Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

396. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 11, 1972, 1121Z.

762. Subj: Cyprus: Meeting with Prime Minister on Delivery of Greek Note to Makarios. Ref: Athens 760; State 023559.²

1. I called on Prime Minister this morning at 0830, in accordance with appointment we arranged last evening. I went over Secretaryʼs message with Papadopoulos point by point. Under point (C) I explained why we viewed Greek initiative as potentially highly dangerous, pointing out again, as I told him I had pointed out on other occasions to Palamas, options open to Makarios in reacting to any pressure. I presented point (D) by stating that an indication of how seriously the U.S. felt about issue of Czech arms was not only our view on desirability that all diplomatic possibilities be exhausted, but that we prepared to make all-out effort to see that such diplomatic possibilities for settling the issue had the maximum chance of success.

2. Prime Minister then made lengthy statement of his position on problem which he introduced by asking what it was that made U.S. consider Greek initiative highly dangerous. I gave him possible scenario of what could happen if Makarios felt undue pressure were being placed upon him, referring as I developed the scenario to statements made by Palamas supporting our fears that events might actually develop in this way. I mentioned publication of letter, possible demonstrations of support for Makarios, reaction by Grivas, possibility of violence, and prospect of Security Council being quickly drawn in where Makarios would have friends strongly supporting his position against Greek Governmentʼs unbearable pressures upon him. I then gave PM my own personal estimate that China and Soviets and many countries of Third World would support Makarios against efforts of the Greek Government to put him in extreme difficulty.

3. Prime Minister, after this explanation, said he was surprised by our characterization of Greek action program as “highly dangerous,” and he was surprised by U.S. position on Greek program. He said facts were that Makarios bought arms to give to the Communists in Cyprus because they were solidly backing his policies with Lyssaridesʼ men, and it certain that bloodshed would ensue. Greek Government not only one of the forces for guaranteeing peace on island but is also government of country with blood relationship to Cypriots. Greek Cypriots are also Greeks. It is an historic fact that Hellenism has been cursed by civil war and fratricide. It historical necessity to find as soon as possible peaceful way of dealing with situation and to find most appropriate measures to avert clear dangers which could ensue. This action program had been very carefully studied and cannot be taken as action by one government interfering in internal affairs of another government.

4. Prime Minister said letter, which would be delivered at 1000 this morning to Makarios, is a statement, a kind of announcement, to Cypriot Government urging them to deliver Czech arms to the United Nations and also then urging them to undertake actions within their Government which would restore national unity. This action could be whatever ways and means Cypriot Government feels would be best, and only very very delicately is it implied and hinted that one of the means for restoring national government would be reshuffle of Cypriot Government. No mention whatever made of Makarios having a major or minor role in it. The only mention of government is that it should be composed of men of great integrity and trust.

5. Prime Minister added: “If this action is considered as a highly dangerous one, I just wonder what action wouldnʼt be? Would you rather we left the field to the Turks and allowed them to carry out their threat of sending arms in turn to Turkish Cypriots, which they will probably do at the time of rotation of Turkish contingent, which would encourage highly dangerous situation?” To back his certainty that Ankara considering sending arms to Cyprus, he quoted from report of conversation between American Ambassador in Ankara and Greek Ambassador there, who had spoken to officials of Turkish Government. American Ambassador had said that Foreign Minister Bayulken told him that GOT was considering restoring balance which had been upset by sending arms to Turkish Cypriot community. Turkish Ambassador to Washington had said much the same. Prime Minister added that contacts of American officials in Ankara show that Turks not intending to take hasty action, and in any event no action in the immediate future. However, Turkish Ministry of Defense appears far more worried about issue of Czech arms than Turkish Foreign Ministry.

6. With this picture in mind and with logic and sequence of his views expressed briefly, and with real surprise at characterization given to GOG action program as “highly dangerous,” he felt obliged to state that Greek Government feels “national imperative to keep same stand regarding letter which will be delivered at 10 oʼclock today.” However, Prime Minister said letter would not be made public today or tomorrow, February 11 or 12. He hopes that within next 24 hours U.S. will do its best to urge and convince Makarios to hand over arms.

7. In response I expressed my deep regret to Papadopoulos that he did not see fit to postpone sending letter, until we could have further opportunity for discussion. He said he would be pleased to discuss matter further, perhaps even later today. I said I thought this would be most useful.³ I asked him whether I could report to my government that he fully supported principle in para (D) on the desirability of exhausting all diplomatic possibilities. His answer was “most certainly.” Finally, I asked him if we could have copy of letter. He said he would send a copy to me later in morning after letter had been delivered to Makarios.⁴

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Nicosia, Ankara, USUN, USNATO, and London. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP.
2. Telegram 760 from Athens, February 11, 1020Z provided a summary of Tascaʼs discussion with Papadopoulos. (Ibid.) Telegram 23559 is summarized in footnote 2, Document 394.
3. No record of a subsequent meeting was found.
4. Telegram 772 from Athens, February 11, 1324Z, contained the text in addition to an Embassy commentary. (Ibid.)