301. Memorandum of Meeting Between President Johnson and King Constantine1
King Constantine of Greece in his conversations with the President described developments in Greece and pointed to two times at which the confrontation with the coup leaders might occur: (1) at the time the committee report on the constitutional revision was reviewed by the coup leaders, and (2) at the time of a plebiscite on the constitutional revision. The first might be in December, the second later in 1968. The King was not certain that a confrontation would occur on the other hand—it might occur at any time if a “second round” were attempted—but these two times were obvious potential points when the crunch might come. The King elaborated on the fact that if a confrontation were to occur, it would be on issues of real substance, not on such questions as, for example, military appointments.
The King expressed a lack of confidence in the coup leaders’ ability to come up with coherent government policies. He did not think that they had the talents to govern. He was evidently by no means confident that they would stick to the constitutional commitment and schedule.
Speaking of return to constitutional government and the King’s relationships with the military in general, he noted that he had some support of certain military leaders in the northern areas but he recognized that as time went on the coup leaders were attempting to infiltrate all commands with officers of absolute loyalty to them.
The King spoke at some length about the question of confrontation and his relationships with the coup leaders. He gave the impression of being serious-minded and devoted to the concept of returning Greece to constitutional procedures and democratic processes. He stated that he was willing to get his family out of Greece if tensions between him and the coup leaders grew, and to go so far as to risk his life if a confrontation were unavoidable.
[Page 635]He inquired as to what we were prepared to do in the case of a confrontation and spoke of the possibility of (1) the landing of marines as a show of force, (2) the positioning of Sixth Fleet units in Greek waters, and (3) a sympathetic U.S. posture and a public statement reaffirming the U.S. support for the King’s efforts to return the country to constitutionalism.
The President explained the problems growing out of such a request and noted that a military intervention would not be feasible. The question of a public statement would be studied in the light of circumstances at the time, but he could not commit himself in advance on this question.
Addressing himself to the question of military aid, the King made a plea for restoration of military aid, noting that the continued withholding of aid was not achieving the U.S. political objectives and causing serious irritation to the coup colonels. Some military aid linked to continued loyalty to the constitutional scenario would be helpful.
The President made clear that he could make no commitment until legislation was passed but indicated that he understood the King’s argument. In terms of specific requests, the King pointed to the need to be in a position to communicate with his people in the event of a confrontation and asked for a possible use of VOA radio facilities (either Thessaloniki or more likely Rhodes). Secondly, he asked for more efficient two-way communications facilities between the Palace and the US Embassy in Athens. His third request was for US support of a program loan of $70 million for Greece to assist in the reconstruction of the earthquake-damaged areas. On this subject Mr. Rostow explained the problems involved in reopening the question of a program loan for a country that had graduated from the AID school and had achieved the economic growth rate which Greece had over the past years. Speaking to the question of the earthquake, it was stated that the needs on that front could be examined with a view to any assistance of a humanitarian nature that might be given to relieve the temporary housing needs in the stricken areas. There was talk of examining the possibility of obtaining Nissen huts but it was understood that this matter would have to be explored more fully with Athens.
The King explained the legal position with Andreas Papandreou, and the President explained our political problem with him and other political prisoners. It was clear the King did not rule out an amnesty once the legal procedures had been followed.
The King explained his deep disappointment in the failure of the Cyprus talks. Secretary Rusk volunteered that he would take the matter up with the two Foreign Secretaries in New York.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GREECE. Secret; Nodis. The source text, which bears the handwritten dates “9/13” and “9/15/67,” bears no drafting information but, according to a September 25 covering memorandum by Benjamin Read, it was prepared on the basis of Walt Rostow’s recollections. According to the President’s Daily Diary, he met with King Constantine alone in the Oval Office from 12:37 to 1:30 p.m., when they joined Vice President Humphrey, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostow, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Lucius Battle, Greek Chargé Alcibiades C. Papadopoulos, and Grand Marshal of the Greek Court Leonidas Papagos for a luncheon. The King left the White House at 2:35 p.m. (Johnson Library)
During his Washington visit, the King also met with members of Congress. A memorandum of this conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Athens Post Files: FRC 72 A 5030, POL 7 Visits, King Constantine.
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