Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

128. Letter From Ambassador at Large Bunker to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements)¹

Washington, July 14, 1976.

Dear Bill:

I have received the Department of Defense proposal of June 18 for a new United States position on neutrality which also concerns the issue of a post-treaty defense role for the United States.² I agree that the continuing interest of the United States in the defense of the canal is a central issue in the negotiations. Any treaty must take account of this interest. But based upon my experience to date I believe that Panama would have considerable difficulty with your proposal as formulated. In any event I shall study it most carefully and will consider how it might be presented. I do not intend to proceed except in full consultation with you.

Another matter of considerable concern not only here but in Panama as well is the pace and timing of negotiations. I share your view that we must be sensitive to our domestic environment and move forward with due caution. At the same time our own interests would not be served if the negotiations were allowed to idle for too long a time. We must take account of the Panamanian dimension, particularly their internal pressures and the expectations which derive in part from your conversation with General Torrijos last fall. As I recall, Torrijos accepted your judgment that it would not be possible to complete the treaty before the end of this year. Clearly, however, Panama has its political needs. In this context, Torrijos has indicated—both privately and publicly—that tangible negotiating progress is necessary by early next year or he will find it difficult to cope with internal pressures.

As you know, important differences remain on many of the major issues in the negotiation. Much work will be required if we are to develop negotiable positions, in compliance with the Joint Statement of Principles, that may permit us to reach an overall conceptual agreement by early next year. In this regard I believe that we should aim for an initialled conceptual accord by January 9, 1977, which will be the 13th anniversary of the 1964 riots. Even after the conceptual accord has been initialled we must still engage in the laborious and time-consuming task of drafting treaty language.

Based on my discussions with Tom Dolvin and other members of the negotiating team, I propose the following scenario:

During September we would hold a low-key or private round to discuss major outstanding issues on an informal, and wholly tentative basis. Our team would discuss the range of alternatives regarding some or all of the issues but no formal positions would be tabled. The following month we would expect Panama to respond to the ideas covered in the preceding month and we would then want to study the Panamanian positions with you. Then, after the election, both negotiating teams would meet in Panama and/or Washington to try and reach formal but ad referendum agreement on the major issues. If necessary, we would return in coordination with Defense to the President for additional guidance so that we might reach overall conceptual agreement on the major treaty issues by no later than January 9, 1977.

This schedule, of course, would be tentative and subject to revision in the light of developments later in the year. Nevertheless, in my judgment it represents an honest effort to achieve the minimum to be accomplished and still sustain credible negotiating momentum.

Assuming you agree with this general scenario, I would appreciate your cooperation in conveying this decision to the appropriate officials in Defense. Meanwhile, I would welcome your views.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ellsworth Bunker³

1. Source: National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiation Files, Lot 81F1, Box 126, POL 33.3–2/Treaty Negotiations, July–Dec 1976. Secret.
2. The proposal, transmitted by Dolvin and Veysey, interpreted NSDM 302 “to require the negotiators to obtain, through clear and unambiguous treaty language, a right for the United States to take unilateral action in the event that any threat to the neutrality or security of the Panama Canal develops after the termination of any new treaty.” (National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 3, Defense [Protection]) NSDM 302 is Document 95.
3. Bunker signed “Ellsworth” above this typed signature.