148. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • Your Meeting with Ambassador Michalowski, Monday, March 222

He is returning to Warsaw for home leave and consultations, and presumably wants a general discussion with you. As you know he is a slick operator, having survived through the Stalinist, Gomulka, and now the Gierek regimes. However, he and some in his Embassy have shown some signs of nervousness about their future. There was even a report in January that Michalowski was considering defection.3

In this light he may reopen the question of the catalytic cracking process (an $8 million process to be sold by a Illinois firm). Our decision to turn it down last November was a setback for Michalowski,4 who had lobbied for it and enlisted the aid of Congressman Zablocki.5 The negative decision, however, left open the possibility of reopening it later.

Jan Kaczmarek, Chairman of the Polish Science and Technology Committee, who is coming here in April to visit with Ed David, mentioned continuing interest in obtaining the process, so Michalowski may hope to take a favorable signal home with him.

If he raises it you might say:

  • —naturally, if a formal request is made by the Chicago firm, and the Polish Government is still interested, we would review the case;
  • —what reason would the Ambassador cite for a favorable decision now compared to last November? (He will now argue that we should have a positive interest in helping the new government, and promoting stability in Eastern Europe.)
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Note: If he does not mention it, there is no reason for you to take the initiative. (Defense is strongly opposed to the whole project.)6

Conference on European Security. Even under Gierek, the Poles remain an active agitator for a European Conference; their latest scheme is for several conferences on the grounds that there is so much to discuss. He may ask about the Berlin talks and argue that they should not be a strict precondition. He might say that if Berlin is stalemated, a grand conference might improve the atmosphere for a Berlin settlement.

You might say:

  • —if Berlin cannot be settled, what meaning would a conference have that avoided all the difficult questions;
  • —even if there were a Berlin settlement, it is difficult to see what would be an acceptable agenda for a conference. MBFR is the only subject of conceivable interest, and a conference of all Europeans is not necessary for this;
  • —the Poles would do well to use their influence on Ulbricht and the Soviets to settle Berlin, rather than promoting a meaningless conference.

Indochina. I doubt that the Ambassador has anything special to raise, other than pumping you for whatever he can on Laos, etc. He might say something about the danger of Chinese intervention, etc. He remains personally very sensitive to allegations that the Polish role years ago was anything but honorable.

You might say:

that the Polish role in the ICC has been far from helpful, and it is surprising that the Poles would issue a special statement denouncing the South Vietnamese operation, after years of silence about North Vietnamʼs role in Laos. Even Hanoi scarcely hides that its forces are fighting in the panhandle.

The Polish Internal Scene. You might say that you were surprised that the Poles reversed the price increases after resisting popular pressures. Is this a sign of weakness and instability? Will the new government be forced into increasing concessions now that the population has learned the secret of putting pressures on the central government?

You might ask in what way Gierekʼs foreign policy will differ from Gomulkaʼs.

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The Poles are complaining on the one hand that we are obstructing the ratification of the Polish-German treaty, but on the other hand, they have indicated to Bonn they do not wish it ratified before the Soviet treaty. If Michalowski raises this with you again, you might wish to comment:

  • —We expressed our “satisfaction” with the treaty at the time of its signing, and you have said on many occasions we support a German-Polish reconciliation;
  • —The West Germans linked the treaties to the Berlin negotiations, not the United States, but we abide by their desires;
  • —The ratification issue and linkage is a highly charged issue inside West Germany, and we do not wish to inject ourselves in domestic politics;
  • —Together with the Allies we will consider an appropriate statement on the occasion of the ratification of the German-Polish treaty.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Confidential. Urgent; sent for information.
  2. According to Kissingerʼs March 22 record of schedule, the meeting with Michalowski did not take place. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976)
  3. An attached January 16 Department of State memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger reported this possibility; not printed.
  4. See Document 139.
  5. Clement Zablocki (D–Wisconsin).
  6. In a June 2 letter Nutter advised Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Harold B. Scott of Department of Defense opposition to the sale of catalytic crackers to Poland and Czechoslovakia because of their “strategic significance.” The letter is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971.