319. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1

3469. 1. Mrs. Tasca and I called upon the King and Queen of Greece July 8.2 After exchange of usual pleasantries King welcomed me and said it was a tradition for royal family of Greece to have close and excellent relations with US Ambassador to Greece.

2. I opened by stating my pleasure with opportunity of meeting him and the Queen. US policy towards Greece was clear and based upon the two sound principles of security and democracy. We believed there was no better alternative.

3. I described Soviet threat in the Eastern Mediterranean and importance of Greece to NATO security and to our bilateral security interests which had to take priority over all other interests. Greece was a member of NATO with obligations in the NATO area under the NAT. Those who opposed military aid to Greece were willy-nilly undermining Greek membership in NATO as it could not be accepted that the Greek people should be deprived of the means of defending themselves.

4. The second pillar of our policy was to promote a return to democracy. Since I had arrived in Greece I had seized every opportunity to make clear to the regime that the maintenance of strong bilateral relations depended upon a solid majority behind the Presidentʼs policies. This required an early return to parliamentary government in Greece. The American people, I observed, simply feel differently about Greece for historic and philosophical reasons than they do about other countries; hence the great US interest in early return to democracy.

5. Our policy involved working with PM Papadopoulos and had to take account of the realities of the power situation in Greece. The vehicle at hand must be the 1968 Constitution which was basically sufficiently democratic in approach for it to be key element in evolution. The withholding of military aid would be and had been counterproductive. There had been much misunderstanding publicly regarding US policies and the American Embassy in Athens, some in good faith but some also in bad faith.

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6. The King said he was pleased to hear my views. He had been puzzled by Barbourʼs reference to Wayne Hays and latterʼs implying King opposed military aid.3 On the contrary he considered that military aid was highly essential to Greeceʼs national defense. He could not recall having talked to Wayne Hays on the subject and seemed even doubtful where he had seen him. The King considered the 1968 Constitution fully adequate but said he and opposition could not support it publicly until some agreement reached with GOG on its implementation. (He may have been referring to operation of constitutional court and setting date for elections.) He added that military aid should somehow be tied to progress on the constitutional front in some general, not specific way.

7. I countered by saying GOG was firmly in saddle (point he accepted), and was now in its fifth year. I repeated that military aid basically was not a useful element of pressure; it had been tried and failed; the GOG could get attractive military credit from French who were eager to sell arms to Greece. Moreover, there was a growing nationalistic feeling, particularly among some of younger officers. Pressure would strengthen these officers against Papadopoulos, and excessive pressure might even bring a new military group to power who were not bound to the traditional concepts governing the country as were present top military rulers.

8. In fact, I continued, our main influence had to be quiet persuasion with the PM on the basis of (1) his desire to see the aims of the revolution achieved through implementation of the 1968 Constitution; (2) the indispensable link between democracy in Greece and strong relations with the US. Under present circumstances these relations were undermined by GOG failure to implement fully the 1968 Constitution. If the foregoing were correct, I said, then opposition leaders in good faith should concentrate on bridge-building to PM through the 1968 Constitution. After all, none of them wanted to go back to 1967, to which King expressed his agreement by nodding, and perhaps the differences between the enlightened opposition and the PM were not really so great. If this were so, I continued, pointing to PMʼs contacts [Page 802] with politicians from last parliament, perhaps present phase may be one of reconciliation, in which case all should consider how to encourage PM to move ahead on this basis and tailor their activities accordingly. I may have persuaded the King in this sense.

9. King had earlier asked whether I knew what Papadopulos wanted. Before I could answer, he said it was unlikely anyone could answer this question. I noted that one could take the position of recent article in London Observer and come out with convincing line that PM planned to do nothing, or one could look at the public and private statements of the PM and at the fact Cabinet had met nearly every Friday last year working out the implementing legislation for Constitution. I thought it was the better part of wisdom to proceed on the assumption that the PM intended to implement the 1968 Constitution and to encourage action in that direction. I noted that the Constitution provides for return of King.

10. The King said he agreed with my comments on 1968 Constitution. He realized clearly the obstacles to his return, but he indicated he was willing to talk to PM. Latter, however, had had no contact with him for two years in spite of Kingʼs expressed interest in opening such a dialogue. King noted that his return should be based upon an agreement to implement the Constitution with elections, but he was willing to be reasonably flexible on a date. He observed that his return would legitimize the Government and would be generally helpful.

11. I asked him what happen in 1967. He explained he had visited Washington in September and had asked for help during a meeting with President Johnson, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow. He said he made plain all he was seeking was moral support since US force would have been unthinkable; the President told him that he could count on his moral support if he moved against the junta.4 He had decided to move in December because he could not get the junta to agree to a specific program for return to parliamentary government. The result had been a disaster because the effort had failed. He assumed full responsibility for failure. He would not go into details, but one of reasons for failure he mentioned was his determination to avoid bloodshed.

12. Since that time had had gone to Washington for EISENHOWER funeral and found Vice President Agnew sympathetic and understanding. However, he was greatly disappointed because he had been unable to see President Nixon, particularly since latter saw Pattakos.5 King again returned to the need for evolution now, noting risks in delay, and mentioning especially danger of younger officers ousting PM.

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13. I agreed, adding my assessment that if PM fell, his successors might well talk somewhat, perhaps a great deal less, about democracy. I repeated again that our major influence would have to be quiet and effective persuasion. I asked whether King did not think that US public posture which appears to pressure the government strongly on the return to parliamentary government might not inflame nationalistic sentiment among younger officers, thereby undermining the PMʼs policy of close ties with the West in general and US in particular. The King nodded agreement.

14. During the course of our conversation the King expressed the view that the Greek armed forces would like to stay out of politics and to restore full military discipline. He spoke highly of General Angelis, who had been military aide to his father, and thought General Zagoriannakos, head of Third Corps, who had been his aide for two years, a real comer. King was aware that some in Greek armed forces, particularly younger officers, fear his return on ground that it will affect their future. I said this was also my impression. He hoped we could help to dissuade officers of this idea. He seemed to be convinced that if he returns, bygones must be bygones and no distinction should be made which could be divisive; it would be completely contrary to the interest of Greece, and he wanted to look forward. In this connection he commented that efforts should be made to persuade middle grade officers to support the 1968 Constitution and to support PM if he decides to proceed with its full implementation.

15. King spoke in highly derogatory terms of Andreas Papandreou who was beyond consideration for any future role in Greece as far as he was concerned. He recalled fatherʼs sad comments on Andreas who King said blackmailed father, a son who threatened to keep grandchildren from him if he did not comply. This was principal reason for failure to form coalition government just prior to Kanellopoulos Cabinet which overturned by April 1967 coup. Coalition might well have prevented this disaster. [5½ lines not declassified]

16. In concluding our discussion we agreed that our talk had been quite useful in creating a better understanding of our positions and interests. I asked him to give our Counsellor of Embassy in Rome Barbour any further thoughts he might have to pass on. They would reach me.

17. King asked about latest events in Cyprus. We both agreed there was no alternative to continuation of intercommunal talks. King said good relations between Greece and Turkey vital. I agreed and praised PMʼs attitude in this regard. King was critical of Makariosʼ trip to Moscow6 [Page 804] and his seeking to enlist Soviet aid, although King said his own relations with Makarios were excellent. He did not think Makariosʼ opening to Communists significant as Greece would never go in that direction. This was generally true, I agreed, but Soviets followed salami tactics and would be happy with modest first-slice gains such as somewhat lessened accessibility of Greek facilities to US military, i.e. of profiting from stress in Greek-US bilateral relations. Their economic aid to Turkey supported my point on the matter, and they stood to gain from delay in solution from present Greek situation.

18. Comment. I believe meeting was useful. King seemed pleased with meeting. I found him unquestionably strongly pro-US, pro-West and anti-Communist. He is interested in returning to Greece and profiting from his past mistakes which he freely acknowledges, although he still does not sound altogether like constitutional monarch. If he were to return, he might provide some guarantee against any untoward political deterioration here. My feeling is that we should pursue course of reconciliation under 1968 Constitution and see pragmatically where chips finally fall regarding Kingʼs future. After all, picture of King and Queen hangs over Prime Minister Papadopoulosʼ desk, as well as in each of the monarchsʼ offices throughout the country, and full implementation of 1968 Constitution provides for his return. Even though I continue to believe that his chances of being accepted by present establishment remain relatively small, Greeks are volatile, sentimental and unpredictable people.

19. Department may wish to repeat to American Embassy Rome.

Tasca
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
  2. Prior to his departure for Rome, Tasca discussed his visit to the King with Palamas. He reported on this meeting in telegram 3367 from Athens, July 6. (Ibid.)
  3. Robert Barbour, Minister Counselor at the Embassy in Italy. Citing the Kingʼs reputed comments, Congressman Wayne Hays (D-Ohio), Chairman of the House Rules Committee, introduced an amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations bill for 1972 that would have cut all aid to Greece. The Hays amendment was defeated in committee by a 14–12 vote but the Congressman reintroduced it once the legislation reached a vote in the full House where it won passage and subsequent Senate approval. The amendment banned aid to Greece unless the President affirmed the assistance was “in the overriding requirements of the national security of the United States.” For text of the relevant portion of P.L. 92–226, amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, approved February 7, 1972, see 86 Stat. 27. President Nixon signed the waiver for assistance to Greece on February 17.
  4. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 301.
  5. See Documents 243 and 244.
  6. For the condensed English text of the communiqué from Makariosʼs visit to the Soviet Union, June 2–9, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXIII, No. 23 (July 6, 1971), pp. 9–10.