Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

104. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 10, 1975.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position in Canal Treaty Negotiations, Panama’s Position on Korea, and Zionism Issues in United Nations, Panamanian Domestic Politics

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Aquilino Boyd, Panama’s Permanent Representative in the United Nations
• John D. Blacken, Counselor for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Panama

Canal Treaty Negotiations

Ambassador Boyd opened our luncheon conversation with a discussion of United States presidential politics. After commenting that the media in the United States had not been treating President Ford well, Boyd opined the President would be reelected. He then took up the position paper presented by Ambassador Bunker in September.² The current United States position, in Boyd’s view, was directly linked to the coming elections. The paper was one which President Ford could point to and say that he is not giving up anything and that there would be a United States presence in Panama for an indefinite period, i.e., perpetuity. This paper had had a terrible negative impact in Panama, reversing the favorable climate that had existed immediately prior to Ambassador Bunker’s visit. The statements by General Brown and Deputy Secretary Clements and the news reports in the United States of a breakthrough in the United States’ position had caused high hopes in Panama.³ The new U.S. position made it clear to Panamanians that there had been virtually no progress in the U.S. position and even some retrogression.

Boyd said the United States should withdraw its recent position paper in the negotiations because to insist upon maintaining it would cause the negotiations to stall. He feared, however, that President Ford would be very happy to stick with that negotiating position until late in 1976. This, however, would be a tactical mistake. Absence of progress on substantive issues would lead to student violence that Torrijos would be politically unable to control. Torrijos was already having difficulty with the economy. This was affecting the political climate. If Torrijos cannot show progress in the negotiations, he will not have sufficient political justification for taking strong measures against the students. United States’ leaders should understand that any suggestion of an indefinite period for defense means perpetuity as far as the Panamanians are concerned. Such a concept is totally unacceptable.

I stressed that Ambassador Bunker had said that the United States’ position was negotiable. Moreover, I had the impression that Panamanians had not fully understood the United States’ position until it had been clarified in subsequent sessions.

Boyd said he had recently talked with Ambassador Nicolas Gonzalez-Revilla (on October 24 immediately before the Ambassador had departed for the United States). Nico, he said, was gloomy over the prospects for the negotiations. Minister-Negotiator Tack with whom he had since talked was depressed and saw little hope on the basis of positions which the United States had presented.

Immediately after Boyd’s arrival here on Thursday (October 28) he had a long talk with General Torrijos. According to Boyd, when the subject of the negotiations arose, Torrijos had in a matter of fact way thrown up his hands and said, “Well, what can we do? The present position of the United States is extremely difficult for us.” Boyd then said Torrijos accepted the necessity of waiting until after the United States’ elections, but he could do so only if real progress was made soon on basic issues.

Boyd argued that the United States should not seek in its own interest to get defense rights at this time extending beyond the end of the century. To do so would only poison the relationship between the United States and Panama. On the other hand, if the United States would agree to a defense treaty which, along with the treaty for canal operation, would end by the year 2000 a new relationship would be created. During this time the United States could develop the kind of atmosphere in which it could subsequently negotiate an extension of its defense rights in Panama. But to get such a commitment now would be impossible.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the treaty negotiations.]

Torrijos, the Students and Domestic Politics

Boyd commented that he didn’t know whether Torrijos could keep control of the students during the next year. He commented that he was certain that Torrijos could not control them if the United States’ position remained firm that it wanted an indefinite period for the military bases. This brought us around to a discussion of the domestic political situation in Panama. Boyd acknowledged that the economic situation in the country was bad and getting worse. He said, however, that if it became known that a new treaty were in sight, within six months the economy would be booming again. Bankers would immediately loosen up on their lending. Apart from the National Guard and the National Assembly of Community Representatives (NACR), Boyd said there were five major political groups in Panama today: the old politicians, the private sector, the Catholic church hierarchy, labor unions and the students.

The old politicians no longer represented a serious threat. They had shown some opposition immediately after the 1968 overthrow of the Arias regime that was past. They were now sitting and waiting but seemed to lack the courage to take decisive action.

The private sector, despite its discomfort with Torrijos at times had done very well under his government. He had provided stability, despite his increased taxation and despite the rhetoric of his government toward drastic reform had done nothing more drastic than the United States’ New Deal in the 1930’s. The private sector did not feel seriously threatened and therefore would in general support a new treaty.

The Catholic church hierarchy had improved its relations with the government since 1961 when church-state relations had reached their nadir. Archbishop McGrath⁴ was very capable and would be of help to the General if a new treaty were to be placed before the people.

The labor groups also would not pose a serious threat to the government. They were all reasonably docile, had benefitted greatly from GOP policies and were not inclined to challenge Torrijos.

The students, Boyd said, were the major problem facing the government during the next year. The radical groups were increasingly bold in their opposition to both a new treaty and to the government. As long as Torrijos did not have to use force to stop the students from a seemingly justified incursion into the Canal Zone, Torrijos would probably be able to move against them and control them, but the negotiations had to be going on and had to appear to be succeeding. Any prolonged stagnation or stalemate in the negotiations would lead to a very dangerous situation for Torrijos and for the treaty negotiations. It was up to the United States, Boyd said, to try to avoid this problem by understanding the imperatives of the Panamanian position and the fact that Torrijos had compromised greatly in agreeing that there would be military bases here.

COMMENT: Boyd appears to understand our representations and agreements better than do many other GOP officials, but for him—as for others—Panama’s overall strategy on the canal issue overrides other considerations. Only if they become convinced that their position on UN issues will adversely affect the canal treaty negotiations will they alter positions which they perceive will place pressure on or embarrass the U.S.

Two hours before my luncheon conversation with Boyd, the Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Organizations and Treaty Affairs, Pedro Brin Martinez, had told me Panama would vote for the friendly resolution on Korea and against the hostile resolution,⁵ but, despite subsequent representations by Ambassador Jorden to Torrijos, Panama’s delegation acted as Boyd recommended to Torrijos —it absented itself from the vote.

In discussing the canal treaty negotiations, Boyd appeared to place more importance on the duration issue as a problem in the negotiations than on lands and waters. While all Panamanian officials from Torrijos down insist that 25 years is a maximum duration for any treaty, Boyd is the first person who has suggested to me that the U.S. position paper calling for a 50-year treaty for defense be withdrawn.

Boyd’s assessment of the relative support and threat that various domestic groups imply for Torrijos appears fairly accurate.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, USD/P Files, FRC 330–87–0068, 1975–1977 Memcons Re: Treaty Negotiation. Confidential. Drafted by Blacken. The meeting was held in the restaurant in the International Hotel. Sent to Dolvin under a November 17 covering memorandum from Howard which reads: “General Dolvin, I think that you would find the attached Memcon interesting reading. Richard Howard.” Dolvin initialed the covering memorandum.
2. See footnote 2, Document 99.
3. See Document 97.
4. Marcos Gregorio McGrath, Archbishop of Panama.
5. U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 3390A and 3390B were two competing resolutions on the reunification of Korea. The United States supported Resolution 3390A. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1975, pp. 203–204)