Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

113. Memorandum for the President’s File¹

San Clemente, California, January 7, 1972, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Eisaku Sato, Japanese Prime Minister, on Friday, January 7, 1972 at 11:00 a.m. at San Clemente

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
• Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda
• Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba
• Ambassador Genichi Akatani (Interpreter)

• The President
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Mr. William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
• James J. Wickel, American Embassy Tokyo (Interpreter)

Okinawa Reversion

Minister Fukuda reported that he and Secretary Rogers had worked out all the joint statement language about Okinawan reversion, except for the date which they left blank, to be filled in by the President and the Prime Minister. Secretary Rogers had proposed May 31, but had also left room for further consideration.

The President asked whether some indication should be given of the importance the Prime Minister attached to moving reversion up earlier than July 1.

The Prime Minister emphatically declared that an earlier date would be a great political plus. The GOJ had always hoped for reversion on April 1, even though this is April Fools’ Day.

The President responded wryly that we didn’t want to fool our military.

The Prime Minister explained that June 23 marked the end of combat on Okinawa, and there were strong desires in both Japan and Okinawa to celebrate that anniversary under Japanese administration.

The President felt that May 31 would be a good date.

The Prime Minister replied that June 1 would be better, to avoid the technical problems (such as budget) which would arise if Japan were to assume control for only the one last day of May.

The President said that it is his nature to be generous, and having checked closely with our security officials to see if it would be possible to offer a better date, he proposed May 15, if that would help.

The President and the Prime Minister shook hands on this deal.

The Foreign Minister then reported on his earlier discussions with Secretary Rogers about the possibility of returning a golf course and a beach to Japan, after reversion.

The Secretary replied that the golf course would not be difficult, but the beach used by enlisted men could present a problem. Okinawan reversion itself represented a big step, and we had to make certain to maintain our military establishment in the interest of the security of both Japan and the United States. Any attempt now to renegotiate facilities would pose a political problem, and he advised the Foreign Minister to be as forthcoming as he could about his reasons for requesting such additional adjustment.

Minister Fukuda explained that he did not intend to name a specific golf course, or beach, or other facility, nor did he wish to announce any agreement by the United States to discuss the return of some facilities after reversion, but would keep it in his heart. Such an agreement, he reasoned, would strengthen the Prime Minister in Diet deliberations.

The President asked whether this meant that the Prime Minister would be better able to answer Diet questions about base realignment and consolidation.

Minister Fukuda answered affirmatively.

The President thereupon committed the United States to an understanding that we would return a golf course after reversion.

Minister Fukuda added that anything along these lines be done in accordance with the 1969 Joint Communiqué, that is, that security capabilities not be impaired, the importance of which he stressed.²

Secretary Rogers pointed out that Japan might consider some alternative for the beach used by enlisted men and again cautioned against renegotiating the agreement because of the commitments given in the Senate.

Minister Fukuda promised to bear this in mind, and did not believe, in any case, that the return of facilities even after reversion would be that easy to accomplish.

The Prime Minister requested Minister Fukuda to give him a detailed report of his discussions with the Secretary later.

Minister Fukuda said that he was well aware that any announcement about the post-reversion return of a golf course and beach would accelerate the thrust for reversion; therefore he intended to keep this in his heart.

The Prime Minister (reminding Minister Fukuda of his political A–B–C’s) said that an early announcement would gain face for the opposition.

Minister Fukuda replied that this would not be disclosed until later.

The President said that the Prime Minister, if questioned, could respond that we had discussed this, and that representatives of the USG had indicated a willingness to be reasonable in working out something in the interest of both countries without impairing security capabilities.

The Prime Minister again expressed his appreciation for the May 15 date. The earlier the better, but he asked Minister Fukuda whether it would be necessary to explain why Japan would take over the administrative rights for half a month.

Minister Fukuda proposed to explain this on the grounds that both sides agreed that they could complete preparations by this date.

The President supported this reason, saying that we moved the date up to the earliest one that would permit completion of the preparations.

The Prime Minister asked whether Minister Fukuda and Secretary Rogers had discussed the reassurances to be given on R-day on the removal of all CBR weapons.

Secretary Rogers replied that he had agreed to transmit a letter to Minister Fukuda May 15 confirming the absence of all CBR weapons, along the lines of the testimony before the Senate.

Minister Fukuda suggested that he also might wish to confirm continued cooperation by the United States with Japan’s nuclear policy.

The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for this assurance, and noted that he and the President had discussed CB weapons earlier.

Secretary Rogers said that there are no CB weapons present.

The Prime Minister explained that suspicion in Japan had deepened when certain code markings at ammunition depots were repainted by the U.S. forces after the issue was raised in the Diet.

Minister Fukuda commented that American servicemen gave considerable help to the opposition parties in support of allegations of the presence of nuclear and CB weapons.

The Prime Minister said that anti-war groups seemed to be rather successful in this area.

Minister Fukuda turned to Naha airport and the US Navy P–3s stationed there. The United States, he said, had promised to return Naha airport to exclusive Japanese control by R-day (for civil aviation and Air Self Defense Force use) and to transfer all the P–3 aircraft elsewhere. It seemed that these P–3s might be transferred to Iwakuni MCAS (located in Yamaguchi Precture, the Prime Minister’s home district) or Misawa AB, which would create the political problems he had reviewed for Secretary Rogers. He reported that he had made a request of the Secretary that these P–3 aircraft be transferred to another base in Okinawa, not to mainland Japan.

Secretary Rogers replied that we must consider this carefully, because while the aircraft themselves could be transferred it is unlikely that the service facilities at Naha AB which they require could be rebuilt elsewhere so quickly.

Along these lines, Secretary Rogers also noted the discussions of Japan’s purchase of the Northrup F–5 trainer (which would mean much to California) and the Grumman ASW aircraft.

Minister Fukuda explained that Japan has already invested heavily in its own T–2 program, and having already produced two of these aircraft it would be difficult to stop now. The ASW aircraft, he said, is a separate matter, which he intended to restudy.

Secretary Rogers emphasized that the F–5 had much to recommend it: low cost, availability now to begin training pilots, and the fact that its purchase would help offset some of our own defense expenditures in Japan.

Minister Fukuda replied that the Ministry of Finance believed that the less purchased the better, but it is also concerned about costs and prefers the least expensive course. On the other hand, the Defense Agency, which has already built two T–2 aircraft, favors its own program, even though more costly, as a means of developing Japan’s own independent aircraft industry. However, he agreed to give more thought to this problem.

The Secretary suggested that the GOJ purchase some F–5’s as a transitional measure, since production of its own T–2 would probably not meet the time frame for training F–4 pilots.

The Prime Minister suggested a deal: he would consider the F–5 purchase if the United States would consider not moving the P–3’s to Iwakuni MCAS.

Minister Fukuda noted the existing arrangements for coproduction of F–4’s in Japan, and the possibility of training F–4 pilots in the United States. He felt that it would be better to leave discussions of these aircraft to the business firms themselves. (Note: This signal is consistent with others, which indicate that the GOJ might procure the F–5 if Northrup works out a joint venture with a Japanese firm.) Otherwise he did not believe this is a subject for the political leaders to take up. He added that he would review this again, in terms of the budget.

The President asked whether the joint press statement had been agreed on.³

Minister Fukuda reported that it had been, and thereupon proceeded to read all of paragraph 4 and the economic paragraph to the Prime Minister (in Japanese).

Minister Fukuda then explained that the substance and the manner of the R-day assurances of a nuclear-free Okinawa would not be made public.

The Prime Minister asked whether the United States could consider an open-visit policy for responsible Self Defense Force officers to help eliminate any possible allegations about nuclear weapons remaining in bases in Okinawa. Of course, he said, this would constitute something other than a formal “inspection” process.

Minister Fukuda explained that the opposition recently charged in the Diet that it had photographs backed by statements by American servicemen to prove the presence of nuclear weapons at Iwakuni MCAS. At that time, a senior Self Defense Force officer, escorted by his American host, toured the facility and was thus enabled to report that he found no evidence whatsoever of nuclear weapons in the facilities in question. On this basis the Prime Minister was able to respond with confidence to these charges in the Diet. This kind of messy political problem arose from time to time, and it would be most helpful in refuting future charges if after reversion Self Defense Force officers could say they have visited the bases and found no nuclear weapons.

Secretary Rogers said the Americans in question are desertees. In principle, we could not accept inspection, but in terms of seeking a modus vivendi he said that he would consult the DOD.

The Prime Minister said that recently some stolen shipping invoices for poison gas, thinned down for training purposes, had been presented in the Diet as proof of the presence of CB weapons in Japan. He had great difficulty in answering these allegations, which were followed immediately by other charges that the United States forces kept sheep at one base as a safety measure, since everyone knew sheep were the first to die of leaking gas, and thus served as a warning device. This turned out to have no basis in fact whatsoever, but it indicated the kind of trouble he has been having.

The President suggested that this party join the other Cabinet Ministers in a nearby room for a brief review of their discussions.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning January 1, 1972. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wickel. The meeting took place at the Western White House. Holdridge sent this memorandum to Kissinger under a January 21 memorandum. Kissinger approved the memorandum of conversation without further distribution except for Eyes Only distribution to Rogers.
2. The text of the 1969 Joint Communiqué is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 953–957.
3. The text of the joint press statement is in Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1972, pp. 118–119.