105. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting of Panama’s Treaty Policy Group

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. Fabian Velarde, Information Coordinator for Chief of Government General Omar Torrijos
  • Mr. John D. Blacken, Counselor for Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Panama

During the evening of November 17 Panama’s highest treaty policy group headed by Vice President Gerardo Gonzalez met to discuss the negotiations. Fabian Velarde, who participated in the session, has told me the following:

1. Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla reported his view that the U.S. negotiators were coming without a substantially altered position from that which had previously been presented.2

2. After much discussion the group agreed to give Minister-Negotiator Tack and Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla broader flexibility than they had had up to the present time. This decision was made in order to obtain movement in the negotiations which would lead to concessions by the U.S.

3. The mood of the meeting, however, was “heavy”. The participants were pessimistic about the willingness of the U.S. to negotiate seriously at this time. Members of the group believe that Ambassador Bunker has considerably more flexibility than he has used. One person commented “the old man (Bunker) is just playing us along”. The group feared that the U.S. is not prepared to make concessions in the negotiations now because it might cause political problems for President Ford. There was some sentiment in favor of suspending the talks.

4. Velarde said that many members of the group believe that American officials are coldly calculating—like computers. They think the US has planned out exactly what it wants to achieve and will control the pace of the negotiations to fit the needs of U.S. domestic policies while at the same time seeking to offer Panama just enough to keep quiet. Velarde said he did not share this view, but many of the others held it.

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5. It is clear, said Velarde, that not much will be accomplished in this negotiating round. He is worried about what to say to the public after it is over. He reminded me that Torrijos was severely criticized by nationalists after his October 11 speech.3 The General had not said anything about the negotiations for a long time. He must say something soon. He needs to show some progress. Velarde added, “Do not forget we have December 12 anniversary (of the defeat of the Filos Hines Base Agreement)4 and the January 9 anniversary of the 1964 riots to face”. I repeated to Velarde what I had said in a previous conversation: The U.S. was prepared to move ahead with the negotiations, seeking agreement in concept on the major issues within the near future. It was my personal opinion that even by working expeditiously, it would be difficult for the two sides to complete a draft treaty before the end of 1976. The U.S. negotiators needed to obtain some movement from Panama if they in turn were expected to offer concessions.

COMMENT: Velarde said he had contributed little to the discussion during the previous evening because of his lack of familiarity with the issues. He prefaced his comments concerning the policy meeting with the words that he did not think he was doing anything unpatriotic by telling me something of the meeting. He felt that communication about mutual problems was extremely important if we were going to succeed in solving the canal issue.

I doubt that the policy group understands the distinctions in categories present in the United States position on lands and waters. In my conversations with persons close to the negotiations, they appear to count as gains only those parcels of land that are to be turned over to Panama without restrictions.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiation Files, Lot 81F1, Box 125, POL 33.3–2/Canal Treaty Negotiations/General, July–Dec 1975. Confidential. Drafted by Blacken.
  2. See Document 99.
  3. In telegram 6268 from Panama City, October 11, the Embassy reported that Torrijos’ speech contained an “appeal for patience and calm with regard to Canal treaty negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750355–0015)
  4. On December 12, 1948, the Panamanian Assembly, under pressure from the public, rejected the Filos Hines Base Agreement which would have allowed the United States to maintain 135 military bases in Panama.