Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

127. Memorandum From the Deputy U.S. Negotiator (Bell) to the Senior U.S. Treaty Adviser (Wyrough)¹

Washington, June 25, 1976.

U.S.-PANAMA TREATY NEGOTIATIONS: Handling our Latest Crisis

The Negotiators met with Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla and Torrijos’ confidant Rodrigo Gonzalez June 24. The Panamanians reiterated that the Boyd-Kissinger conversation at Santiago² had a “heavy” adverse impact on their Government.

Panama interpreted the Secretary’s remarks as (a) indicating that the President is not prepared to fulfill his negotiating commitments before November—or, indeed, perhaps before the year’s end, and (b) ruling out any “substantial progress” at all during this period (progress, that is, on the duration-neutrality complex).

More important, Panama has concluded that the United States deceived Panama at Santiago. It lured Panama into the Joint Report and the Resolution,³ which told of significant progress, then after those documents were on the record the Secretary told Boyd: “no more progress this year”. They confided that Torrijos came close to instructing OAS Ambassador Pitty to “lash out” at the United States publicly following the Boyd-Kissinger meeting.

Responding, the Negotiators pointed out that the Clements-Brown arrangement with Torrijos included an understanding that there could not be much progress before the year’s end.⁴ Rodrigo Gonzalez confirmed that Torrijos had, indeed, so understood. But, he explained, domestic problems for Torrijos had increased in the period since that arrangement.

The Panamanians asked what the two negotiating teams should do “between now and then”, and the wisdom of holding a round in July was addressed.

The Negotiators pointed out that if a round were to be held before the Republican Convention, the U.S. positions could not be very attractive to Panama, and that a July round could conceivably add to the President’s troubles in the election campaign. But they wished to know if Panama had any desire for a July round, on the understanding that not much substantive negotiating would probably be possible. The Panamanians said they would consult on this question.

Late in the evening of June 24, Gonzalez-Revilla telephoned me to say that the United States could be “99% certain” that Panama agreed to putting the next round over until after the August Convention. I told him that we wanted to be sure that such a course would be 100% agreeable to Panama—that we did not want Panama to feel that the United States was imposing a postponement, and that the United States would be willing to hold a July round without much substantive progress should Panama so desire.

Gonzalez-Revilla said he understood our position fully, and would let us know once he returned to Panama if there were any change in the Panamanian position.

Several remarks he made in the course of the conversation led me to infer that we should not expect all sweetness and light from Panama during this waiting period.⁵ Their irritation with developments and Santiago plus, now, a postponement of the next round, are likely to put Torrijos in a bad mood.

I suggest that the options paper you are preparing, requested in my memorandum of June 23, should now deal principally with how the Panama problem is to be “managed” between now and early September, when the next round will likely occur.

S. Morey Bell⁶ Minister

1. Source: National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations Lot 81F1, Box 126, POL 33.3–2/Canal Treaty Negotiations/General, Jan–June 1976. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to Bunker, Shlaudeman, Low, Dolvin, Chargé Gonzalez, and Feldman, Mark B..
2. See Document 126.
3. Regarding the joint report, see footnote 2, Document 126. Resolution AG/RES, 219 (VI–0/76) on the status of the negotiations, adopted on June 17, recognized the “significant differences” between the parties but expressed the hope that the negotiations would be completed in 1976.
4. See Document 97. During the September 3 meeting, Clements told Torrijos that political problems in the United States precluded completing the treaty before the end of 1976. “Torrijos replied that one or two years would not be ‘a problem.’” (Telegram 215649 to Panama City, September 10, 1975; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750314–0185)
5. In a June 23 memorandum to Wyrough, Bell remarked that Panama was ready to “(a) declare publicly that an impasse in the negotiations exists and (b) substitute an openly aggressive policy toward the United States for the policy of ‘appeasement’ Boyd has been pursuing.” (National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations, Lot 81F1, Box 126, POL 33.3–2/Canal Treaty Negotiations/General, Jan–June 1976)
6. Bell initialed “SMB” above his typed signature.