Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 10, 1972, 2321Z.

750. Ref: State 023559.² For Secretary from Ambassador Tasca.

1. On receipt your message I immediately sought interview with Prime Minister, explaining that despite late hour I had important message from Secretary which could not wait until morning. Few minutes later I received answer that PM in bed, not well, and could not see me before morning. I replied that unfortunately this not good enough. Washington taking very seriously question of note to Makarios, which in fact constituted ultimatum. It essential I be able to discuss this problem with PM.

2. Prime Ministerʼs private secretary and interpreter, who closest confidant, shortly called back to say PM could see me at 0830 tomorrow morning (February 11). I said I wanted to know for certain that this would allow time for me fully to discuss problem before Panayotakos carried out his instructions. Reply to this message was that PM could not meet me before 0830 tomorrow.

3. In course of passing my messages to PM I got through to Papadopoulos content of your message, and there no question but what he fully aware our position. I will deliver your message in person to him at 0830 tomorrow, which should give PM time to change Panayotakosʼ instructions, if he is willing to do so.

4. British Ambassador has just called me (0120) to say he has received instructions to take same position as US with GOG and was seeking to do so.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia and Ankara. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP.
2. Dated February 10, 1950Z, it instructed Tasca to call on Papadopoulos and urge him to use all diplomatic channels to find a solution to the Czech arms crisis. At a minimum, Tasca should request that Greek action be postponed to allow for discussion with the United States and the NATO allies. (Ibid.)