Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

147. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

Contingency Study for Poland

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

I. Summary

A. Contingencies

1. Termination or suppression of disorders without major involvement of Polish or Soviet Armed Forces.

2. Development of disorder in Poland into a nationwide wave of disorders constituting a national uprising against the regime or against its leadership.

3. The involvement or employment of Soviet armed forces to help Polish armed forces and security forces in suppressing the disorders. This could involve the two divisions of Soviet forces currently stationed in Poland and/or the use of Soviet forces brought in from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, or Eastern Germany.

B. U.S. Interests

1. In view of close historic ties with the Polish people and the large number (estimates range from 7 to 10 million) of American citizens of Polish origin, repression in Poland, even if carried out exclusively by Polish forces, could not be ignored by the US. Severe repression (Contingency 2) could cause a number of current activities—including Polish export trade, exchanges, present and planned exhibits, programs involving use of PL–480 zlotys and CCC credits—to be put into question. This could have an impact on US programs elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including the USSR.

2. As a major world power, the US in its own self-interest could not ignore the possible use of Soviet troops against the Polish population.

3. If Soviet troops were used against the Polish people, this action would put in serious jeopardy any negotiations we may be conducting or contemplating with the Soviet Union, in particular the SALT talks and the Berlin talks, which could hardly continue to the accompaniment of severe US condemnation of the Soviet action. For this reason, it would be in the US interest to deter, if possible, a Soviet involvement which could only destabilize the situation in Central Europe.

4. The Romanian and Yugoslav Governments would view the use or possible use of Soviet troops in Poland with renewed apprehension. This could produce pressures for some form of assurances regarding opposition to Warsaw Pact military action against either of those states and US support for their continued independence.

5. Use of Soviet troops in Poland would certainly have adverse effects on the development of Chancellor Brandtʼs Eastern Policy. It could produce internal political changes in Western Germany and an FRG call for a renewed statement of the US military commitment.

6. The US military posture in Europe and the question of increased West European efforts on defense would be affected, the degree depending on the extent of involvement of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland and the degree of popular reaction in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Eastern Germany.

7. US interests outside Europe (Middle East, Viet-Nam, Caribbean) might benefit from Soviet preoccupation in Central Europe.

C. Assumptions

Under Contingency 1

The contingency in which the demonstrations subside or are suppressed without further loss of life has, it would appear, now occurred. The principal proponent of the decision on the extent and timing of the price rises, Jaszczuk, has been held responsible by the Polish Central Committee and removed from the Politburo. Gomulka, who is reported ailing, has, as the top man, also accepted responsibility or been held responsible along with three close associates, and has been removed. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary, those advocating economic reforms may become temporarily more cautious.

Moscowʼs most immediate concern in this contingency will be for Warsaw to get matters firmly in hand. If the new regime appears to be moving effectively to meet the situation, Moscow will probably be less inclined to meddle than to accept and support the Polish regimeʼs decisions.

The USSR will be concerned nevertheless by the fact that violent demonstrations have succeeded in producing rapid results on the top leadership level. Increased attention to internal security and further emphasis on ideological orthodoxy may result. Soviet propaganda may play the theme of the role of Western influence, or even mischief making, in the events.

In the foreign policy field, the most direct feedback may be on East-West relations in Europe. The Polish disorders, demonstrating the volatility of Eastern European populations, will already have strengthened the arguments of conservatives as to the potential risks of détente policies. The most likely outcome would be continuation of Moscowʼs European policy, but with greater caution on those items which create greater direct contacts with the West. There may be a heightened effort, in seeking Western credits and technology, to avoid a concomitant increase in Western presence or influence.

By and large, this contingency does not appear likely to produce major changes in Soviet policy on more distant areas such as the Middle East, Viet-Nam, or SALT (the talks in any case being in recess).

Under Contingency 2

The use of Polish armed forces and security forces on a nationwide scale would generate major attention in world media and raise questions in Poland about the viability of the new Polish leadership. Unless the new leadership contained the situation promptly, military-oriented figures might gain in stature. In the West, opponents of building bridges to Eastern European regimes would very probably gain support for criticisms of current US programs in Poland in particular and perhaps in Eastern Europe in general. In Germany, Chancellor Brandtʼs efforts to normalize relations with Poland, and his entire Eastern Policy, might come under stronger domestic criticism. East Germanyʼs opposition in Warsaw Pact councils to Brandtʼs initiatives would be strengthened. If major loss of life, widespread casualties, and/or a significant disruption of supplies occurred, the question of US or international medical or food assistance in the wake of the suppression of the uprising might arise.

As the situation in Poland continued to deteriorate, Moscow would be increasingly troubled and increasingly insistent that the Polish communists put their house in order. The Soviets would be more disposed to advise and ultimately demand that Wawsaw pursue courses of action to resolve the situation.

The Soviets would be increasingly concerned over the possibility of spillover into other Eastern European countries and into the USSR—particularly if the spreading and duration of the demonstrations showed signs of becoming an organized movement. Heightened internal security measures and repression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Soviet urging of such measures in Eastern Europe would be likely.

In these circumstances, the anti-Western propaganda which accompanied heightened internal repression would begin to affect foreign policy. As the inconsistency between détente diplomacy and vigilance propaganda became embarrassing, Moscowʼs policy toward Western Europe and then its policy in other areas would tend to stiffen, especially as Western nations shrank from contacts with the Soviets.

Under Contingency 3

The use of Soviet forces to quell Polish disturbances would revive the atmosphere prevailing in the wake of the Czechoslovak invasion.

Anxieties would rise sharply in Romania and Yugoslavia. The possibility of sympathy demonstrations in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany, also conceivably leading to the use of Soviet troops, could arise. It would become difficult, in a period in which Soviet weapons were killing Poles, for US and other Western representatives to sit across the negotiating table from Soviet representatives in Berlin—and perhaps even in Vienna in March, when the SALT talks are scheduled to resume. The movement toward détente—now spearheaded by Chancellor Brandt—would probably halt for a period of time. There would, in such an atmosphere, be a heightening of concern about the Western defense posture in Europe. The USSRʼs preoccupation in Central Europe might however cause it to reduce its military and military-related involvements elsewhere in the world, i.e., the Middle East, Cuba, Viet-Nam.

One of the motives for Soviet intervention would be concern over potential spillover effects of continuing disturbances in Poland on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The trend toward greater internal security precautions would continue, as would scapegoating anti-Western propaganda. To the degree that some Soviet or East European leaders might see the situation as one of the products of détente diplomacy or an added argument against allowing Western influence to grow in Eastern Europe, they would feel the need for greater caution in dealing with the West in the future.

The use of Soviet troops in Poland—especially if they should be engaged in bloody incidents—could not but arouse widespread revulsion in world opinion. Part of the task of the Soviet Foreign Ministry would probably be—as it was after the interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968)—to attempt to limit damage to Soviet interests abroad. Indeed, if this contingency were preceded by a period of Soviet anticipation of intervention, Moscow might even try to inhibit adverse reactions by making some quiet but positive diplomatic gestures in advance—perhaps hinting at some greater prospect of progress in the Berlin talks or SALT for the purpose.

Our choice of options under this contingency would have to be adjusted to take account of the nature of Soviet military involvement, i.e. whether it was at the specific request of the Polish Government or essentially on Soviet initiative; whether it involved Soviet troops standing by for effect as Polish forces did the job, or whether it involved direct confrontation and violence between Poles and Soviet forces; whether, in the latter instance, units of the Polish armed forces became active against Soviet troops. There would have to be a large number of draft Action Papers if each possible combination of the above factors were to be provided for.

D. Options

The following options are listed in relation to the three contingencies discussed. These options are not recommended courses of action but possible courses of action and therefore constitute a checklist rather than a set of proposals. A separate section itemizes possible US actions and could be taken in anticipation of a possible Soviet decision to use Soviet troops in Poland. These options should not be viewed as measures which would necessarily inhibit, delay or prevent a Soviet decision to intervene; they are unlikely to have that much effect. They are, however, measures which might, in this contingency, be worth taking in terms of establishing US concern for the consequences to the Polish nation and to the prospects for stability in Europe of a Soviet intervention.

(Under Contingency 1)

a) Make a statement at the next press conference by the Secretary and/or President giving briefly our understanding of the origins of the disturbances and expressing our sorrow at the loss of life, particularly in instances where this occurred as the result of ancillary actions by persons not acting on the basis of substantive economic or political grievances. State that we are prepared to continue efforts toward improved relations.

b) Determine broadcast policy for US and US-controlled media.

(Under Contingency 2)

a) Call in the Polish Ambassador and express concern at the loss of life involved in suppression of the uprising. At the same time, a public statement to this effect could be made by the President or the Secretary.

b) Suspend exchange programs underway with Poland and cancel the opening of Architecture exhibit in Warsaw (scheduled for mid-January 1971).

c) Review other US programs in Poland, involving the expenditure of US-held zlotys. (Those which are of direct benefit to the Polish people, such as the planned construction of a new wing at the American Hospital in Krakow, should be continued. Additionally, the Poles are servicing or repaying financial obligations to the US, arising from now-terminated PL–480 programs. We would not want to impel the Polish Government to stop these payments.)

d) Suspend US travel to Poland.

e) Recall our Ambassador from Warsaw on consultation.

f) Withdraw MFN tariff treatment from Polish exports to the US. (Although we can expect significant Congressional sentiment for withdrawal of MFN, doing so would be in violation of our GATT agreement. In addition, we undertook in 1960 to obtain MFN for Poland as part of a claims-settlement agreement. Removing it now could only result in Polish default on debt payments and a consequent long-term impact on trade and financial relations.)

g) Cancellation of the current $25-million unused CCC credit. (However, it would be self-defeating to refuse to allow Poland to buy agricultural products if we were at the same time mounting any sort of relief effort.)

h) By administrative decision, place Poland in a more restrictive category for export-licensing purposes. (Doing so, however, would run counter to our general policy of encouraging trade with Eastern Europe and probably not have a particularly significant impact.)

i) Offer spot medical or food assistance at points where local medical or food supplies are not meeting needs in the aftermath of suppression.

(Between Contingency 2 and 3)

a) Call in the Soviet Ambassador and warm him of the seriousness with which we would view any punitive Soviet action against the Polish population. At the same time, a public statement to this effect could be made by the President.

b) Use the Hot Line to convey our concern to the Soviets and couple this with a public statement by the President.

c) Stimulate preventive action in the UN Security Council; call an emergency NAC session.

(Under Contingency 3)

a) Immediately break off any negotiations under way with the Soviets and cancel all exchange programs.

b) Take such steps as (a), (b), or (c) above which have not already been taken.

c) Prohibit Pan-American flights to Moscow and Aeroflot flights to New York and discourage commercial activities.

d) Make a public statement expressing US condemnation and listing the actions taken or proposed.

e) Recall our Ambassador from Moscow for consultation.

f) Attempt to get parallel actions taken by other Western Governments.

g) In the event Soviet forces are used without a Polish request, take the matter to the United Nations Security Council in concert with other countries.

h) Avoid threats of military action but consider what stage of alert might be assumed in NATO.

E. Key Issues

The most important questions which will confront the US are:

Under Contingency 1:

1. Broadcast Policy.

2. US Public Reaction.

Under Contingency 2:

1. How far to cut back our relations with the Polish Government.

2. Whether to participate in or offer any spot medical or food assistance in the wake of the disorders.

Under Contingency 3:

1. How far to cut back our relations with the Soviets.

2. Whether negotiations on such important questions as Berlin or SALT should be broken off or only postponed.

3. The degree to which such action would be effective.

4. The number of US troops and amounts of matériel which might have to be moved to Europe in order to allay possible fears of our Allies.

5. The determination of the desired NATO alert status in concert with our Allies.

[Omitted here is Section II, a list of draft action documents.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Secret. The paper was an attachment to a January 8, 1971, memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, not printed. In the memorandum, Eliot wrote in part: “The two contingency papers requested at the WSAG meeting you held December 18 are now in a final version and have been distributed to members of the Interdepartmental Task Force on Poland. (Copy enclosed.)” A second contingency paper on East Germany is not printed. For the minutes of the WSAG meeting, see Document 144.