158. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Polish Ambassador (Trampczynski)1

Kissinger: My Soviet experts, incidentally, reading that Soviet note2 say itʼs the mildest thing they could have done. It gives them, it covers them with Hanoi.

Nixon: Can I ask a question about this fall? I donʼt want this—are we supposed to announce today that weʼre going to—I donʼt want them to—I donʼt want to announce and then have these little assholes3 pull the plug on us and cancel it.

Kissinger: They wonʼt pull the plug independent of Moscow.

Nixon: Okay.

Kissinger: Whatever they do weʼll become—

Nixon: One thing that, if I can poll you on this, what you had in mind, I remember what happened when the U–24—you remember too, but I was here. And I know what happened and I know what an embarrassment it was to President EISENHOWER. Henry, Iʼm not—weʼve got to play Moscow very carefully. If we ever get a feeling that theyʼre going to break off the summit, weʼre going to break it off first.

Kissinger: No question.

Nixon: We have got to do it, see?

Kissinger: No question.

Nixon: You agree, donʼt you?

Kissinger: Totally.

Nixon: In other words, so thatʼs—

Kissinger: Joe Kraft5 called their spook. Heʼs not at all sure of himself. He says he notices that the Russians are very mild in their response. He said, “Do you guys know what youʼre doing? I said, “Joe, write anything you want.” He said—

[Page 380]

Nixon: You can keep talking to [unclear].

Kissinger: He says why are you, he says why [unclear].

[Trampczynski enters and an initial exchange of pleasantries takes place.]

Nixon [to Trampczynski]: We will look forward to coming to, as you know we, as I have said, and as you are aware, we have differences in types of government, differences about certain areas of the world. But the United States seeks good relations with all countries. We particularly have a reason to seek good relations with Poland because there are so many Polish-Americans and they all want—

Trampczynski: One-third of the Polish nation is living in the United States.

Nixon: One-third?

Trampczynski: One-third, right. Yes.

Nixon: And we want to—we will do that, having full regard for your right to have any independent policy and for us to have an independent policy, but there are many areas where our two governments can work together and thatʼs what we try to seek—thatʼs what I was trying to do in China. Thatʼs what I will be doing in the Soviet Union. Thatʼs what we will be doing in Poland. But with Poland I will go with a little different feeling because I know so many Polish friends in Chicago, in Cleveland, in Pittsburgh, in New York, and in California. And they say, “Youʼve got to go to Warsaw.”

Trampczynski: [laughter]

Nixon: Philadelphia, yeah. The Cardinal that Iʼm meeting in Philadelphia is Polish, did you know that? The Catholic Cardinal in Philadelphia.

Trampczynski: Krol.

[Omitted here are Nixonʼs discussion of his previous visit to Poland and Kissingerʼs discussion of his own earlier visit.]

Nixon: I can assure you that we will, as I said, we want the visit to be one that will be, that will show the friendship between our two peoples, recognizing the differences that our governments may have, but trying to find areas of agreement, respecting each other. Thatʼs the only basis for an East-West relationship. We understand that very much. And I think we can get that understanding with your government, that we can find parallel areas to work together, particularly the economic field.

Trampczynski: That will be very true of the visit. [Unclear] solve these problems of international [unclear].

Nixon: At least help.

Trampczynski: It will help us out with some of our bilateral relations.

[Page 381]

Nixon: No problems can ever be solved. You can only start solving them.

Trampczynski: [Unclear]

Nixon: You know, the economists know that you can never solve economic problems. You just start.

Trampczynski: [Unclear]

Nixon: Well, itʼs very good to see you. My best to you. We will see you then if not sooner.

[Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries as Trampczynski leaves.]

Nixon: Let me tell you something, this is just bullshit.

Kissinger: If you were in Hanoi and you saw, you read the papers today 48 hours after the bombing of Haiphong, the Polish Ambassador can send such a warm invitation, can broach such a warm invitation.

Nixon: Of course, this invitation was written before the bombing, you know?

Kissinger: But he delivered it 48 hours after.

Nixon: You think they have that good of communication?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: They probably went [unclear] before sending anything.

Kissinger: It means two things: it means the Russians didnʼt stop them from sending it, and that they delivered it. No, also as far as our press is concerned, this announcement—what are they going to say, “The Communists are very mad at you”?

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 709–10. No classification marking. The editors transcribed portions of this conversation specifically for this volume.
  2. Regarding the Soviet protest note of April 16, 1972, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, October 1971–May 1972, Document 112.
  3. Reference is to the Polish Communists.
  4. For documentation on the U–2 airplane incident and the cancellation of the Paris summit between EISENHOWER and Khrushchev, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region, Soviet Union, Cyprus, Documents 147156.
  5. Syndicated columnist for the Washington Post.