Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

131. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1969, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with the President Concerning Poland and other matters

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mr. Henry Kissinger
• Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

1. At the Presidentʼs suggestion, I discussed the situation in Poland briefly, noting the relatively good opportunities the Embassy had for contacts and the wide-spread sympathy towards the U.S. on the part of the people. These factors, plus a strong feeling of nationalism in Poland, provided the U.S. with the possibility of exerting constructive influence in Poland. I said I had the impression that the Polish Government in recent months had indicated interest in improving its relations with Western Europe and with the U.S., in part because of economic pressures; the Poles realized that they could not get everything they needed from the Soviet Union and they were interested in trade and Western technology. In conclusion, I noted that, of course, the regime in Poland was thoroughly Communist and closely attached to the Soviet Union.

2. The President expressed himself in very friendly terms toward Poland and her people. He recalled with pleasure the warmth of the reception he had received in Warsaw when he visited there as Vice President.² On the other hand, he knew that Gomulka was extremely tough; the President had found him cold as steel and harder in his attitudes than Khrushchev.

3. The President said he was very anxious for the U.S. to keep in contact and communication with the Polish people. He remarked that it was not within our capability, certainly in the short term, to pull Poland away from the Soviet Union. Also, there could be no thought on our part of stimulating revolutions in Poland or any of the other countries in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the President felt that we could be active in promoting contacts with Poland in cultural and other fields. In this context, he wondered if it would be appropriate to send a member of the Cabinet to Poland soon. I said I felt it probably would be too early for such a step, although it certainly should be kept in mind, if, as I hoped, relations between the U.S. and Poland improved. The President mentioned that, if it would not be appropriate to send a Cabinet member, we might keep in mind the possibility of other high-level officials from his staff. For example, Mr. Moynihan might visit Poland with a view to discussing urban problems with Polish experts.

4. The President favored trade with Poland and with the other East European countries. After Viet Nam is settled, the Administration will be prepared to take far ranging actions in this field. For the present, however, attitudes in Congress prevent any major moves in this direction since some of the East European countries are helping North Viet Nam. The President knew that Eastern Europe could not satisfy its requirements in the technological field by depending on the Soviet Union. In particular, he believed this was true in the computer field, and he thought that, in the future, we should give consideration to selling computers in Eastern Europe since such a step could be in our interest.

5. I mentioned my concern at the prospect that, because of budgetary problems, the U.S. would not be able to exhibit at the Poznan international fair in June 1970. The President said he believed it was of great importance that we exhibit at Poznan and the money to do so could be found somehow. He asked Mr. Kissinger to be in touch with Mr. Shakespeare of USIA on this subject. In speaking of Poznan, the President mentioned the possibility that a Cabinet officer might be sent to open our exhibit at the fair next year. On the general question of trade fairs, the President commented that we should emphasize our participation in fairs in Eastern Europe, where our presence is needed. We should not be so concerned about other areas, such as Western Europe, where trade and contacts are good in any event.

6. After I had described, at the Presidentʼs request, the enthusiastic reception given in Poland to the Apollo 11 moon landing, the President suggested that, if Hungary declined to receive the astronauts on their forthcoming tour, we should request Poland to accept their visit.³ The President remarked that Poland had been his first choice as a country in Eastern Europe for the astronauts to visit, but he had anticipated that Gomulka would not be willing to accept them. However, in view of the great public response in Poland to the moon shot, he now thought that it might be difficult for Gomulka to turn down the prospect of such a visit. The President noted that he did not feel it was appropriate for the astronauts to tour all of the countries of Eastern Europe and that it clearly would not be appropriate for them to go to Romania so soon after his own enthusiastic welcome there.

7. The President then spoke about U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If the Soviets now appear to be seeking détente and to want agreement with us on certain problems, this is because they see it as in their interest to do so. They approach these matters with their heads, not with their hearts, which is quite understandable. We must aim at convincing the Soviets that they need our cooperation in various areas in order to have peace and stability. One area is in Eastern Europe; others are in the Middle East and Viet Nam. The Soviets have some soft spots in Eastern Europe. We can work on these to some extent with the view to stimulating constructive change, but we must always bear in mind that we cannot go too far. The examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (although we had nothing to do with the latter) are very fresh in our minds. All in all, it is a delicate game which must be played with skill. The President encouraged me to recommend ways in which we could expand our contacts in Poland. He felt that for too long we have not been sufficiently active in our Polish policy.

8. The President referred to the problem of the Oder-Neisse frontier.⁴ He wondered how serious this question really was for the Poles, since there was no chance of changing this boundary in any case. Mr. Kissinger commented that recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier by the FRG was strictly an internal political problem in West Germany. The acuteness of this problem was lessening with time as the influence of the expellees declined. The President repeated again that changing the border was unthinkable.

9. The President questioned me concerning the problem of anti-Semitism in Poland, recalling that it seemed fairly bad when he had been there in the late ‘50’s. I said the situation had worsened following the Arab-Israeli war.⁵ Special procedures had been instituted by the regime under which Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel could do so by giving up their Polish citizenship. Around 6000 had taken advantage of this, leaving roughly 22,000 Jews in the country. It appeared that Gomulka himself had not favored the anti-Semitic campaign and in the last six months the situation seemed calmer. The President remarked that by their policy the Poles had lost some of their brightest people through emigration and he thought the anti-Semitic actions in Poland had been highly unfortunate. Mr. Kissinger noted that this problem was also related to internal domestic politics in Poland, since a number of Jews had occupied high posts in the Communist Party and the Government and had been targets of Moczar. Mr. Kissinger understood Jewish emigration would end as of September 1. I said the situation was not entirely clear on this point. We had received assurances from Polish officials that emigration of Jews in the future would be permitted under normal procedures, although probably on a more selective basis than in the past.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL POL–US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting took place at the White House.
2. For documentation on Nixonʼs August 2–4, 1959 visit to Poland as Vice President, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe Region; Poland; Greece; Turkey; Yugoslavia, pp. 190–225.
3. The Hungarian Government turned down a visit by the Apollo 11 astronauts during their September 29–November 5 worldwide tour; see Document 110. The astronauts did not visit Poland.
4. See footnote 9, Document 130.
5. Reference to the “Six Day War” of June 1967. Documentation on the U.S. concern regarding official anti-Semitism is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe; Austria; Finland, Documents 132, 134, and 135.