Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

159. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

• The Problem of the Presidentʼs Meeting with Cardinal Wyszynski²

As you asked, I have discussed this informally with the Polish Ambassador. His immediate reaction, which he said was of course personal, was that such a meeting would be undesirable. He said he recognized the pressures on the President and Cardinal Krolʼs interest. But in his view there has been remarkable progress in State-Church relations and Polish-Vatican relations. The Soviets have tolerated this uniquely in Poland. Meanwhile, however, relations between Gierek and the Cardinal³ have not improved; it is still the problem that the Cardinal regards himself and in fact is something of a second head of state. A meeting with the President could only reinforce this problem especially when he is in the country for barely 24 hours. It could reverse the positive trend.

There is an additional problem. June 1 is Corpus Christi, one of the major Church holidays in Poland. People normally walk in the street with candles and the Cathedral will be crowded. (It is a day off for everyone.) The whole focus of the Presidentʼs visit, from the standpoint of the regime (and Moscow) could thus be changed into a religious demonstration with overtones of our recognizing the Cardinalʼs secular role.

The Ambassadors also said that Gierek has agreed to the Cardinalʼs accepting an invitation to the US from Cardinal Krol but has reserved a decision as to timing. This was a further sign of improving relations.

The Ambassador asked whether he should report our talk to Warsaw. I told him not to do this, though of course this canʼt be controlled. (We obviously donʼt want an official démarche from Gierek and Co.) I stressed I was merely asking his opinion to enable us to form a judgment. I stressed that he should not repeat our conversation within his Embassy (which is leaky as a sieve) or anywhere else. He said he understood, especially since he himself had been talking without instructions and as a “Pole” rather than a diplomat.

My own judgment now is that the President should be dissuaded from having a meeting. The coincidence with Corpus Christi, itself involving the risk of demonstrations, could still be used for some gesture to the Church, for example by reference in the departure statement at the airport.

Recommendation

1. That you urgently discuss this with the President.

2. That thereafter Haldeman send clear instructions to Chapin in Moscow.

Note: This all needs to be done today, before next Monday/Tuesday, lest Chapin raises the matter when he gets to Poland.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for immediate action.
2. In an April 10 memorandum to Chapin, Haldeman wrote: “In Poland, the President wants to visit the old Cardinal [Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski]. He talked to Cardinal Krol about this while he was in Philadelphia. Henry may have some problems with this, but it should be worked out if it can be done on a sound foreign policy basis.” (Ibid.)
3. Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of the Polish Catholic Church.
5. An attached April 19 note by Sonnenfeldt reads: “A.H[aig]. 1. HAK says this is ‘turned off.’ 2. HAK says he will make sure Haldeman knows. 3. You should make sure. HS.”