157. Editorial Note
On the morning of March 30, 1972, President Richard Nixon raised his proposed visit to Poland in an Oval Office conversation with his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger. He instructed Kissinger to discuss the matter with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in his scheduled conversation that afternoon:
“Nixon: First of all, do your best to cut the deal on Poland.
“Kissinger: I think I can handle that.
“Nixon: But the second thing—And then say, and you can point out that, he can have, he need to be not concerned about what I say on Poland. He can be very sure. Thereʼs no problem on that. That weʼll be totally discreet. But that I think weʼre going to be in a terrible position if we turn it down.” A fuller account of the discussion is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 73.
Kissinger discussed the proposed visit during his luncheon meeting with Dobrynin. Kissinger reported on the meeting as follows: “I opened the conversation by discussing the possibility of a visit to Poland by the President. I told Dobrynin that I had mentioned the fact that the visit to Iran would be the last stop. However, we had now received a formal invitation to Poland; previously it had been only a feeler, but now it would be very difficult in an election year to turn it down. We would not go to Poland in order to embarrass the Soviet Union. When we went to Romania, we knew that it might create some difficulties but we were willing to pay the price, though it was not our intention even there deliberately to produce difficulties. In the case of Poland, our motives are quite different. Dobrynin replied that he was very moved by the fact that I bothered to check with him. He recognized that we did not have to check our movements in eastern Europe [Page 377] with him, but it was an example of our goodwill. He was certain that Moscow would not object, but it would make a very good impression in Moscow if we could hold up our decision until we got a formal answer.” For the full text of Kissingerʼs memorandum of conversation, see ibid., Document 76.
Kissinger reported to Nixon personally that afternoon:
“Kissinger: Well, I had a long talk with Dobrynin. And I put the Polish proposition to him. And I said, ‘You know, the basic departure that we are doing here is that we want to build policy on the recognition of weʼre two superpowers and that we donʼt want to interfere in each otherʼs basic concerns.ʼ And I took—I showed him the cable we had from Warsaw and the reply we gave. I said, ‘This is the spirit which we would like to deal with you. We donʼt need to ask you if we want to go there but we want to show you the President is particularly concerned in what your reaction is.ʼ So he was practically in tears. He said, ‘This is the most generous thing I’ve heard. You will, I cannot tell you, Henry, how much this will impress Mr. Brezhnev.ʼ
“Nixon: That we asked because he knew what we did on Rumania.
“Kissinger: Yeah. I said, ‘I want you to know, when we went to Rumania, we knew it would annoy you. Weʼre going to Warsaw because, and if it raises any problems for you, weʼll look [unclear].ʼ And he was practically in tears. He said, ‘Speaking informally and as a member of the Central Committee, I am certain they will say yes. But if you can wait ‘til Monday, he said—so that he is formally—‘so that you get a formal reply from us, it would mean a great deal to us. But I can tell you now that it will be yes. It will almost certainly be yes.ʼ But he was practically in tears.
“Nixon: You see, they, we have to realize weʼve got some chips to play too here…. And you told him that I would not embarrass them and that I—
“Kissinger: I said that you will say nothing that would embarrass. And I said it [unclear] to our support in domestic considerations.
“Nixon: He understood that.” For a more complete text of the taped conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, see ibid., Document 77.
As late as April 3, the Soviets apparently had not responded to Kissingerʼs feeler on Poland. In a telephone conversation with Nixon that evening, Kissinger said: “I think if we donʼt hear from them [the Soviets] about Poland tomorrow we should just do it.” The conversation continued:
“P: That I am sure about. Why do you think they delayed on it?
“K: They may not have had a chance to have everyone together—or they may just be cute. They may be going to Poland now.
[Page 378]“P: I donʼt think our going to Poland will change anything. Tell them tomorrow. We canʼt hold it any longer—itʼs starting to leak.” For a more complete transcript of the telephone conversation, see ibid., Document 80.
On April 5 Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel reported from Warsaw: “I called on Vice Minister Spasowski today and informed him of Presidentʼs decision to accept Polish Governmentʼs invitation; of his appreciation for this invitation and the opportunity to visit Poland; and of his proposal to arrive in Warsaw, after one-day visit to Tehran, in mid-afternoon on May 31 and to depart approximately 24 hours later directly for the US.” (Telegram 1316 from Warsaw, April 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL–US) On April 17 President Nixon received Polish Ambassador Witold Trampczynski, who delivered separate letters of invitation to the President to visit Poland from Polandʼs President, Henryk Jablonski, and Polish Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz (see Document 158).
Even before Nixon received the official invitation, the White House staff had initiated plans to exploit the trip for the Presidentʼs re-election campaign in 1972. On April 15 at 1:15 p.m. Deputy Assistant to the President Dwight Chapin wrote David Parker of the White House staff: “This is just to remind you that you are to get the ethnic information regarding the Poles and where theyʼre located [in the United States] so that we can consider a Presidential trip there shortly after Russia [i.e., the Russian trip].” Immediately thereafter, Chapin followed up in a memorandum to Herbert Klein of the White House staff (1:20 p.m.): “We should put together a plan to start cultivating and feeding stories to the Polish newspapers. It is my understanding that there are some Polish newspapers scattered around the country and at least one in Chicago called the ‘Polish Alliance.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Dwight L. Chapin, Chronological, Box 16)
On May 9 Nixon accepted the Polish invitation in separate letters to Jablonski and Jaroszewicz. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, Poland Pres: Jablonski and PM: Jaroszewicz)