Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

320. Memorandum for the Presidentʼs Files¹

Washington, August 4, 1971.

RE

• Meeting between the President, U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry Tasca, and General A. M. Haig, August 4, 1971 (2:56 p.m.–3:49 p.m.)

In welcoming Ambassador Tasca the President complimented him on his excellent performance in testifying before the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.² Ambassador Tasca replied that he was confident that the House action designed to prohibit military grants or sales under the Foreign Assistance Act would not necessarily inhibit the President.³ The President would be able to take the actions necessary to insure that U.S. security was not jeopardized by a cessation of military shipments to Greece. Ambassador Tasca stated that the House Committee understood that the President would exercise the waiver and intentionally provided for this contingency in the draft amendment.

The President then noted that the compulsion in Washington to inflict changes in government upon Greece was on the whole self-defeating. At the same time, he noted that it would be especially helpful if the Greek Government were to announce elections sometime in the future and improve its stance with respect to martial law. He suggested that Ambassador Tasca consider informing the Greek Government that President Nixon, who remained their staunch friend, would welcome in the near future some significant step towards the liberalization of the regime.

The President then commented that he had finally authorized the Vice President to visit Greece and that the visit would take place sometime in October.⁴ The President suggested that Ambassador Tasca might wish to indicate to the Greek leadership that the Vice Presidentʼs visit would provide an outstanding opportunity for making an announcement on the governmentʼs intention to conduct elections. Ambassador Tasca answered that he was not confident that such an approach would succeed and suggested that perhaps the elimination of martial law would be more palatable to the Greek leadership. President Nixon reiterated that the Ambassador should discuss this matter with the Greek leadership, emphasizing the Presidentʼs staunch friendship and support for their regime but also making it clear that our own domestic problem here made some movement necessary if we are to retain the kind of flexibility necessary to provide military and economic assistance to the regime. Ambassador Tasca said that he would undertake this mission.⁵

The meeting adjourned with Ambassador Tasca expressing his appreciation to the President for his continuing support.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Haig. The memorandum was not initialed by Haig because it was retyped by the White House staff on August 11. A tape recording of this Nixon–Tasca conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8.
2. For a sanitized text of Tascaʼs August 3 testimony, see Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d Congress, 1st session, pp. 303–322. In a June 25 memorandum to Haig, Saunders reported that the Department of State was inclined to bring Tasca back from Athens to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “because some critics in Congress have tried to drive a wedge between Tascaʼs policy and State Department policy.” Saunders noted that Tasca was “closer to the President” and therefore the White House would be involved by inference. Haig saw no objection to Tasca testifying and noted: “Tasca can take care of himself.” In backchannel message 1087 from Athens to Kissinger, June 29, Tasca offered to testify to refute critics of the administrationʼs policy in Greece. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, Europe, Middle East, Latin America, 1971) Sonnenfeldt advised Haig on July 1 against “an open hearing on Greek policy.” Saunders, however, recommended to Haig on July 2 that since the House Foreign Affairs Committee had also requested that Tasca testify, they should agree rather than risk a confrontation with the Congress. (Both memoranda are ibid., Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)
3. Reference is to the Hays amendment; see footnote 3, Document 319. According to a transcript prepared by the editors specifically for this volume, Tasca told the President: “I tried to get across to them the point that much as we donʼt like the kind of government theyʼve got, thereʼs no alternative to our policy and the only way weʼre going to get to democracy is through them, because theyʼre firmly in the saddle. And so weʼre going to have to work with them. If you want security [and] democracy, youʼre going to have to work with these fellows.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8)
4. In telegram 3175 from Athens, June 24, Tasca reported that he had been informed of the Greek Governmentʼs displeasure that a forthcoming visit by Agnew to Europe did not include a stop in Greece. Tasca had suggested attention to the Greek desire for a vice presidential visit. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)
5. A transcript of this portion of the conversation, prepared by the editor specifically for this volume, reads: “Tasca: Iʼve gotten the word to him [Papadopoulos] through some of his very close business friends that he ought to help [you?] between now and the end of 1972. It would be useful for him to fix a date for elections. Nixon: Absolutely. You tell him that when you get back. First of all, Iʼd put it to him this way: you say heʼs got a friend here but itʼs damned important.” The Ambassador then turned to the possibility of an Agnew visit to Greece and the President told him to inform the Greeks that “It would be a great thing, a really big thing … if they could make a symbolic [gesture?] before he came.” Nixon then returned to his need for some political help from the junta if he was to continue battling Congress over issues relating to Greece. (Ibid., White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8)
6. In an August 6 letter to Nixon, Tasca stated that he believed his Congressional testimony had reinforced the administration position on Greece before Congress and indicated his desire to continue to serve the President in “an assignment of equal importance… with similar challenge.” In an August 6 letter to Kissinger, the Ambassador described himself as a “lightning rod” for critics of the Presidentʼs policies. In an August 25 reply to both letters, Kissinger responded with “good wishes on your return to what is one of our most challenging diplomatic assignments to say the least.” (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)