378. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers1

Cyprus: Strategy Papers

In accordance with the consensus at the August 11 SRG meeting on Cyprus,2 NEA has prepared two papers dealing with the evolving situation.

At Tab A is a strategy paper exploring options for controlling the Cyprus situation by diplomatic mediation designed to sustain the ongoing local talks. I recommend that the U.S. role involve quiet and indirect support of mediation under some form of UN aegis.

At Tab B is a contingency paper outlining appropriate U.S. responses to outbreaks of violence on the island. Our reactions would vary depending on circumstances, but generally involve direct U.S. diplomatic activity (usually in conjunction with the U.K.) in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Washington, and support of UN efforts on the ground in Cyprus and in New York.

Recommendation

That you approve the approach outlined in the strategy paper at Tab A. This approach, and the contingency paper at Tab B will be discussed at an SRG meeting now scheduled for September 8.3

Tab A4

Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps

Situation

Ten years of experience with the Cyprus problem demonstrate one constant: when the parties to the dispute are not negotiating, the [Page 920] probability of violence increases exponentially. Since June 1968, the local talks have kept the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context. In addition, this instrumentality has provided what is the unique advantage of having the people directly concerned discuss those problems which directly concern them.

On August 9, the Turk Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, tabled a paper setting forth the “final” Turkish Cypriot position. He insisted on and made all Turk Cypriot compromises made thus far contingent upon the establishment of a separate and autonomous Turk Cypriot administration from the village to the national level. He also raised the need for a specific GOC disavowal of enosis (union with Greece) and injected the question of international guarantees. Archbishop Makarios subsequently declared the talks “deadlocked,” although neither party has made a move to break off negotiations.

With the local talks approaching termination and frustration levels rising on all sides, the possibility of an outbreak of violence is greater than at any time since 1968. Rather than react to a violent development the Cyprus situation would be better dealt with by seeking to revive US/UK/UN diplomacy. The goal of such a diplomatic effort would be preservation of negotiations to avoid a confrontation on the island which would sooner or later bring in Greece and Turkey on opposite sides. There are several options and variations thereon; all of them involve some form of mediation.

Mediation Option I: UN

UN mediation has clear advantages. First, the UN is already seized of the problem and is on the spot. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council are involved in the Cyprus problem as a result of the March 4, 1964 (and subsequent) Resolutions5 and the presence of the United Nations Force (UNFICYP) on the island. Second, with the UN out in front, Greek, Turk, and Cypriot fire would be concentrated on that organization rather than any specific country. Third, the UN provides a broad cover for both neutral mediation and, at a later stage, perhaps the guaranteeing of the results of that mediation. There are, however, problems with the UN being the focus of activity. The Turks/Turk Cypriots have already expressed their antipathy toward UN mediation, preferring instead the convening of the London-Zurich guarantor powers. Moreover, in a UN mediation effort US inputs would necessarily be diluted by the views of others, and it is difficult for the UN as an institution to bring pressure to bear on the parties.

[Page 921]

Variant A. By far the most preferable variation of the UN mediation option would involve consultations among the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots which would result in joint agreement on a mediator and the principles upon which mediation would be based. The initiative for the consultations could be undertaken by any one of the parties, preferably Turkey, or perhaps could be jointly undertaken by Greece and Turkey through their dialogue. Once the parties had agreed on a person and on guidelines, U Thant could formally give the individual his blessing and the mediation would proceed. A retired senior statesman (e.g., Lester Pearson) or an internationally-renowned legal expert (e.g., Edward Hambro of Norway or Pierre Laline of Switzerland) would be preferable to a currently active “super star.” The latter might raise hopes too high with the danger that the failure of his mission would bring increased tension.

Variant B. Archbishop Makarios could unilaterally request U Thant either to undertake a mediation effort on the basis of the March 4, 1964 Resolution or to activate his good offices under the December 22, 1967 Resolution.6 The problem here would be that the Turks might reject the concept of mediation because it was a Makarios proposal. In any case, were the Archbishop to take a UN initiative, the US would be forced to support the effort.

Variant C. It is possible that U Thant or his Special Representative on the island, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, might take the initiative to regenerate the SYGʼs good offices. The local talks were convened by Osorio-Tafall, acting under the SYGʼs good offices mandate, and he then withdrew stating that he would be available for mediation should the sides reach a deadlock. U Thantʼs next report to the SC on Cyprus will be in December in connection with renewal of UNFICYPʼs mandate. He could choose to move in this framework.

Mediation Option II: US

The argument for US mediation is that our position as NATO leader and primary ally of Greece and Turkey, as well as our active mediatory roles via the Ball and Vance Missions to defuse crises, give us the primary responsibility for the Cyprus problem. Since the US is the repository of a great deal of experience with the Cyprus problem and the country most able to influence all the parties, it is incumbent upon us to shape the Cyprus situation in a positive way before there is a crisis and before we are compelled to intervene under the worst possible conditions. Theoretically, this position has much merit. However, as a practical matter in the present circumstances there should be no direct [Page 922] US mediation. The reasons are that such an effort would immediately put the US in the middle of a three-cornered struggle of Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots and expose us to criticism from all sides. In addition, our influence would be wasted too early in the game. A direct US intervention should be preserved as a last ditch option in the case of an uncontainable outbreak of violence.

Mediation Option III: Independent

A third variant on mediation would be the appointment of a neutral, non-political third party (preferably European) as mediator. This option would probably not emerge spontaneously, but could be stimulated by the US, acting in concert with the UK, or within the NATO framework. For example, Italy, with its interest in playing a significant role in “Mediterranean” diplomacy, might be stimulated to perform the mediatory function. Also, Italy has outstanding candidates such as elder statesman Manlio Brosio or legal expert Roberto Ago. Independent mediation, like a UN effort, has the advantage of placing someone else out in front. Another positive factor is that lack of direct involvement with the UN would make an independent mediator more palatable to the Turks. The main problems would be the difficulty of finding a willing candidate and again the inevitable dilution of US inputs and lack of influence on the countries concerned.

US Diplomatic Strategy

Given the dangers inherent in the situation on the ground, the need for the US to keep the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context and the considerations involved in mediation, it would be best for the US quietly to reactivate its diplomacy vis-à-vis Cyprus. In general terms, our goal should be to insure that in the case of a real stalemate in the intercommunal talks and increasing violence on the Island a mediation effort can be quickly and efficiently mounted. The ideal kind of mediation would be that outlined in Option I A, i.e., a UN-sponsored effort stimulated by the parties and involving a mediator and guidelines previously agreed upon. The next most feasible approach would be Option III. In either case the US role should be that of an amicus curiae providing behind the scenes ideas and support.

At the very minimum, if we are successful in proceeding with mediation, the negotiating process will be spun out and time will be gained. At the maximum, breakthroughs might be achieved which would either solve the Cyprus problem or provide for a more stable modus vivendi.

Next Steps:

1.
We believe Assistant Secretary Sisco should call in the Turkish, Greece, and Cypriot Ambassadors (with supporting actions in the cap [Page 923] itals) and ask them to clarify their positions as reflected in the latest documents exchanged in the local talks. In addition, he should discuss with them where we go from here on the Cyprus problem, emphasizing the U.S. desire for diplomacy and negotiation, and probing reactions to UNSYG good offices (which Makarios has already floated in the press).
2.
The next step would be determined by events in the coming weeks. The Foreign Ministers of all the parties will be in New York for the UNGA and, if stalemate and crisis seem imminent, Secretary Rogers will consider exploring with the Foreign Ministers (particularly Olcay of Turkey) some form of mediation as generally outlined in Option I A.

Tab B7

CYPRUS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR VIOLENT INCIDENTS

The historical record shows that serious intercommunal violence has often erupted in Cyprus. An action-reaction escalation of violence could bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation as in 1964, 1965, and 1967. With the local talks between Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot negotiators now approaching deadlock and with frustration and uncertainty increasing, the coming weeks and months will be particularly delicate.

Our contingency plans are based on past Cyprus crisis management and are geared for quick reaction to contain violence. U.S. responses vary depending on the kind and scale of the incident, which side initiated the violence and for what reason.

Procedure in Case of Accidental Incidents: In the case of an accidental shooting incident, a small scale provocation, or a loss of control by the Greek or Turk Cypriot leadership of a sizeable portion of its military forces or civilian population, initial US responses would appropriately focus on Cyprus itself.

1.
The United Nations force on the ground (UNFICYP) has in the past, and could today, successfully interpose its troops between the local opposing groups.
2.
Our Embassy in Nicosia would encourage rapid UNFICYP interposition and would make strong representations (probably in conjunction with other Embassies and U Thantʼs Special Representative) calling for either the GOC and/or the Turk Cypriot leadership to restore discipline and order within their ranks.
3.
On the international diplomatic level we would encourage joint US, UK, UN diplomatic démarches in London, Washington, New York, Athens and Ankara in support of efforts on the Island to contain the violence.

Procedure in Case of Premeditated Violence on a Small Scale: Premeditated violence, by either the GOC or the Turk Cypriots, is always a possibility. Because the vast majority of the mainland Greek troops on Cyprus were withdrawn in the wake of the 1967 crisis, Cyprus is today virtually defenseless relative to Turkey. For this reason Makarios would surely not go so far as to generate incidents which might invite mainland Turkish intervention. However, it is conceivable that His Beatitude might stimulate incidents simply to get the UN more involved by obtaining an increase in the size of UNFICYP and/or diplomatic intervention by the Secretary General or the Security Council. In such an event, the scale of violence would probably be kept as small as possible and U.S. reaction would be as described in steps 1, 2, and 3 in the above paragraph.

Procedure in Case of Large-Scale Violence: By far the most dangerous contingency would be a decision by the Turk/Turk Cypriot side to provoke violence as a prelude to Turk military intervention for the purpose of forcibly partitioning the Island. In this event our primary task would be to persuade the GOT that such a violent course of action would be self-defeating.

1.
We would encourage UNFICYP to interpose its forces. If the fighting is on a large scale UNFICYP interposition might be futile (as in 1967). Certainly in the case of an invasion from Turkey UNFICYP would not take preventive action.
2.
In concert with the UK, and other interested parties, the U.S. would make representations in Ankara, Washington, and London to convince the Turks that the GOCʼs ability to generate a full scale international crisis would inevitably bring mainland Greece into conflict with Turkey, activate the international community against what would be regarded as stark aggression, and possibly involve the Soviet Union in a manner inimical to Turkish interests.
3.
A corollary diplomatic move would be to activate the United Nations. U Thantʼs Special Representative on the Island and UNFICYP would no doubt be involved ab initio in efforts to stop the fighting. In addition, we could consider an emergency session of the Security Council with a view to mobilizing support for an immediate cessation of hostilities.
4.
NATO would be involved in a full-blown Cyprus crisis. Since the 1963–1964 period, the Secretary General has maintained a Watching Brief. If serious hostilities were to occur, we would activate the NATO Secretary General (as in 1967) to support our diplomatic efforts to counsel moderation and achieve an end to the fighting.
5.
Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale outlined above remains the Special Presidential Mission. Both were crucial in stopping the shooting in 1964 and 1967 respectively. This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation caused by serious fighting on the Island.

The Soviet Dimension: The attitude of the Soviet Union in the event of serious intercommunal violence is difficult to predict. The Soviets appear to have two distinct and partially conflicting policy goals. On the one hand, a constant in Russian policy has been preservation of the independence and territorial integrity, i.e., the “non-NATOization,” of Cyprus. On the other hand, the USSR has courted Turkey fairly consistently in recent years. The most probable course of Soviet diplomacy would be to make threatening noises against outside interventions while attempting to cool off Makarios in order to avoid the possibility of such interventions. In any UN activity they would probably come down on the side of a small independent nation but not strongly enough to badly irritate Turkey. In short, in the case of a Cyprus crisis, I would anticipate that the Soviet policy would be verbal as indeed it was in 1967.

Converting a Crisis Into Progress: In the past, Cyprus has presented opportunity in crisis. If the situation, either by accident or design, should deteriorate to the point where there is large scale fighting and the threat of Turk invasion, and if such a crisis can be defused by diplomacy, then we should give active consideration to steps which might subsequently by taken to assist in removing the basic causes of strife between the two communities. An example of this procedure was the successful US/UK/UN drive to initiate the local talks in 1968 following the Vance Missionʼs successful resolution of the 1967 crisis.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Boyatt on August 27, concurred in by Davies, and cleared by Thornton (S/PC). Tabs A and B were sent to the White House, which in turn sent them to the members of the Senior Review Group on September 4 for discussion at the September 8 meeting. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
  2. See Document 376.
  3. Rogers initialed the approve option on September 3.
  4. Drafted by Boyatt on August 27; concurred in by Davies, Sisco, and S/PC; in substance by Churchill, Pugh, and Armitage; and in information by Richard Davies (EUR).
  5. Text of Security Council Resolution 186, March 4, 1964, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 566–567.
  6. Security Council Resolution 244; text is ibid., 1967, p. 372.
  7. Secret. Drafted by Boyatt on August 27, concurred in by Rodger Davies and Sisco; in substance by Churchill, Pugh and Richard Davies; and in information by Armitage.