270. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)1
Dear Henry:
I have read your letter of February 27th with great interest.2
Let me try to state very simply my understanding of the mandate, and what is expected back here.
I understood the NSC decision of November 14, 1969 (NSDM 34)3 to mean that it was decided, in principle, that we were prepared to lift the suspension of arms shipments. This decision to resume shipments was not conditioned on concrete steps by the Greek Government in the direction of constitutional democracy. But you were to make clear to the Government that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease U.S. problems in speeding the release of the suspended [Page 689] equipment. The suspended shipments were to be resumed, but only after the President reviewed your report of the Greek Governmentʼs response to your representations about movement toward a constitutional situation, beginning with the less dramatic items.
My understanding was that in accordance with this mandate you would explore this whole matter in a cooperative way with the Greek Government, and we would await your report of that exploration. When that phase was over, you would then be in a position to recommend when Papadopoulos should be informed that we had decided to lift the suspension of shipments, and to recommend, as well, the speed with which deliveries should be resumed, and what items ought to go beginning with the less dramatic items.
Some of this scenario, thanks to your efforts, is now behind us. I suggest that you could bring it nearer completion by immediately taking the following steps: Send us (a) a succinct synthesis of all your conversations with the high-level people; (b) your evaluation of the current attitude of the Greek Government with special reference to the prospects of its moving in a constitutional direction; and (c) your recommendations as to when and how the arms embargo should be lifted.
We would then bring your evaluation and recommendation to the attention of the White House, following which we should be in a position to transmit to you the appropriate go-ahead to inform Papadopoulos of our plans.
We not only do not believe it is necessary, but believe it undesirable and contrary to what was contemplated by the November NSC decision, for this whole matter to be reassessed in the context of a broader study of the Mediterranean. If this were your recommendation, you would in effect be asking the President to reassess a decision which had already been made.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, U.S. Policy Towards Greece. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only; Official–Informal.↩
- Attached but not printed. In it Tasca recounted a conversation with Shakespeare and requested clarification regarding the implementation of the policy outlined in NSDM 34.↩
- Document 262.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩