Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

106. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Panama Canal

PARTICIPANTS

• Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
• William H. Itoh, Office of Congressional Relations

While waiting for the Secretary this afternoon, I discussed several subjects with Senator Goldwater, including the Panama Canal issue. He remarked that he had spent more time thinking about this single issue than any other foreign policy question in recent years, and that his views on the subject had changed markedly over the past 18 months.² The reappraisal of his position was initially brought about as a result of conversations he had with Americans who lived in Latin America and with a few Latin American nationals. These discussions sensitized him to the importance attached to the Canal issue in Latin America. He slowly became convinced of the necessity for the U.S. to make some concessions to defuse the increasingly hostile attitude in the area.

Senator Goldwater said his own assessment of the strategic importance of the Canal also influenced his position. He then noted that the Canal cannot accommodate the larger ships of our navy and is painfully vulnerable. The scuttling of one ship could close the Canal (this could be accomplished by an act of sabotage and not necessarily by an attack on the Canal). Finally, Goldwater also pointed to the unwillingness of the Congress and the people to support the commitment of our armed forces to military operations in support of the Canal.

Goldwater thought his constituency was far behind his thinking on the subject and noted that the public would have to be made aware of the complexities of the issue to alleviate public hostility. I mentioned Ambassador Bunker’s Los Angeles speech.³ He had not read it but had heard that it was good and considered that sort of thing useful.

I asked if the Senator noticed any changes in perception of the Canal issue on the Hill. He responded that Byrd’s decision to withdraw his amendment to the State Appropriations Bill reflected some change.⁴ He again commented on the problem of information on the issue, stating that “no more than 15% of the Congress” really understands the Canal problem.

Goldwater said he favored a gradual turnover of our economic rights over a 35-year period, and a full withdrawal of our military presence over a 45-year period.

Finally, Goldwater said he hoped that “nothing would happen” in ’76 to make the Canal an issue. He emphasized that it would be absolutely impossible to get any positive action on a new treaty in the Congress before the ’76 elections.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 3, Congress. Limited Official Use.
2. In an October 9 letter to Kissinger, Goldwater wrote: “I am beginning to change my mind from rigid opposition to recognition that something has to be done” and asked if the Kissinger-Tack principles were still the basis of the negotiations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P750159–1770) Kissinger affirmed that the negotiations were still operating on the basic blueprint of the 1974 Kissinger-Tack principles in his November 4 reply. (Ibid.)
3. For the text of Bunker’s December 2 address to the World Affairs Council, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 22, 1975, pp. 881–885.
4. Byrd announced his decision on September 3. (“U.S. Feuding on Panama Treaty Eases,” Washington Post, September 3, 1975, p. A3)