to be talked out of its plans. Full picture is not yet in, but it would seem that National Guard units loyal to Greece are being positioned to take over key installations in Nicosia on signal. We assume the signal will come sooner rather than later. GOG must realize that delay will give Makarios more time to marshal his physical and diplomatic defense.

3. As a matter of naked power—which it was said it will not use—Greece may be able to pull this off. If Greece intends to use the National Guard for this purpose, is not really counting on mass support and is willing take the international onus, it can probably seize control of the Presidential Palace and other vital Govt installations. But if this is not its intent, its planning is based on some incredibly bad estimates. Two comments made by Palamas to Amb Tasca stand out.²

4. Palamas quotes Panayotacos as being “quite certain Greek Cypriots would choose Greece over Makarios.” If we are talking in terms of popular will rather than recourse to violence that is ridiculous. The feeling for Hellenism is strong here, but the junta is held in low esteem and the admiration which Greek Cypriots have for Makarios would, if translated into votes, turn any Western democratic politician green with envy.

5. Palamasʼ other statement which seems baseless is that because of Czech arms deal Makarios is in a weak position to appeal to UN. To us the case seems to be quite the contrary. Makarios should not be hard put to demonstrate that arms were imported to counter a conspiracy aided and abetted by Govt of Greece. In a Security Council context we think he would find many supporters, not the least the Soviets. We would not be surprised to see Soviet Amb Barkovsky be Makariosʼ next caller after Panayotacos.

Crawford

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Athens, Ankara, USUN, London, and USNATO. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 CZECH.
2. See footnote 2, Document 393.