Office of the Historian

74. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable1

TDFIR DB–315/05042–75
Washington, April 25, 1975.

COUNTRY

  • Panama

DOI

  • Late April 1975

SUBJECT

  • Concern and Disillusionment of Panamanian Leaders Over Prospects of Obtaining a New Treaty

ACQ

  • [2 lines not declassified]

SOURCE

  • See below.

To State: No distribution except to Mr. Hyland. To DIA: Exclusive for Lt. General Graham. To NSA: Exclusive for Lt. General Allen.

1. The source of paragraph two is [4 lines not declassified].

2. In late April 1975 Juan A. Tack, Panamanian Foreign Minister, told Carlos Lopez Guevara, a Foreign Ministry advisor, that both he and General Omar Torrijos, Chief of Government, are concerned and disillusioned about the prospects of obtaining a new Canal treaty. Indalecia Lievano, Foreign Minister of Colombia, informed Torrijos that he obtained the impression that during his meeting with Dr. Henry Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State,2 Lievano had the impression that the situation in the Senate and the House of Representatives was not conducive for ratification of a new Canal treaty. Aside from their reluctance to give up rights in the Canal Zone, some members of Congress are opposed to even negotiating a treaty because they question the legitimacy of the present Government of Panama. Lievano [Page 206] reported that despite the sentiment of the Congress of the United States, the executive branch of the Government of the United States is doing what it can to arrive at a reasonable and just new Canal treaty.

3. The source of paragraph four is [3 lines not declassified].

4. While in Panama following his meeting with Dr. Kissinger, Lievano told a member of the Colombian Embassy he personally was pessimistic regarding United States ratification of a new Canal treaty. He said that the Department of State is worried about congressional concerns over the legality of the present Government of Panama.

5. The source of paragraph six is [4 lines not declassified].

6. Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Noriega, the G–2 of the National Guard (GN) and other GN officers are very upset over recent statements by United States Congressmen concerning the treaty negotiations. Noriega interprets these statements as being part of a well conceived plan, orchestrated by “Washington” to deny Panama a new treaty. Noriega now holds the opinion there will be no new treaty. He bases this opinion on the defeats the United States has suffered around the world which have hardened the attitude of Congress. Noriega has been gauging the mood of Congress through personal telephone calls from Nicolas Gonzalez-Revilla, Panamanian Ambassador to the United States.

7. The source of paragraphs eight and nine is [4½ lines not declassified].

8. After his meeting with Torrijos and prior to his departure from Panama Lievano told a Panamanian journalist that Panama is now preparing for and expects a postponement and possible discontinuation of the treaty negotiations. He said that the United States may stall and attempt to postpone signing a new treaty since it is doubtful that a new treaty would be approved by the Senate at this time. Torrijos told Lievano that Panama’s reaction to such a tactic would be to engage in world-wide denunciation of the United States. This anti-U.S. campaign would be launched among Latin American countries and would be followed by a request for support from the Third World nations, especially the Arab bloc. The Communist nations would be asked to participate.

9. There are government employees who are currently discussing with students the possibility the Canal treaty negotiations may fail for the purpose of preparing students to react in a hostile manner towards the United States.

10. (Field comment: [1 line not declassified] reported that as the result of Lievano’s meeting with Dr. Kissinger, Tack and Torrijos were optimistic regarding the Canal treaty negotiations. The source of this report subsequently clarified that he meant Tack and Torrijos were optimistic a new treaty would be “signed” during 1975. He did not mean “signed and ratified.”)

11. Field dissem: [2½ lines not declassified].

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A, Box 499, Folder 1: (SNIE 8–1–75) Panama Canal Treaty: The Likely Consequences of Certain Contingent Developments (Drafts). Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad.↩
  2. During the April 8 meeting, Kissinger remarked: “This is a massive domestic problem. It is impossible for the United States to maintain the position it has had since 1903. We need prerogatives in defense or we won’t get the treaty through the Congress.” He added: “But our Congress is out of control. The condition is described here as ‘Latin American’—no executive authority,” and “given the present state of affairs with the Congress, they wouldn’t approve the Declaration of Independence.” (Memorandum of conversation, April 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820125–0196)↩