Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 25, 1971, 1105Z.

4435. Subj: Cyprus: Next Steps. Ref: State 147911.² For Sisco From Ambassador.

1. Summary: In response to your request for my views on Cyprus mediation effort, I suggest that we consider having Secretary urge Greek-Turkish agreement on mediation effort for submission to UNSYG. Prospects for SYGʼs developing agreement on mediation with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus seem slight, but at least it might buy us time if, as appears likely, intercommunal talks cannot be revived. My recommendations made on assumption that Makarios still holds most of trump cards and can spoil any initiative he does not like; that Turkish Government believes time is working against it on Cyprus and that it will take unilateral initiative at some point to prevent further deterioration of its position; and finally that it is unlikely Makarios and Turkish Government will be able to agree on terms of reference for mediation effort which could lead to a solution. In circumstances our best hope may be to involve our two NATO allies in formulation mediation proposal which would, to some extent, preempt Makarios recourse to UN and might inhibit both Makarios and Turkey from taking unilateral action on Cyprus. End summary.

2. My thoughts on next steps in Cyprus are based on three assumptions. I believe that we must keep foremost in our thoughts fact that Makarios still holds most of the trump cards. He has Greek Cypriots behind him, some degree of support from Soviet Union and broad support in the UN. He has demonstrated that he is not subject to dictation by Greece and, indeed, he has the capability for resisting any initiative which is unacceptable to him. Second thought we need to keep in mind in that regardless of whether Turkish Government has decided on some course of unilateral action Turks recognize time is working against them on Cyprus. It is doubtful whether Turkey can acquiesce in continuation present situation if intercommunal talks cannot be revived or if some other form of negotiation cannot be initiated. Third point I see as basic to this situation is irreconcilability of Makarios and Turkish Governmentʼs views on bases for negotiations and therefore on role for mediator.

3. I think that the time has come for U.S. to consider taking more active role before events move in new and adverse direction. Recent messages (USUN 2310 and Nicosia 1482)³ have further clarified situation following Makariosʼ public statement of what has been implicitly recognized privately: Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot positions are virtually irreconcilable through medium of intercommunal talks as presently constitued. It is now clearer that GOT objections to UN mediation remain as strong as ever; Makarios is being propelled by his fear of Greek-Turkish understanding in precisely this direction; and Greece is closer to Turkish position on UN involvement than to that of Makarios, but must for reasons of Greek-Cyprus relations maintain certain degree of ambivalence.

4. In view of present facts of situation I must remain basically pessimistic over Cyprus mediation effort. Perhaps best that we can achieve is to buy some more time, which in the case of Cyprus is always worthwhile. What I am suggesting is that we approach the question of mediation with our eyes open and that, as in the case of intercommunal talks, we make the process of entering into mediation as protracted as possible, since such an effort is, under present circumstances, unlikely to succeed. One of valuable aspects of merely entering into mediation effort is to inhibit both Makarios and Turkish Government from taking unilateral action.

5. We should also, of course, strive to make mediation meaningful, and best prospect it seems to me lies in bringing Turkey in at the initial stage. In this regard, timing may be crucial, in view of exaggerated hopes Turks seem to attach to Olcay–Palamas talks. Secretary might want to consider suggesting to Olcay and Palamas that they try to reach agreement on mediation proposal in their talks in New York. If they succeed they could then approach UNSYG to see whether he would be prepared to undertake mediation effort and to explore ways in which it could be launched. U.S. would of course be in position also to weigh in with SYG at that juncture to urge him to accept task. Greece and Turkey would be able to view mediation effort as their creation, knowing it also enjoyed endorsement of U.S. It would then be up to the Secretary General to negotiate with Makarios on the acceptance of the Greek-Turkish proposal. Alternatively, Greece and Turkey could transmit to SecGen their ideas of mediation and at same time request those of Makarios. SecGen would then be charged with negotiating out agreed terms of reference, or some other solution or approach based on the principle of negotiation rather than unilateral action. Thus Makariosʼ demand for UN mediation would have been met in circumstances which should keep UN situation manageable.

6. I realize that approach which I am suggesting is filled with complications, particularly finding suitable mediator, but I can see no alternative means of launching mediation effort that would not be rejected out of hand by at least one of parties involved. Positive advantages of this formula are that Turkish objective of prior agreement with Greece before next stage in negotiations would be met, while Greece would be extricated from predicament of having to guarantee agreement of Makarios to Greco-Turkish understanding. Fact that mediation launched by joint proposal of our two NATO allies involved would help protect U.S. interests.

7. I may have further thoughts after I see Palamas on Cyprus. In my discussion with him (State 152029)⁴ I do not intend to allude in any way to U.S. policy review. There are other bases for exploring further with Palamas question of Greek position on intercommunal talks, mediation, and London-Zurich accords, which are areas in which we need further clarification of GOGʼs current thinking.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN. A notation on the first page reads: “Sent to San Clemente.” A summary of the telegram was included in Kissingerʼs evening notes, August 25. (Ibid.)
2. Dated August 12, it requested comments on the possibility of a new mediation in the Cyprus dispute. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
3. Telegram 2310 from USUN, August 18, reported on comments made by Turkish representatives on the Cyprus situation. Telegram 1482 from Nicosia, August 18, stated the Embassyʼs preference for a UN rather than a U.S. mediation effort. (Both ibid.)
4. Dated August 19; in it, Sisco instructed Tasca: “In approaching Palamas re GOG position on future of Cyprus problem, your discussions should be couched in terms of recent press speculation on possible UN mediation rather than of US policy review. We should not like to tip our hand in this still very tentative stage of our thinking.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)