126. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- United States-Panama Treaty Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
- Panamanian Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd
- Ambassador Nander Pitty
- Dr. Carlos Lopez Guevara
- Secretary Kissinger
- Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers
- Stephen Low (notetaker)
Boyd: You must feel good about the outcome of the sessions.
Secretary: So far they have been very good. The atmosphere with our sister republics has really changed. At Tlatelolco, the whole thing was an attack on the United States. The atmosphere has improved greatly.2 You have behaved with great wisdom. You could have been inflammatory. I told the Foreign Minister of Venezuela that I thought Torrijos has behaved with restraint and wisdom after much provocation.
Boyd: We understand your electoral process.
Secretary: If we get through the year, we can move rapidly.
Boyd: In one week of shuttle diplomacy, you could get a treaty.
Secretary: There is no sense of facing the issue until after the election. An elected president can do the treaty and sell it to the Congress. You have cooperated very well. We should move carefully. We are getting most of the issues resolved. How about lands and waters?
Boyd: We cannot make systematic progress until we get a clear idea of duration.
Secretary: Is it true that the useful life of the Canal is only forty or fifty years?
Boyd: Thirty to fifty is what the experts say.
Secretary: And after that, what happens?
[Page 335]Lopez: We will have to have new works; make some substantial modifications.
Boyd: I must tell you frankly; General Torrijos was very disappointed with the press reports of the President’s statement about giving us the Canal at the end of its useful life.3 He was really very upset. He said, “What do they want to give us, a piece of junk?”
Secretary: In terms of this campaign, I don’t know what is being said. I made my own mistake about defense. But considering it was Florida,4 even saying that we were engaged in negotiations was going a long way.
Boyd: Also in Phoenix, where you said you would defend the Canal against all of Latin America.5
I do think that at the next meeting we have to make some progress in terms of the duration issue. We have talked about the end of the century. Bunker says thirty years; one term for control and one for defense.
Secretary: On operation, there is no problem.
Boyd: We are willing to look for all kinds of safeguards regarding neutrality and the openness of the Canal. Who is going to be more happy than the present generation of Panamanians in 1995? They will be in a very good position.
Secretary: If we had a clause in which you guaranteed free access in perpetuity, that might do it. Then it would take a lot of courage if you were to violate it. You couldn’t get away with it. I believe it is a problem that we can find a solution for by handling practical problems through practical provisions. You have to remember that for us to continue the formal consideration process during a campaign is some thing. We have no discipline now. People don’t care if they’re fired. [Page 336] If the Democrats win, they will pursue our policy. If Ford wins, you know what we would do. The thing is to get through the next few months without it becoming an issue. Can’t they work on practical issues like access and a few things that safeguard our rights other than duration?
Boyd: Since this is a package of eight points, you have to tell your team and we will work it out. Tell them to present a term of duration relating it to the other points. They can say, we are willing to do this and that and the other things.
Secretary: It’s okay if we don’t do it in July. You understand we can’t do anything without it becoming public. We want to put it up to Congress with an elected president. If we did it now, even a Democratic candidate might be forced to say things he didn’t want to say. I want to keep Panama out of the campaign. Our joint declaration was very helpful.
Boyd: I have another idea. Have General Dolvin come up with a proposal on duration from the military side.
Secretary: No, it wouldn’t work. I know the Pentagon. We have made great progress. Clements has come around to our point of view. Now he is on our side and we have Goldwater. Even in Phoenix I really supported negotiations. All I said was that if we failed we would defend the Canal, but I don’t expect that we will fail. I will talk to the General but don’t expect major progress in July.
Boyd: You have to think about our internal situation. General Torrijos is not having an easy time.
Secretary: It is amazing. He has done a superhuman job. You and he have shown great wisdom under trying conditions.
Boydd: We are afraid we might be thrown to the lions if we don’t do something by August. The economic situation is not very good.
Secretary: The Republican Convention is on August 16. Until then Reagan will attack the President on anything.
Boyd: Then can’t you do something through an executive order in Panama to alleviate the situation? We want to build a container port. Our Minister of Finance wants to see Bill Rogers about this.
Rogers: I would be delighted to see him if he wants to come.
Secretary: We will extend ourselves for that. Is there anything the military can do in Panama?
Rogers: The problem of a container port is that it is not just an Executive Branch decision, and Congress feels very strongly about disposing of property.
Boyd: I will report this discussion to General Torrijos.
Secretary: I have high regard for him and appreciate his restraint. The Vice President knows him personally and has a very high regard. [Page 337] The President has stuck by the negotiations. We all know what the issues are. We can try to work them out with some kind of guaranteed access in perpetuity, do something on lands and waters now. That is one area where we ought to be able to be more flexible.
Lopez: We have talked and talked and talked about this.
Secretary: If we can’t do anything on duration, we can move on lands and waters.
Boyd: After drawing up the draft of an agreement, we will have to do something which will give a forceful optical impression like the disappearance of the Canal Zone.
Secretary: It will be a historical event and I think we ought to make something out of it.
Boyd: I am convinced that President Ford will continue to help. Torrijos and Rockefeller are two persons who have tried to show good will.
Secretary: I have been very impressed by your conduct here. It has been calm and constructive.
End of the conversation.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1374. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Low on June 17; approved in S/S. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Carrera Hotel. Kissinger was in Santiago to attend the OAS General Assembly.↩
- A reference to the February 1974 Tlatelolco Conference; see footnote 3, Document 29. At Santiago, in contrast, the United States and Panama on June 9 presented a joint report to the OAS General Assembly on the status of the Canal negotiations. For the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 5, 1976, pp. 12–13.↩
- During a question-and-answer session May 2 in Fort Wayne, Indiana, Ford stated: “All the experts that I have talked to tell me that the economic usability of the canal is no longer than 50 years. In fact, it is getting less and less valuable as a means of transportation today than it was 5 or 10 years ago. So, what we are trying to do is to make sure that during the economic lifetime of the canal, we have an absolute control over it.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book II, p. 1412)↩
- See footnote 6, Document 99.↩
- In a question-and-answer session after an April 16 speech to the Downtown Rotary Club in Phoenix, Arizona, Kissinger stated: “Now, if necessary, we will defend our interests in the Panama Canal against all of Latin America, if we must. But, in the meantime, we want to explore whether it is possible to achieve arrangements in which our interests in the defense of the canal and in the operation of the canal are fully safeguarded but in which, at the same time, we are avoiding the possibilities that are inherent in that situation, where all of the Latin American countries could unite against the United States on that narrow issue. I repeat: the United States will not surrender its interests in the defense of the canal or its interests in the operation of the canal.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 10, 1976, p. 605)↩