Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

269. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, March 2, 1970, 1618Z.

970. 1. The speed with which the Greek regime carries out its publicly expressed desire to put the 1968 Constitution into full effect is likely to be very much affected by the relative strengths of the forces within the regime which favor a return to constitutional government, as opposed to those who prefer to prolong the present regime indefinitely. In this context the present Greek regime should not be viewed as a personal dictatorship but rather as collegiate in its make-up. Prime Minister George Papadopoulos plays the main role, but he by no means enjoys a free hand. He has shrewdly manipulated the other key players in the regime so that his freedom of action has been steadily increased. Those who collaborated with him most closely on 21 April and 13 December 1967 still count very heavily in terms of influence and political power, but Papadopoulos has managed to consult with the Revolutionary Council as a whole less and less and to broaden his base by relying more on civilian ministers and senior army officers such as General Odysseus Angelis, while keeping a wary eye on the young commanders of combat units.

2. Furthermore, in understanding the regime it is essential to keep in mind that its leaders and supporters consider themselves a revolutionary regime empowered to make revolutionary reforms, and not merely as another coup group taking power as an interim measure prior to handing affairs back to the politicians.

3. At this time the Greek regime functions roughly as follows:

A. Papadopoulos is the undisputed leader.

B. Next in line of authority are his fellow Revolutionary Council members, Vice Premier Stylianos Pattakos and Minister of Coordination Nicholas Makarezos. They are often joined by Vice President Patilis (who “saved Thessaloniki for the revolution” on 13 December 1967), and Lt. General Odysseus Angelis, who is the highly respected commander of the Hellenic Armed Forces, to form the top five.

C. After the top five we would place the three members of the twelve-man Revolutionary Council who elected to remain in the army and who fill key functions as follows:

(1) Colonel Mihail Roufogalis, who is the most intimate friend of Papadopoulos and who as “coordinator” of the Greek Central Intelligence Service acts as Papadopoulosʼ Chief Counsel in affairs dealing with the security of the revolution,

(2) Colonel Antonios Lekkas, who screens army personnel assignments and keeps an eye on the senior generals, and

(3) Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis, who as Director of Military Police is responsible for the reliability of the army, who transmits to the Prime Minister the views of the yo Unger unit commanders, and who in turn explains the revolutionʼs policies and actions to these officers.

D. The six other members of the Revolutionary Council, who in December 1967 were persuaded to resign their army commissions and become secretaries-general but not ministers, are probably still next in political power. They derive power from their prestige as members of the Revolutionary Council and resist Papadopoulosʼ tendency to overlook the Revolutionary Council as a corporate body. Constantine Aslanides, the Director General of Athletics, who is establishing a considerable reputation for himself in this field, figures prominently in this group.

E. They are however being challenged by the civilian ministers who may in the long run have greater influence in shaping the future of Greece than any of the above outside the top five. The Prime Minister consults the Council of Ministers for hours at a time each week, and the Council not only thrashed out the 1968 Constitution article by article, but is doing the same with its enabling legislation, which will be the law of the revolution. Some of the new civilian secretaries-general are being drawn from what appears to be an embryonic political party loyal to Papadopoulos. Among the ministers, Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinellis enjoys considerable freedom of action in foreign affairs, as does Finance Minister Adamantios Androutsopoulos in matters of budget and taxes.

F. Senior army officers who hold senior commands or staff positions or have left the army to assume key jobs in civilian agencies provide Papadopoulos with a core of executives. They look to Papadopoulos for guidance and they tend to support his moves toward implementing the Constitution. This group includes the directors of the State and Armed Forces radios, directors in the Prime Ministerʼs and Regentʼs offices, the directors of the Central Intelligence Service and of the National Security Directorate and the Citizensʼ Commissioner.

G. Important policy decisions are usually made by the top five, taking into account the pressures of the various “constituents” of the revolution. The most important of these “constituents” are:

(1) The officers who now command the combat companies and battalions, mainly those officers who pulled guns on their superiors on 21 April or 13 December, and who have reason to fear for their careers, if not their personal safety, should the regime falter. They very much fear that the King will return with vengeance in his heart. Their current slogans are “no elections, no King, and forward with the aims of the revolution.” They are especially against elections because they associate them with a return to the status quo ante, and with both the loss of their present influence and perhaps even the return of old politicians and retired officers. These yo Unger officers tend to form loose associations by cadet school classes, and from among the Revolutionary Council they feel closest to the class of 1943 and Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis. They also share a common interest with the Regent, Lt. General George Zoitakis, who perhaps may not look forward to the Kingʼs return either, and has shown a concern for the “purity of the revolution.”

(2) Army officers who did not take a direct part in the revolution, but who generally support Papadopoulos and appreciate the enhanced status of the Army since 12 April 1967. They may resent the assertiveness of the yo Unger unit commanders, but they lack the power to confront them.

(3) Civilians who have embraced the revolution, including some publishers and journalists, virtually all the mayors, village presidents, etc., who were appointed by the regime, who are enthusiastic executors of new public works and who look confidently to playing a part under the new Constitution. The ties between the village and town leaders and the army officers are generally strong—the army officers having spent many years at army posts in the countryside.

4. Papadopoulos has gradually widened his own base of support so that he is already somewhat less vulnerable to a challenge by a member of the Revolutionary Council. He has thus far weathered the storm of Revolutionary Council member Dimitrios Stamatelopoulosʼ resignation, but Stamatelopoulos remains a threat on the sidelines around whom disgruntled revolutionary officers could coalesce. Today Papadopoulos must cater more to the commanders of army combat companies and battalions. He is still their acknowledged leader and will probably continue to be so as long as he does not do things which seem to threaten their positions or weaken the army. However, he must continually demonstrate that his regime promotes clean government which does not discredit the army, and that the army receives the arms and other support to fulfill a defense mission which the yo Unger officers deployed along the frontier with communism feel very deeply. On several occasions, notably just before his December year-end speeches in 1968 and 1969, he was forced to delay his speeches and modify portions of them in deference to the pressures of the revolutionary officers. Thus, these officers have shown at times an ability to provide very compelling collective pressure.

5. I believe that Papadopoulos is clearly in charge, that he represents the best choice among the available leaders within the regime, but that his room for maneuver depends on his ability to cope with his less politically minded colleagues—some of whom carry guns. His future may well be influenced by factors beyond his control. I believe this is what he meant when he told me that he must pass through a mine field in his progress toward implementing the Constitution.

6. In sum, our best current information is that the tenure of the present regime is not likely to be seriously challenged inside Greece for some years. Every ambassadorial colleague I have spoken with shares this view. American interests would seem to be best served by encouraging Papadopoulos to implement the 1968 Constitution as rapidly as possible, and by using our influence to strengthen his hand against any opposition to that course from among his revolutionary colleagues.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 GREECE. Confidential; Limdis.