175. National Security Decision Memorandum 931


  • Secretary of State
  • Secretary of Defense
  • Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
  • Director of Central Intelligence


  • Policy Towards Chile

Following the discussion at the meeting of the National Security Council on November 6, 1970,2 the President has decided that the basis for our policy toward Chile will be the concept underlying Option C of the Interagency paper submitted November 3, 1970 by the Department of State3 for the consideration of the National Security Council as outlined in the guidelines set forth below.

The President has decided that (1) the public posture of the United States will be correct but cool, to avoid giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime; but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests.

Specifically, the President has directed that within the context of a publicly cool and correct posture toward Chile:

—vigorous efforts be undertaken to assure that other governments in Latin America understand fully that the U.S. opposes consolidation of a communist state in Chile hostile to the interests of the United States and other hemisphere nations, and to the extent possible encourage them to adopt a similar posture.

—close consultation be established with key governments in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, to coordinate efforts to oppose Chilean moves which may be contrary to our mutual interests; in pursuit of this objective, efforts should be increased to establish [Page 452] and maintain close relations with friendly military leaders in the hemisphere.

—necessary actions be taken to:

a. exclude, to the extent possible, further financing assistance or guarantees for U.S. private investment in Chile, including those related to the Investment Guarantee Program or the operations of the Export-Import Bank;

b. determine the extent to which existing guarantees and financing arrangements can be terminated or reduced;

c. bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit or other financing assistance to Chile (in this connection, efforts should be made to coordinate with and gain maximum support for this policy from other friendly nations, particularly those in Latin America, with the objective of lessening unilateral U.S. exposure); and

d. assure that U.S. private business interests having investments or operations in Chile are made aware of the concern with which the U.S. Government views the Government of Chile and the restrictive nature of the policies which the U.S. Government intends to follow.

—no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the Government of Chile (programs of a humanitarian or private social agency character will be considered on a case by case basis); existing commitments will be fulfilled but ways in which, if the U.S. desires to do so, they could be reduced, delayed or terminated should be examined.

The President has directed that the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness prepare a study which sets forth the implications of possible developments in world copper markets, stockpile disposal actions and other factors as they may affect the marketing of Chilean copper and our relationships with Chile.

The President also has directed that the Senior Review Group meet monthly or more frequently as necessary to consider specific policy issues within the framework of this general posture, to report actions which have been taken, and to present to him further specific policy questions which may require his decision. To facilitate this process the President has directed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group, comprising representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State, to prepare options for specific courses of action and related action plans for the consideration of the Senior Review Group and to coordinate implementation of approved courses of action.

Henry A. Kissinger
  1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of AID, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  2. See Document 173.
  3. The paper is Document 33 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–16, Documents on Chile, 1969–1973.