139. Editorial Note

In a meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Davies on September 11, 1970, Polish Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski referred to the “‘unpleasant news’ he had heard an hour earlier from Commerce Secretary Stans on the recent U.S. Government action further postponing a decision on the catalytic cracker licensing case. He said that, while not unexpected, this would cause unfavorable consequences in U.S.-Polish relations.” Davies replied that “the decision might be reviewed in the future when further improvement in the atmosphere of U.S.-Polish relations had occurred.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POLUS) On the decision to postpone a decision on the Polish request, see Document 14.

On September 19 Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff presented Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger with a memorandum in preparation for the latterʼs upcoming meeting with Ambassador to Poland Walter J. Stoessel. Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Stoessel will probably be interested to hear from you a rationale for Polish-American relations, in view of the negative decision on the sale of petroleum technology to Poland. (We have told the Poles that it is deferred because of the ‘general political situation.’) You may wish to say that the President does not feel the time is ripe for any special moves toward Poland. Our main interest at present is demonstrating that the countries most friendly to us, Romania and Yugoslavia, benefit from their positions of independence, and that we, in fact, differentiate between the countries of Eastern Europe. Of course, Poland is not on a par with East Germany, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria. We regard Poland and Hungary as a kind of middle ground, which means that various exchanges and so forth should proceed. Later we might reconsider the cracking plant.”

Sonnenfeldt continued: “He may mention that the Poles are taking this cracking plant decision as a touchstone of our relations, and reading a great deal into it. This, of course, makes life for Stoessel more difficult. You might point out that as long as the Poles play the North Vietnamese and Soviet game as members of the ICC we have to take this into account. On the other hand, we are not so unrealistic as to expect Poland, in light of its geographic position, to condemn the Brezhnev doctrine.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971) There is no record of Kissinger meeting with Stoessel in Kissingerʼs Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 428, Miscellany, 1968–1976) No other record of the meeting has been found.