Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

73. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, April 22, 1975, 11:55 a.m.–12:21 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Panama Canal Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman

  • Henry A. Kissinger

• State

  • Robert Ingersoll
  • Amb. Ellsworth Bunker
  • William Rogers
  • Morey S. Bell

• DOD

  • William Clements
  • Howard H. Callaway
  • Maj. Gen. George Wallace
  • Gen. Henry Koren

• JCS

  • Gen. George S. Brown
  • Lt. Gen. John Pauly

• CIA

  • William Colby
  • Lou Marengo

• NSC Staff

  • LTG Brent Scowcroft
  • Stephen Low
  • Lt. Col. Donald MacDonald
  • James Barnum

Secretary Kissinger: Do we need a briefing, Bill?

Mr. Colby: I’m prepared to brief if you wish.

Secretary Kissinger: Go ahead.

Mr. Colby began to brief from the attached text.²

Secretary Kissinger: What is an extended period? (Referring to the second scenario in the SNIE (Special Intelligence Estimate) in which consideration was given to the prospects if a treaty is signed but the U.S. Senate fails to act for an extended period or rejects it.)³

Mr. Colby: Over a year or so. (Continued to brief.)

Secretary Kissinger: Does General Torrijos have the capability to carry out sustained terrorist attacks on U.S. installations and personnel (if the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty)?

Mr. Colby: Yes, he has the capability. What would happen is that he would benefit from the nationalistic feelings that would be unleashed.

Secretary Kissinger: Terrorist attacks inside the Canal Zone? Do you agree, George (Gen. Brown)?

Gen. Brown: Yes.

Mr. Colby: The problem is that there are a lot of vulnerable things there, machinery and stuff.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. In addition, you’d have the Latin American problem, which would be a mess. Okay. Ellsworth (Amb. Bunker), could you give us a rundown on where the negotiations are at this point and what you are trying to do?

Amb. Bunker: What we are trying to do is to obtain a treaty which would preserve our national security interests and at the same time be salable to both Panama and to our own Congress. In spite of Congressional criticism, I think that the package we have put together so far would protect our security interests. The problem is that we can’t get a treaty if we have to stick to our earlier instructions. Torrijos has made it quite clear that he will not accept a 50-year treaty duration. They want something less than that. If you will recall, in 1967–1968 we offered a 30-year duration. They turned that down. We tried again in 1971 and 1972 with a 50-year duration. They turned that down. What we want to do is put together a treaty that will give us optimum security but is also salable to Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: What would make it salable to Congress? I saw where (Senator) Thurmond has already lined up 37 Senators in opposition to it.

Amb. Bunker: I think that perhaps half of those 37 are persuadable.

Mr. Clements: You know, Henry, the issue also involves the question of other priorities. Do you want to have a flap over this issue, or save your guns for a more important issue?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that’s what the President will have to decide. He’ll have to weigh that against the international consequences—where we would be years from now without a treaty. What happens after twenty-five years as far as defense of the canal is concerned?

Amb. Bunker: Well, we’re asking for a twenty-five to fifty year defense duration in the treaty. We also hope to be able to negotiate some type of military presence there after the expiration of the treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: What’s the problem then?

Amb. Bunker: Well, the question is, can Defense accept 20 years’ duration on canal operations and 25 years on defense? What we are asking for is some flexibility. What we would like to get is somewhere between twenty-five and fifty years’ duration on defense.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think would be realistically acceptable to Congress?

Amb. Bunker: I would hope that Congress would accept somewhere between thirty-five and fifty years’ duration on defense. Say forty years, for example.

Secretary Kissinger: Would the Defense Department fall on its sword over ten-years on duration? What happens after forty years, for example? Who defends the Canal after forty years?

Gen. Brown: I think the (Armed) Services would have to consider a ten-year difference very carefully, but I don’t think they would fall on their swords over only a five-to-seven year difference. Ten years would give us some problems.

Mr. Clements: If we drop more than ten years, we would have real problems.

Secretary Kissinger: I have real difficulty understanding why the Services could accept forty-three years and not forty. What do you have, inside information that something is going to happen then?

(General Scowcroft entered the meeting at this point reporting that President Thieu had not left Saigon.)

I understand the lower cut-off point, but not the higher.

Gen. Brown: We can talk in increments of five years, but ten years would be difficult to accept.

Secretary Kissinger: After X number of years, what happens? Who takes over operation and defense of the Canal?

Amb. Bunker: Panama would take over operation of the Canal. After say forty years’ duration on defense, Panama would also take over responsibility for the defense of the Canal, but we would hope to be able to negotiate some sort of residual presence.

Gen. Brown: Is this spelled out explicitly?

Amb. Bunker: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: In the treaty?

Amb. Bunker: In an agreement.⁴

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. What we face here are two issues. The first one is substantive. Defense is arguing that the treaty’s duration for defensive purposes must be fifty years and not less than forty years. Even forty years gives them a lot of pain. (Senator) Thurmond opposes any kind of new treaty. By the way, he called me the other day and claimed that we were planning to turn over a number of things like the police, the fire department and postal service unilaterally to the Panamanians.⁵

Mr. Rogers: There are no unilateral turnovers planned. Provisions in the treaty relate to turning over installations to the Panamanians.

Secretary Kissinger: Then I can assure Thurmond that there will be no unilateral transfer of jurisdiction outside the treaty.⁶

Mr. Rogers: Absolutely.

Mr. Clements: There is no transfer of jurisdiction or services outside the treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my sympathy for the citizens of the Canal Zone is zero. The Canal Zone is nothing more than a vestige of colonialism in my view.

Gen. Brown: There are a number of things that are irritants to them, but they are minor and I’m sure we can work them out.

Mr. Clements: That’s right, Henry. You know, if in the President’s judgement the timing is not right to have a treaty, we can make some small accommodations with the Panamanians. There’s a lot of little things we could do. They are not much in terms of value, but they would be symbolic.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think, Bill?

Mr. Rogers: I think they are interested in a treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: Suppose Torrijos does want a treaty? If he does, how flexible is he? If there is no treaty, will he accept unilateral accommodations to ease the pain? Do you think this is manageable?

Amb. Bunker: I think it would be very difficult for him to accept.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, how about a three-minute lecture on the land and waters issue.

Amb. Bunker: In our negotiations, the Panamanians have made it clear that they cannot accept an overwhelming U.S. military presence in the Canal Zone. We propose to turn over some facilities and areas to them. We should not hold on to those areas that are not critical to the defense of the Canal. Some of these areas that we do not plan to turn over are near the major cities, however, and they say that constitutes an overwhelming presence. We would like to reach some accommodation with them on that issue. Train ing fields, for example, could be shared.

Secretary Kissinger: Could this be done unilaterally if necessary?

Amb. Bunker: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill, do you think this will satisfy them?

Mr. Rogers: No I don’t.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the State Department and the Defense Department should get together and work out what we are willing to give up and what optical changes we could make to satisfy the Panamanians.

Gen. Brown: Yes, isolate our differences.

Secretary Kissinger: You two (Defense and State) get together and get an agreed position. I think this is a matter for the NSC once we see what the differences are.

Mr. Colby: I think the Panamanians will want a treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we’re clear about that. As I understand it, this is really a domestic political decision that the President will have to make. Many in Congress are opposed to a treaty. It’s the judgement of the Intelligence Community that if the treaty negotiations break down, there are going to be one hell of a lot of problems. If the President decides to proceed with a treaty, he is going to get one hell of a lot of flak in this country. We have to get agreement on the land and waters issue. When we have that, we can present it to him for decision. I think we’ll have an NSC meeting on this in two or three weeks. We’ll let the President make the decision.

Mr. Clements: Good.

1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 24, Meeting Minutes—Senior Review Group, April–May 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes were sent to Kissinger under a covering memorandum from Davis dated April 25. The briefing papers for this meeting, including a covering memorandum from Low and Granger to Kissinger, April 19; undated talking points; a memorandum from Clements to Kissinger, February 27; a memorandum from Bunker to Kissinger, March 28 (see footnote 2, Document 71); a memorandum from Koren to Low, April 18; an undated summary and analysis of State and Defense Department arguments; a list of past NSDMs regarding Panama; and an undated proposed NSDM that would alter the negotiating instructions for the negotiating team are in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 14, Senior Review Group Meeting, 4/22/75—Panama Canal (1). A memorandum from the Department of State to Ford may refer to Document 65.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. SNIE 84–1–75, “Panama Canal Treaty: The Likely Consequences of Certain Contingent Developments,” April 18, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files (1950–1975), Box 499, Folder 2: (SNIE 84–1–75) Panama Canal Treaty: The Likely Consequences of Certain Contingent Developments.
4. See Document 57.
5. Record of conversation not found.
6. Kissinger spoke to Thurmond on the telephone on April 23 to assure him. (Department of State, FOIA Virtual Reading Room, Henry Kissinger Telephone Transcripts)