321. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Henry Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece
  • Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
  • Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by saying with some emotion that if he could go to Peking he could not understand all the fuss about not allowing people to go to Greece. If you are a dictator, he said, it is only safe to be the enemy of the US. It is none of our business how they run their government. He could understand the necessity for some cosmetics to keep our allies happy. But Greece is certainly freer than its northern neighbors.

Ambassador Tasca replied with equal emotion, “You ought to see some of the instructions I get.” He noted the last instruction that he should see some members of the opposition and make sure his meetings got to the Greek Press.2

Dr. Kissinger with even more emotion said, “How the hell would we like it if the Greek Ambassador here started running around with Senator Fulbright and publicizing that?” Then he said, “That Sisco operation is the worst disaster Iʼve seen.”

Ambassador Tasca said that it is difficult to carry out instructions such as the ones he sometimes gets.

Dr. Kissinger suggested that Ambassador Tasca, the next time he gets an instruction that he doesnʼt feel is in line with the Presidentʼs policy, send a message to the White House by the back channel. Such instructions do not represent the Presidentʼs policy. We will try to monitor the outgoing cables better here.

Ambassador Tasca said he couldnʼt agree more. He described it as the “surrealism” of diplomacy.

Dr. Kissinger said that the Vice President would probably be coming to Greece in October.

Ambassador Tasca said that if we are to achieve the policy objective we want, we should “work it my way.” Sisco had written him [Page 808] urging him to see Rowland Evans, the columnist, and Tasca had been decent to him only to have Evans write in the most derogatory fashion. Tasca said that he had become a political target and he had to have the support of the people here in Washington. He noted that the exiled Greek journalist, Elias Demetracopoulos, was orchestrating a campaign against him. Demetracopoulos had told him (Tasca) he would get the Ambassador out of Greece.

Dr. Kissinger, again with emotion, said that there is no question of Tascaʼs being pulled out of Greece. Of course, we want constitutional rule in Greece, but it is “indecent to suck around Sadat” and then to beat the Greeks over the head.

Ambassador Tasca said that the Greek government had let 2,500 people out of jail during the year, and there is now considerable freedom of the press. He noted that the press had printed the MooseLowenstein report.3

Dr. Kissinger at that point said that he had to go to another meeting. But he assured Ambassador Tasca that it was not the US policy to give the Greek government a hard time.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1264, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 4/1/71–8/31/71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on August 13. The meeting took place in Kissingerʼs office.
  2. Apparent reference to instructions in telegram 99827 to Athens, June 7; see footnote 2, Document 316.
  3. See Document 303.