Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

156. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹

Washington, March 22, 1972.

Nixon: The memorandum they want is self-explanatory about Poland and Turkey.² Oh—Look, I want you to read over them with Haig, but I donʼt want to have Henry take either of them.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: They view it both to the extremes. Let me—Let me come around to it another way—

Haldeman: Haigʼs where you want it, right? [unclear]

Nixon: Let me come at it another way. Both Haig and Henry will come up with the wrong reasons insofar as our interests are concerned.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Now the sole purpose of our travels is Vietnam. The fact that Turkey is a NATO member is—doesnʼt bother me one damn bit. Weʼre not going to make any decisions. Weʼre just going to stop by. The way Iʼve read that memorandum is to go to Istanbul for maybe 4 hours. And weʼll then go to Warsaw and be received informally. On the [unclear] yesterday [unclear] presentation, we got returned and announced it. Last thing—actually, Henry—maybe weʼll see some dire plot evolve during the trip, which they, uh—on the other hand, we must try to examine, which I point out in the memo. Weʼll look at the dire plot. Let [unclear] look and then look at what it will mean to us to go into Warsaw and with any kind of a break get a hell of a reception, which weʼre likely to get. I mean weʼll get Radio Free Europe or whatʼs left of it. [Horrick?] and I must schedule it, and all that sort of thing. Weʼll get that. Now the problems, that, so—weʼll play it off against the German thing. But the whole approach that—and Iʼve been extremely good about this, Bob, with Henry—the NSC and the State Department people are gonna be disappointed—Iʼve always put—well, what does the country require? I spent time with that jackass Smith³ yesterday. I spent 45 minutes, almost an hour, on that arms control bit. The whole thing, you know, he doesnʼt hear himself babble along, and, heʼll go on and on and on and on. Now the whole purpose from now on—this is now March the 23d—The whole purpose of everything we do—

Haldeman: It means reelection.

Nixon: Is it going to affect our reelection? Weʼve got to hammer that into their goddamned cottonpicker heads. Theyʼve got to get it. And they can tell [unclear] to take some risks on the other side. And give Henry your phone memorandum,⁴ which—

Haldeman: [unclear] Vietnam.

Nixon: I want to read Haigʼs memo,⁵ and I donʼt want to see Henry. But I do think itʼs a matter that you can discuss with them. Come in [to unknown person].

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Nixon: Well, that should be a very—well, if youʼll get some—put the, put the [unclear] to Haig. I mean, tell Haig, so—Henry is—Haig will know better about this than Henry. You know, I think Henry wonʼt understand it, but you just tell Haig: “Now look here, be cold-blooded and political about every one of these things.” And, weʼre not going to make a judgment on the basis of like, howʼs this is going to affect this country 50 years from now, or howʼs this going to affect German-Polish relations in the next 6 months or 8 months.⁶

Haldeman: Well, itʼs that simple. The answer is: Which is going to affect Germany more? Our going to Poland for a day, or the President getting—

Nixon: Reelected.

Haldeman:—being defeated in November—

Nixon: Thatʼs right. You put it right to ‘em that way.

Haldeman: And I—You know, by—

Nixon: Thatʼs right, thatʼs right.

Haldeman:—and weʼve got—

Nixon: Donʼt—

Haldeman:—and look at this—

Nixon: The main thing is, the main thing is—

Haldeman:—if we can pull this off—

Nixon: The main thing is, I want you to tell Haig—and you can tell Henry: I do not want Henry to raise these things with them, ‘cause heʼll come in and he just gases interminably about McGovern.⁷ You see heʼs great when heʼs in his field, but when heʼs out of his field, you know, he just goes on and on and on about stuff he knows about and it has no relevance. You see, thatʼs why he probably likes to talk about Pompidou.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Nixon: I mentioned Polish briefly—I asked for Poland briefly last night. [unclear] Right, but who the hell are they? I mean, of course, Rogers has been thinking of these arguments—arguments Iʼm sure. He probably understands them more than I do, but—about the Polish Jewsʼ treatment⁸ and all the rest. But—

Haldeman: Well, Henry gets oversensitive. Heʼs like—in that kind of thing heʼs like a corporate lawyer always—heʼs always afraid not to do anything. Thatʼs the easiest way to avoid trouble. You got to think sometimes [unclear] and games and—

Nixon: How come?

Haldeman: This is one of them. A big reception—

Nixon: [unclear] about Romania.⁹

Haldeman: A big reception in Poland—

Nixon: You expect this result? [unclear] Chicago—

Haldeman: Much more than Romania. Much more than any country weʼve been in.

Nixon: Bob, a big reception in Romania [Poland] affects Pennsylvania, it affects Ohio, it affects Illinois, and it affects Michigan.

Haldeman: How about New York?

Nixon: New York not so much.

Haldeman: [unclear]

Nixon: Well, yeah, Buffalo, youʼre right. Buffalo, Buffalo, I agree. But thereʼs so many other people in New York. I, I must say I agree—

Haldeman: Thatʼs right, thatʼs right.

Nixon: It has some other, but I mean percentage-wise, Pennsylvania is enormous, Ohio is pretty good country. Illinois is pretty good country, and Michigan.

Haldeman: And Wisconsin.

Nixon: Yeah. If you want to go to a second-line state, there is no question.

Haldeman: Thatʼs a second-line state [unclear] where we got a problem.

Nixon: Thatʼs where we got to—we want to cover.

Haldeman: [unclear] Polish and Illinois is one that—

Nixon: Itʼs always the bomb.

Haldeman: You never know.

Nixon: [unclear] dying today.

Haldeman: Especially if thereʼs something if we end up against Muskie,¹⁰ getting the Polish thing, we could blunt some of the [unclear].

[Omitted here is a discussion of Muskie.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 324–22. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haldeman between 11:01 a.m. and 12:47 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) The editors transcribed the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. This is part of a larger conversation that covered multiple topics. Haldeman summarized this portion of the meeting in his diary: “He [Nixon] wants to be sure that I go to work on Haig and Henry [Kissinger], through him, to make the point that some of our decisions have got to be made on the basis of the effect they will have on the election. For example, P[resident] feels strongly we should go to Poland after the Russian trip, while Henry is equally strongly opposed to that, so weʼve got to convince Henry that his position isnʼt right, which may be hard to do.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
2. See Document 155.
3. Gerard Smith, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
4. Apparently a reference to a March 22 memorandum from Nixon to Haldeman. In the memorandum Nixon wrote: “I want you to have a frank talk with Haig with regard to the Polish invitation. Assuming for the moment that the invitation is a trap to get us involved in the German treaty ratification process, I think we should examine it to see if we can avoid the trap and still get the benefit. There is very little question in my mind that a visit to Poland, from the standpoint of its effect in the United States, would be an enormous plus. It would have more effect than all of our other visits put together from a strict political standpoint. This is something that neither Haig nor Henry understand and that they cannot be expected to consider. Take a hard look at it in any event and see what we can work out. On the other hand, I do not want to discuss this matter with Henry. You discuss it with him and then give me a recommendation.” For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 68.
5. Document 155.
6. On March 30 Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger regarding a potential Presidential trip to Poland: “I donʼt know where exactly this stands and whether you plan to take it up with Dobrynin. If you do, you can assume that his response will be positive, or that he will refer the question home and then come back with a positive response. Although Gierek undoubtedly has particular objectives of his own in issuing the invitation, the idea was bound to have Soviet approval. It is almost certainly intended to help Brandt in the ratification debate [for the Warsaw Treaty] and, in the longer term, to deflate Romaniaʼs special position. Both the Poles and the Soviets presumably are prepared to run the risk of emotional demonstrations in the streets of Warsaw. (For us the question is whether the undoubted short-term spectacular that will occur is worth the fact that there will be few short-term results and that we risk offending the West Europeans who have been told, via [NATO Secretary General Joseph] Luns, that the President cannot stop for schedule reasons.)” For the full text of Sonnenfeldtʼs memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 75.
7. Senator George McGovern (D–South Dakota), candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for President.
8. Documentation on the U.S. concern regarding official anti-Semitism in Poland during the governmentʼs “anti-Zionist” campaign of 1968 is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 132, 134, and 135.
9. Regarding Nixonʼs visit to Romania, see Documents 183 and 184.
10. Senator Edmund Muskie (D–Maine), candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for President.