Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

132. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Oahu, Hawaii, August 31, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Tanaka
• Foreign Minister Ohira
• Ambassador Ushiba
• Deputy Vice Minister Tsurumi
• Asian Bureau Director Yoshida
• Minister Okawara
• Acting American Bureau Director Tachibana
• Hidetoshi Ukawa, Interpreter
• President Nixon
• Secretary of State Rogers
• Under Secretary Johnson
• Dr. Kissinger
• Assistant Secretary Green
• Ambassador Ingersoll
• Country Director Ericson
• NSC Staff Member Holdridge
• Japan Country Officer Dawkins
• Mr. Wickel, Interpreter

Plenary Session of U.S.-Japan Summit Meeting: U.S.-Japan Relations; World Affairs; Trade and Economic Problems; Third Country Problems

The President, the Prime Minister, Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Ushiba, who had been holding a separate discussion in the President’s suite, joined the Rogers/Ohira meeting. Acting on the President’s suggestion, Secretary Rogers reported that he and Foreign Minister Ohira had had a useful and business-like exchange on a number of problems of mutual interest, primarily those dealing with the PRC, Taiwan, and Korea. They had been on the point of beginning a discussion of the economic matters when the Prime Minister and the President joined them.

The Secretary said it had been gratifying to hear the Foreign Minister say that Japan was proceeding with its plans for normalization of relations with the PRC with considerable care and thought to ensure that nothing would impair the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan, and that even though Japan establishes diplomatic relations with Peking, it would hope to maintain good contacts with Taiwan.

Secretary said he had stressed that in our desire to improve our relationship with Peking, the President had emphasized in all possible ways that this would not be done at the expense of friends and allies, that in the process we intend to preserve our diplomatic relations with Taiwan and our security arrangements, and that we have assured the ROK that nothing we do with Peking will be at their expense. The Secretary said that in this context he had also discussed the GRC’s membership in the IFI, the Korean question in the UN this fall, and Cambodian membership in the UN.

Secretary continued that the Foreign Minister had given a full and frank explanation of Japan’s intentions in normalizing relations with Peking. On this point, the Secretary had emphasized that we are not giving any advice to Japan, and that it is very important that Japan understand that the decision is Japan’s to make and that we are in no position to approve or disapprove. He had said that in a multipolar world, each nation must follow its own interests but that through conversations such as these we can cooperate with one another.

Finally, the Secretary said he had had an opportunity to refer to the Foreign Minister’s very thoughtful speech to the Japan-America Society, which emphasizes the fact that we really don’t have any foreign policy differences; we have unanimity and this should emerge even though our two nations are moving in new directions which serve their individual interests.

Foreign Minister Ohira expressed appreciation to the President and the Prime Minister for joining this meeting. He said he had explained to Secretary Rogers that the new Tanaka Government had judged that the time was ripe to begin to move toward normalization of relations with the PRC and that he had given the Secretary background for this decision. He had explained that the basic policy of the Tanaka Government in approaching the question of normalization of relations with the PRC was that the basic relationship of friendship with the United States, symbolized by the mutual Security Treaty, should not be harmed. This was Japan’s determination.

The Foreign Minister continued that of course there were differences in the policy of the two countries toward the PRC. The United States is trying to improve relations with Peking and Japan wants to normalize them. Therefore, our approaches may be different, but even so we must approach this difficult problem without harming our relations with the U.S. The route to Peking that now appears to be open wide may prove to be very narrow in the end, but it seems now worth at least a try. Judging from recent PRC actions, an agreement with Peking may not be impossible. He was happy to confirm that the two governments share the same targets and that as we seek to improve or normalize relations with the Chinese we must keep in constant touch to insure mutual cooperation and understanding of each others views.

Finally, as Secretary Rogers had explained, the President and the Prime Minister had joined them just as he was about to say that under the strong leadership of Prime Minister Tanaka it is Japan’s policy to seek to narrow the imbalance in our bilateral trade to an acceptable level in as short a time as feasible, and that the Tanaka Government was about to arrange its domestic economic policy to bring about an increase in imports to this end.

The President reported that his talk with the Prime Minister had been in the same vein. He thought that the key point emphasized by both the Secretary and the Foreign Minister was that while any great power naturally must develop policies to serve its own interests, the interests of Japan and the United States are best served by policies which do not place us in conflict, economically or politically. In his talks in Peking earlier this year and in Moscow, he had always kept foremost in his mind the necessity to enter into no understanding which would in any way be to the detriment of the U.S.-Japan relationship. This does not mean that the policies of two major nations such as ours will always be identical; there may be differences in tactics and timing, whether economic or political. We must avoid embarking on any collision courses and we can do so through meetings like this, which he and the Prime Minister had agreed must take place as often as possible, at high levels and at other levels as well.

Putting it directly, the President continued, we have sought better relations with the PRC because we think it in the interest of the United States, the Pacific countries, and the world to do so, and the same is true regarding the Soviet Union. But, in pursuing these goals, the President emphasized, we do not wish to let anything harm the U.S.-Japan relationship. This is the cornerstone of our U.S.-Japan policy.

He had also discussed with the Prime Minister Japan’s role, not only in the Pacific but also in the world.

Putting the relationship with Japan in the context of overall U.S. policy, the President said that in his view our policy has sometimes suffered in the past from being either too much Europe first or too much Pacific first. Our interests are best served by policies which show equal emphasis on Europe and the Pacific—in other words a total policy rather than one which tilts too far in one direction. In some quarters in the United States there is a tendency to consider Japan exclusively as an Asian power; however, as is the case with the United States, because of its enormous economic strength Japan is inevitably a world power.

The President then described the tremendous change in Japan’s world position that had taken place since his first visit in 1953. Then, what the U.S., UK and Europe did was all that mattered in terms of promoting economic stability in the world. But now Japan has a gross national product greater than any European country and Japan, from an economic standpoint, does not look inside but outside to Latin America, Africa and Europe. In this situation it is essential for any free world economic policy to succeed that Japan play an equal role with the U.S. and the new EEC. In another context, that is why we support Japan’s desire to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council and why, when we schedule meetings with other major Allied nations, we consider it vitally important to have the same intimate consultations with Japan.

We in the United States recognize that the economic futures of our two countries are tied together, not only in the Pacific but in the world.

Prime Minister Tanaka said he had extracted ten points from his notes on his meeting with the President. These were:

1. The close U.S.-Japan relationship of friendship must be strengthened and deepened.

2. Japan deeply appreciates the fact that over the past quarter century, cooperation from the United States had enabled the Japanese economy to grow and become strong.

3. For the maintenance of world peace and the expansion of the world economy, it is essential that the U.S. economy continue to expand and that the value of the dollar be stabilized. This is in Japan’s interest and Japan wishes to cooperate in promoting it.

4. In regard to our bilateral trade imbalance, Japan will do its best to attain a better balance because over the long term good relations cannot be maintained if trade were to remain so out of balance.

5. For the development of normal trade between the U.S. and Japan, it is imperative that the two nations keep in constant touch so that their mutual efforts can profit on the basis of better understanding.

6. Japan fully appreciates the fact that the U.S. has expended great effort to maintain peace in the world. In the economic area, Japan wishes to assist the U.S. to maintain world peace and on a basis of cooperation with the U.S. Japan would like to participate in an effort with the enlarged EEC so as to seek a better world development on an enlarged basis.

7. Japan wishes to expand its economic aid to Southeast Asia and the ROK, and in the post Vietnam period Japan would wish to contribute a sizeable effort to promote continuing economic recovery and welfare programs in Indochina.

8. On Japan’s relations with the PRC, the Prime Minister endorses what the Foreign Minister had said.

9. Even if the world changes, U.S.-Japan relations will not change.

10. It is imperative for U.S. and Japan to be able to communicate with each other. The Prime Minister therefore appreciates the President’s effort in bringing about this meeting and would wish to call on him in Washington after his re-election in November to congratulate him. He looks forward to hearing the President’s views at that time.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL JAPAN-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Ericson, concurred in by Green, and approved in S and J on September 25. The memorandum is labeled Part III of V. The meeting took place in the Kuilima Hotel. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon, Tanaka, Kissinger, and a few other participants had concluded their meeting at the Kuilima’s Presidential Suite at 3:15 p.m. (see Document 131) and then proceeded to the Alii Suite, where they met with the members of the U.S. and Japanese official delegations from 3:15–3:58 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)