Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

41. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 10, 1974, 10:45–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Present Attitude in Congress toward Treaty with Panama

PARTICIPANTS

• Congressional Side

  • Chief Legislative Assistant to Senator Helms (North Carolina)— Dr. James P. Lucier

• Department of Defense Side

  • Deputy Secretary of Defense—William P. Clements, Jr.
  • Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Amos A. Jordan (Acting)
  • Deputy Under Secretary of the Army—Henry L.T. Koren
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter-American, Foreign Trade Disclosure and Military Rights Affairs)—Robert F. Corrigan
  • Director, Inter-American Region, ISA—Major General George M. Wallace
  • Director, Foreign Military Rights Affairs, ISA—Philip E. Barringer
  • Assistant for Panama Canal Treaty Affairs, ISA—Colonel Trevor W. Swett, Jr.
  • Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, OJCS—Colonel Charles D. Corbett
  • Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Canal Zone Affairs—Colonel Ben L. Walton
  • Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense—Lt Col Peter M. Dawkins

1. History of US-Panama treaties in Congress

Dr. Lucier cited the poor track record in Congress with respect to treaties with Panama, emphasizing that Congressional reaction to the 1967 draft treaties made it inexpedient for them to be submitted to the Senate, and pointing out that the wording of the recently initialed principles portends a treaty even more favorable to Panama than the 1967 versions.²

2. Degree of Control over Canal Retained by US

Dr. Lucier stated that the real problem for Congress is the degree of control over the operations and defense of the Canal to be retained by the US. He indicated that he understood the constraint under which the Department of Defense operates, in view of the State Department blue-print for the new treaty, comparing the Defense role to fighting a rear guard action.

3. Statement of Principles

Dr. Lucier focused upon the Statement of Principles which the Secretary of State initialed in Panama City on 7 February, evincing a strongly conservative point of view in attacking each of the eight principles on grounds that they were wrong and based on false assumptions.³ The following summarizes his views on each:

—Principles 1 and 2: Same as first two principles against which 1971 draft treaty was developed.⁴

—Principle 3: The rate at which Panama takes over the Canal is the only thing we are now negotiating.

—Principle 4: The use of the term “Panamanian territory” is an implied assumption. Senator Thurmond strongly believes that the Canal Zone is not Panamanian territory; that the US has sovereign authority there; and that Panama has residual authority, except that Colombia should have first claim to the territory if we get out. This entire matter should be a negotiating chip.

—Principle 5: Who decides what constitutes a “just and equitable share”?

—Principle 6: Panamanian citizens are now to be in administrative positions. Under no circumstances should we have two governments involved, and thus a split administration, which is unworkable.

—Principle 7: With Panamanian participation in the defense of the Canal, again there is split responsibility which is worse in the context of defense than in administration of the Canal.

—Principle 8: A sea level canal is absolutely impractical. It would be too expensive, and a new treaty would not provide sufficient U.S. control. The Sea Level Canal Study provided inadequate treatment of the ecological hazards. We should modernize the current canal.⁵ In this instance, however, we are negotiating for something we already have.

General Comments

Dr. Lucier feels that all eight principles are wrong and are based upon false assumptions. Specifically:

—The State Department is misreading the strong opposition in Senate against a treaty based upon these principles.

—More than the present 35 Senate signatories are expected to endorse the recent Thurmond resolution in support of continued, undiluted U.S. sovereignty and jurisdiction over the U.S. owned Canal.

—Unless the State Department alters its present course and accepts the realities of the climate in Congress, it will collide, head-on, with the Senate. If this happens, the situation could become serious in Panama, because of the present euphoric negotiating climate and subsequent frustration if negotiations falter.

—The only viable alternative to a collision with the Senate is for the Administration to support the expansion of the Canal capacity by the TERMINAL LAKE—3RD LOCK PLAN which Senator Thurmond introduced in the Senate (Congressman Flood introduced a similar bill in the House).⁶ This proposal is still the cheapest, most effective way to modernize the Canal without requiring a change in the boundaries of the Canal Zone or a new treaty.

4. Dr. Lucier’s Comments on Ambassador Bunker’s 19 March Speech and Related General Observations

—There is considerable disagreement in Congress with this speech.⁷

—The real U.S. interest is in continued operation and defense of the Canal by the U.S.

—It is the manner of our presence in the Canal Zone which causes friction rather than U.S. presence per se.

—Our ability to remain in the Canal Zone rests upon the consent of the Panamanian people. We cannot negotiate our required presence unless the U.S. has true sovereignty.

—If a new treaty is negotiated along the lines indicated by the principles, the Canal operation will suffer from the instability of the Panamanian Government. Rivalries for power will result in attempts to undermine the Canal operation by anti-American agitation. There will be efforts, through internal Panamanian Government discussions, to speed up the economic benefits to Panama. The Canal will be prone to external attack by enemies of the U.S. attempting to control the Canal; by subversive attempts within the Government of Panama (GOP) to destroy the Canal operation; and by the resultant U.S. reaction by force, which would demonstrate brutality on the part of the U.S. as well as ineptness on the part of the GOP. Additionally, the U.S. Government will be under pressure to control the GOP, causing further unrest.

—In sum, the solution advocated by Ambassador Bunker will cause significant instability.

5. Response by DODPersonnel

—In reply to Mr. Clements’ question whether he agreed with Dr. Lucier’s views, Ambassador Corrigan admitted that, as a citizen, he shared some of the misgivings over the principles enumerated by Dr. Lucier. He emphasized, however, that we worked for the President, were responsive to his directives, and within those parameters, should see what kind of a mutually satisfactory treaty could be worked out.

—Mr. Koren, DUSA, described Dr. Lucier’s opinion as being at point “A” on an “A” to “Z” spectrum. He stated that the other end would describe the 1903 treaty and the current Canal Zone arrangements as anachronistic. This viewpoint, Mr. Koren observed, holds that some change in the U.S.-Panamanian relationship is necessary, for circumstances could develop whereby the Panamanians could make it impossible for us to run the Canal.

—Colonel Corbett, JCS, pointed out that the current Kissinger approach to the new treaty is part of a grand design for the world and the Western Hemisphere.

6. Further Comments by Dr. Lucier

—The current Kissinger approach will exacerbate our currently less-than-satisfactory relations with Latin America.

—An alternative which would gain the concurrence of the Panamanians and simultaneously receive Latin American approval would be a Third Locks modernization plan.

—This modernization plan would enhance the economic development of all Panamanian sectors.

—We should keep sovereignty over the Canal Zone but revise Canal Zone governmental arrangements based upon a Home Rule proposal with self-determination by Canal Zone residents.

7. Response by Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements

—Directing his comments to Dr. Lucier, Mr. Clements pointed out that the Department of Defense was the wrong audience; that he should do his missionary work with State Department officials; and that the Pentagon has no desire to give up anything in the Canal Zone, but we in the Department of Defense are not sure that we have a choice.

—Mr. Clements volunteered to call Deputy Secretary of State Rush and arrange for a briefing at State similar to that which Dr. Lucier provided DODofficials.

8. Closing Comments by Dr. Lucier

—Senator Thurmond’s position is not one of intransigence; he does not consider Panama or any of our Latin American neighbors to be “banana republics” and he does not advocate “gunboat diplomacy.”

—Dr. Lucier would appreciate a call to Deputy Secretary Rush by Mr. Clements suggesting a similar briefing for selected State Department personnel as the State Department should also be aware of Congressional positions.⁸

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–78–0011, Panama 821 1974. For Official Use Only. Drafted by Swett on June 19; approved by Corrigan. The meeting took place in Clements’ conference room.
2. See Foreign Relations, vol. XXXI, 1964–1968, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 439.
3. See Document 32.
4. See footnote 4, Document 2.
5. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 541.
6. In 1973, Thurmond introduced the “Panama Canal Modernization Act” (S.2330), which discussed a Third Locks Project and was distinct from the later Senate Resolution 301. The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on August 2, 1973.
7. Bunker addressed the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York. For the text of his speech, see the Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1974, pp. 453–457.
8. No record of a call has been found.