Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

40. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 23, 1974, 6–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Panama Treaty Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Panama

  • H.E. Juan Antonio Tack, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief Treaty Negotiator for Panama
  • H.E. Nicolas Gonzalez-Revilla, Ambassador to the United States and Deputy Negotiator

• United States

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker, Chief U.S. Treaty Negotiator
  • S. Morey Bell, Deputy U.S. Negotiator and Country Director for Panama
  • Interpreter Neil Seidenman

I. BACKGROUND

Latin American Foreign Ministers, disturbed at Senate Resolution 301 opposing concessions to Panama, unexpectedly raised the Panama issue at the Washington MFM.² In effect they asked: Is the Administration’s negotiation with Panama not a sham, given a quantity of senatorial sentiment apparently sufficient to defeat any treaty?

The Secretary deflected the ministerial aim during the meeting, then deflected it further by a surprise, midnight appearance at a Panamanian Embassy reception. At that reception the Secretary invited Minister Tack for a private talk in his office upon the Minister’s return from the OASGA in Atlanta.³ His purpose was to acknowledge Tack’s first visit to Washington in his capacity as Panama’s Chief Treaty Negotiator.

II.

The Secretary: “Well, it must be a quiet day in Atlanta without the Panamanian Foreign Minister there! (Laughter)

“No, seriously—very good to see you. You were extremely good on Friday,⁴ and I appreciate it.

“Will you have a drink?”

Foreign Minister Tack: “To celebrate my being away from Atlanta? Not a bad idea.” (Laughter)

The Secretary: “You know, I hope Bunker does not become confused with his Middle East and Panama missions. With his Soviet colleague in Geneva he has instructions to do absolutely nothing, and with you he has instructions to do absolutely everything. And he travels so much that confusion could result. (Laughter)

“And what are you drinking?”

Foreign Minister Tack: “Ellsworth, shall we have our Contadora drink?”

Ambassador Bunker: “I believe that would be fitting.” (Laughter)

The Secretary: “Without the aphrodisiac, I hope. (Laughter)

“Tell me, what are those characters really doing in Atlanta? No, before that: I was wondering if the Ambassador [Gonzalez-Revilla] would like to rent his house. I need one, and it was lovely.”

Ambassador Gonzalez: “Perhaps you could get it through the treaty negotiation.” (Laughter)

The Secretary: “That would be too expensive and I couldn’t afford it. Of course, I might sell some documents.

“Tell me, Mr. Minister, would you like to buy some documents? (Laughter) Just enough to pay for my house, naturally.” (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Tack: “I wish to reiterate my invitation to you to visit Contadora. There is a house there for you. But only, of course, when you demolish the people opposing you and come down to sign a new treaty.” (Laughter)

The Secretary: “That’s going to happen.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “You asked about what is going on in Atlanta. First may I say that I thought your speech was very good. I especially liked your reference to the need for precise definitions for reorganizing the OAS.

“I want to add that Panama is going to act positively regarding that entity. But we have to face reality: the people in Latin America do not believe very much in the OAS, as it is. We think it is in your interests and Panama’s to change it so that the Latins—and yourselves—truly believe in it.”

The Secretary: “Frankly, I think it would be better if we were to keep these meetings of Foreign Ministers going. The only important work will be done in them, not in the OAS.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “I agree absolutely. The informality of such meetings is what permits important work to be done.”

The Secretary: “You know, those OAS procedures are so complicated! There are always people sitting behind me, pushing pieces of paper at me and telling me when to do what. Finally, I simply ignored them and broke protocolary rules, doing what I wished to do to accomplish things.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “It was an excellent idea to break through the protocolary wall. Perhaps you noticed that I decided not to speak. I believe I was almost the only Minister who did not.”

Ambassador Bunker: “You know, when I was in the OAS I had a system. I had an officer sitting behind me, who had instructions to the effect that when my head began to droop, he was to push against my chair and wake me up. It worked.”

The Secretary: “I may try that.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “Actually, we all spend a great deal of time criticizing the long speeches made in the OAS, then it turns out that those who are most critical are those who make the longest speeches.” (Laughter)

The Secretary: “Take Chile. Over an hour!”

The Minister: “To be exact, an hour and a half.” (Laughter)

The Secretary: “You know, it is very difficult to come to the end of a speech on history, and I swear that man was bent on giving us every detail of the whole history of Chile, including all the glorious details of the present government.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “I myself had a lot to overcome on that count—I was a history professor, and I could give the longest speeches you can imagine!” (Laughter)

The Secretary: “You know, this sort of thing can be very discouraging. For audiences, anyway. (Laughter)

“I remember that at one point I was working for a President and we were visiting Ireland. And an American-citizen Irishman who had delusions of grandeur had us for what he called ‘dinner’. Well, there were three hours of that dinner. But it did not end there: a musicale followed. Nor did it end there: we were exposed to an historical pageant. When the pageant got up to about the 17th century, I sneaked away and went to bed, about 3:30 in the morning. But the President had, of course, to stay on—until 4:45 AM. You know, he was so mad when he got away that he came and awakened me and yelled at me for 15 solid minutes!” (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Tack: “Speaking of hours, Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Bunker and I and our Deputies have just had a very valuable one and one-half hour discussion of both the substance and the procedures for the negotiation. I believe we have this undertaking going well.”⁵

The Secretary: “Let me say this. I ask my colleagues in the Department to undertake something, and they tell me it will consume one month’s time. Now, I do not believe that. In my experience, an undertaking is really completed in about one day—there comes a time in every negotiation when you find yourselves devoting just one day doing all the important work that is needed. So, all you have to do is to schedule that one day when you are going to complete this undertaking. (Laughter) No, seriously.

“Let me say this also. I think we may have arrived at a time when a breakthrough is needed. The longer this negotiating lasts, the greater the possibilities for the opposition in the Congress and elsewhere to mobilize.

“Now, frankly, my own personal position would be better if I did not have to be confronted with pressing this treaty through the mass of opposition. But, if we can do it, let’s do it now . . . we all know what’s needed . . . let us move forward.

“Besides, I can’t get anything done in the Middle East if I can’t get Bunker out of this Panama thing!” (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Tack: “Mr. Secretary, ten years have passed, and a mountain of paper has accumulated. But those years and that paper have not contributed, on either side, to a clear perception of, as you say, ‘What is needed.’ We are at last getting that perception. I suppose you might characterize it as a philosophical one, but with a practical aspect to it. It is as simple as this: how do we integrate the two sets of interests: Panama’s urge for sovereignty on one hand, and the United States’ urge for protection of its vital interests on the other.”

The Secretary: “That’s it precisely.

“You realize, of course, that we have trouble in yielding ‘sovereignty’, because of the opposition. But if I can establish that we are getting in return the practical things we need, then I think we might get over the hurdle.

“One large piece of that hurdle is, of course, those people who live in the Zone. I have little sympathy on that score. Still, they are there. I sense that if we could get through a certain transitional period—if we could prove over a period that the ‘Zonians’ could live well enough under your sovereignty, then we would have the problem licked. Right, Ellsworth?”

Ambassador Bunker: “About the people in the Zone, I have talked with all their representatives, and what they are worried about, of course, is their personal security. I have tried to give them assurances that they will be protected, and shall keep doing so.”⁶

The Secretary: “I believe we can meld our practical necessities, and that we can become partners in the Canal through this ‘integration’ process you speak of. Perhaps, then I might be permitted onto Contadora Island to sign the treaty.” (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Tack: “May I suggest that one way of approaching this ‘integration’ problem is for the negotiators to proceed, through a process of elimination, to pinpoint what the U.S. needs and what it does not need to protect its interests in the Canal. You, and many others, know that there are a number of United States activities in the Zone which have no real bearing on the United States’ true interests.”

The Secretary: “For example?”

Foreign Minister Tack: “For example, uniformed American police giving private Panamanians traffic tickets.”

The Secretary: “I agree absolutely. This sort of thing we can find practical solutions for. That is ridiculous.

“What about the terminal date of the treaty? Is that a problem for the breakthrough?”

Ambassador Bunker: “Yes it is, and for that reason the Minister and I have agreed to tackle that issue last.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “We must address it at the last, for otherwise the negotiations would not move forward at all. We would come to a dead stop on that.”

The Secretary: “What schedule do the two of you have in mind?”

Ambassador Bunker: “The Deputies are now consolidating the major issues and . . .”

The Secretary: “I suppose the Deputies work on that island, too. (Laughter) Would that I could get my negotiations located on an island resort.” (Laughter)

Ambassador Bunker: “And, we have an understanding that we would not wish to present a treaty to the Congress during this session.”

The Secretary: “Absolutely, definitely not.”

Ambassador Bunker: “In fact, we have seen the Vice President recently, and he has told us to go slowly for now, but to expedite the treaty matter in 1975.”⁷

The Secretary: “Is the Vice President supporting this?”

Ambassador Bunker: “Yes.”

The Secretary: “That is good. That will help. Then all you have to do is convince the Secretary of State, and you have the thing made. (Laughter) Perhaps it would be well to present the treaty in the first part of next year’s sessions.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “I must say, Mr. Secretary, that I am convinced that we can have something, a first draft, by the end of the year.

“You know, some people think we are going very slowly, but they do not understand how we are working, and I am certain we are doing it the right way. I think we shall be going very strongly after May.”

The Secretary: “The way I see it, we do not wish to provoke a tremendous debate in the Congress and in the country for nothing. There are elections coming up, and I rather think more liberals than conservatives will be elected. So these elections will place your treaty in a much better position.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “I understand what you mean, and I certainly hope so.”

The Secretary: “That is the kind that requires a two-thirds vote, right?”

Ambassador Bunker: “Yes.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “Ambassador Bunker and I will be meeting again in late May and . . .”

The Secretary: “On the island, I presume.” (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Tack: “Yes.”

The Secretary: (To Ambassador Bunker) “A national disgrace! You know, I had so many applicants for the Middle East job, and I picked Bunker. But he didn’t really want it, and . . . Ellsworth, how many times have you been in the Middle East and Panama?” (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Tack: “The work of the Deputies is extremely important. Many people do not understand this, or the way we are working generally, and perhaps it is best that they not understand it.”

The Secretary: “I agree. You have to take the necessary time, and you have to maintain the good will you have both obviously developed. Ellsworth, are you confident this is the way to do it . . . are you content?”

Ambassador Bunker: “Decidedly.”

The Secretary: “OK!”

“Pay no attention to this device attached to me. You know, they’re making a television special on me, and wiring me for sound. I assure you I am not taping this conversation. (Laughter)

“Seriously, I want you to know I am totally behind this reaching for agreement. I want to reaffirm to you privately what I said the other day to the Ministers. Moreover, do not be too concerned with the votes in the Congress. What some members will do today, they would not do with a treaty in front of them.”

Foreign Minister Tack: “After what you have said, and what we learned at breakfast the other day with the two Senators, we believe the Senate is not the problem we had thought it to be.

“Now, Mr. Secretary, I know your time is limited, and I believe you should pass from one canal to another (laughter), so we shall take our leave.”

The Secretary: “Mr. Minister, anytime you are in Washington I would like to see you. Ellsworth, will you see to that?”

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860117–0646. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bell. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. Brackets are in the original.
2. The Meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers took place from April 17 to 18 in Washington. Telegram 85239 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, April 26, provided an evaluation of the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740117–0803)
3. The OAS General Assembly met in Atlanta from April 19 to May 1.
4. April 19. Kissinger headed the U.S. delegation in Atlanta. For his statements before the General Assembly on April 19 and 20, see the Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1974, pp. 510–515.
5. In an April 23 meeting, Bunker and Tack discussed Congressional opposition to the Canal treaty, the content of upcoming negotiations, and educational efforts designed to teach Americans more about the new treaty. (National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiation Files, Lot 81F1, Box 124, POL 33.3–2 Treaty Negotiations—1974, April–June)
6. See footnote 6, Document 31.
7. See Document 35.