Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

379. Telegram From the Embassy to Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, September 7, 1971, 1620Z.

4691. Ref: Athens 4625.² Subj: Cyprus: My Meeting with Palamas Following Makarios Visit.³ Department please pass EUCOM and USDOCOSOUTH.⁴

1. Summary: Palamas has told me that Makarios visit did not go well. Prime Minister was quite blunt with Archbishop, and they parted with differences unresolved. However, he thought Makarios now recognized Greece would have final say in any question over Cyprus in which its vital interests involved. This particularly true of any attempt by Makarios further to involve Soviet Union in Cyprus problem. If Makarios takes any initiatives that get him into trouble with Turkey, he will be on his own. On the other hand, Greece will not permit Turkey to alter London-Zurich agreements by unilateral change in status quo. Palamas does not know what proposals Olcay may put forward in their coming talks in NYC. Makarios now expected to abandon intercommunal talks and sit tight in Cyprus, trusting on Soviet Union to prevent Turkish intervention, while instructing Kyprianou to seek UN involvement. Turkey opposed to UN mediation, and Greece itself doubts usefulness of new UN involvement. My chief impression from meeting with Palamas is that GOG will now take tougher line with Turkey, but there at least common ground of London-Zurich accords. However relations with Makarios are in bad state indeed, and we cannot exclude reaction by Greece to any future moves by Makarios that involve Greek interests. Under circumstances we should give closer consideration to question of our own Cyprus policy. End summary.

2. On September 6 I met with Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Palamas for more than an hour in discussion devoted almost entirely to Cyprus. I began conversation by asking Palamas to brief me on Makarios visit, which had ended only a few hours before. Palamas said that official communiqué indicative of how visit had gone. For first time in meeting between Makarios and Greek Prime Minister, it had been impossible to issue usual communiqué stating that there was complete identity of views between Athens and Nicosia. In fact, Makarios visit had fully exposed differences that existed between Greek and Cypriot Governments. Makarios not prepared to make meaningful concessions to Turks, not prepared to return to London-Zurich accords, and apparently thought he could sit out situation without Turks taking action. Not only had Archbishop discounted possibility of Turkish intervention, but he had said Soviet Union would prevent such intervention even if it were attempted. I asked Palamas whether he believed Makarios had commitment from Soviet Union. He replied that he had no way of knowing, but he was convinced that communiqué issued after Makariosʼ Moscow visit did not reflect what really agreed upon by Makarios and Soviet leaders.

3. Palamas said Prime Minister Papadopoulos had done an excellent job during his meetings with Makarios. He had been extremely tough with Archbishop. Palamas thought that for first time Makarios aware that he could no longer manipulate Greece to suit his own aims. As an example of tone of meetings, Prime Minister had pinned Makarios down on question of his provocative statements. After Archbishop had made it plain he prepared to ride out any storm, Papadopoulos had said that if this were his intention, why did he continue to make statements about enosis? Did he really want enosis? Archbishop said that in his heart he desired enosis, but given realities of situation he would have to say he was against it. Prime Minister had retorted, “Then why donʼt you just come out and say you want independence and have done with it?” Makarios had given usual excuses of his vulnerability to criticism by his own community. Papadopoulos had said that was Makariosʼ own problem, but he wanted to make it clear that where Greeceʼs vital interests were involved, Greece intended to have the final say.

4. I asked Palamas what he expected next, given situation he had described. He replied that he expected Makarios to go back to Nicosia and “sit there and do nothing,” and in certain circumstances doing nothing was itself a kind of action. At same time he expected that Kyprianou would be instructed to inform UNSYG that intercommunal talks had reached impasse and to ask that UN take more active role in Cyprus situation. Makariosʼ recourse to UN could take several forms. He might ask UNSYG to use his good offices, or he might make more formal approach which could involve Security Council. I said that UN good offices could conceivably involve some form of mediation. What were Greek Governmentʼs views on mediation? Palamas said he doubted that new UN initiative would prove useful, but in any case Turkish objections to UN mediation were well known. In general Greece would not be happy with bringing Cyprus problem back into UN. However, during his visit to New York he would take opportunity for discussion with UNSYG on what should be done next.

5. Palamas said that he would be leaving Greece on September 19 for two-day official visit to London, where he had been invited for conversations with Foreign Secretary. He would then travel to New York by ship, arriving September 29. He would have to return to Athens on October 10 or 11. In addition to meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Olcay, he would like opportunity to discuss Cyprus with Secretary Rogers. I said that I thought such a meeting would be useful, and I would certainly pass along his request.

6. On meeting with Olcay, I asked Palamas what position he expected Turks to take. Palamas said he did not really know what GOT would propose. He did know, however, that Turkish Foreign Ministry was still talking in one way and Turkish military acting in another. From reports GOG receiving from Ankara it obvious that Turkish military activities on Cyprus have full approval of Turkish military leadership. At this point Palamas said that he wanted to make one thing quite clear. If Makarios embarked on initiatives on his own without consulting Greece and these provoked reaction from Turkey, he should not expect help from Greece. On other hand, if Turkey takes initiatives that involve its relations with Greece, then it no longer a matter for Makarios. For example, Greece does not intend to permit Turkey to alter London-Zurich agreements. Any attempt to establish by administrative means a permanent Turkish Cypriot enclave would be de facto partition and violation of London-Zurich agreements, “and this we will never permit.”

7. I asked Palamas where Greece stood on London-Zurich accords, in view of impasse in intercommunal talks. Palamas replied that Greece took view that London-Zurich accords were valid. Greece would be prepared to consider any improvements in them, but until such improvements agreed upon, all parties still bound by accords. In this regard Greece would not permit Turkey to take any steps that would “make them worse rather than improve them.”

8. I then asked Palamas if he could enlighten me on what PM had in mind when he spoke at Thessaloniki about “bitterness” over Turkish failure to reciprocate friendly gestures by Greece. Palamas said that he had not been informed in advance of what PM had intended to say about Cyprus, but that he had raised question with PM afterwards. PM said he was angered that after having made conciliatory gestures, Denktashʼs last letter to Clerides had contained preposterous claims for equal partnership of Turkish Cypriot population of 18 percent with Greek 80 percent. This had played right into Makariosʼ hands. Palamas said that Archbishop in his meeting with Prime Minister obviously delighted with Denktash reply, saying it proved what he had said all along: that Turks were not prepared to negotiate. Prime Ministerʼs views on Denktash reply had been communicated to Turkish Ambassador, who had tried to claim that Denktashʼs views not necessarily those of GOT. Palamas said he dismissed this argument as disingenuous.

9. Summing up his gloomy view of situation on Cyprus, Palamas said that extremes aid each other. Turkish rigid and unreasonable attitude encouraging Makariosʼ stubbornness and vice versa. In circumstances the Alliance, and particularly U.S. and U.K., would be well advised to take closer interest in developments on Cyprus. Greece had been doing its best to moderate situation but there real danger that Makarios would try to involve Soviet Union, which together with growing strength of local Communists on Cyprus, could create dangerous situation. (See [less than 1 line not declassified] on Greek concern over Makariosʼ intentions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.)

10. Palamas said that when he had spoken of Greece having final say in questions involving Greeceʼs vital national interests, his statement meant to cover such situation as Makarios involving Russians. I said that Makarios had independent ability to take initiatives which Greece could not easily control. Palamas replied, “And the Prime Minister, in that case, has some initiatives that he can take in Cyprus.” Palamas went on to say that while U.S. and U.K. most closely concerned, NATO as a whole needed to be informed on current Cyprus situation, and he believed Secretary General should under his watching brief bring to attention of NATO members dangerous situation developing in Cyprus following other unfavorable developments in Iceland and Malta.

11. Finally, I asked Palamas what he could tell me about Grivasʼ disappearance.⁵ Palamas said PM informed on September 1 and had immediately gotten in touch with him. They had decided that Makarios should be told right away and this was done. PM quite disturbed by this development. Greek Government trying to find out what Grivas planning and where he was, but so far without success, “although it seems he is in Cyprus.” Palamas asked if we had been able to find out anything, and I said that we had no information on Grivasʼ whereabouts or intentions. I asked Palamas what he expected to come of Grivas affair and he said, “Nothing good, of that you can be sure.”

12. Comments: Palamas apparently reflecting not only his own views but those of PM. He is pessimistic, frustrated, but, I felt, also determined that Greece is not going to be made to suffer the consequences of Cypriotsʼ refusal to compromise. He is obviously unhappy with Turkish unwillingness to be more forthcoming in its relations with Greece or in negotiations on Cyprus. But it seems Palamas—and PM—have even bitterer feelings toward Makarios. The main message that I believe Palamas wanted to get across was that Greece is no longer prepared to have Makarios determine its Cyprus policy and reserves its position on what it will do if Makarios again involves Greek interests. This would be particularly true, I feel, of any attempt by Makarios to more deeply involve Soviet Union in Cyprus problem. At same time Palamas emphasized that Greece will not stand idly by if Turkey attempts alter status quo on Cyprus.

13. I have three specific recommendations following my conversation with Palamas:

A. Generally, I think my conversation with Palamas strengthens the view that U.S. interests likely become more involved in Cyprus and that we should give greater urgency to review of U.S. policy and options.

B. Given Greek mood, it would be particularly useful for Secretary to meet with Palamas in New York and I strongly urge such a meeting.

C. I suggest we discuss with NATO SecGen usefulness of his reporting to Alliance on current Cyprus situation.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Moscow, USNATO, and USUN.
2. Dated September 2, it reported the importance the Greek Government attached to Makariosʼs visit. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
3. September 3–6. In telegram 1647 from Nicosia, September 9, Popper reported on the meeting from the perspective of Kyprianou. (Ibid.)
4. A notation on the telegram reads: “Not passed.”
5. Grivas, the former leader of EOKA and ex-commander of the Cypriot National Guard, who had been living in retirement in Athens since his departure from Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1967 crisis, disappeared from his home around September 1.